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INTRODUCTION
The most nagging, immediate question about the rush to deregu-
late the electricity industry is: Who should pay for the resulting
stranded costs?' This Article explores this question using the
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TRANSMISSION PRICING AND STRANDED
COSTS IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 98 (1995) (calling stranded costs "at least in the short
run, the most critical regulatory issue" in the industry). Perhaps the most important long-term
questions are whether deregulated markets will function competitively, whether increased con-
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stranded-cost treatment in the first two major restructurings: federal
deregulation of wholesale electricity and California's retail restruc-
turing. Stranded costs are the expenses of generating plants and
other investments like power-supply contracts, whose output custom-
ers no longer want to buy. Customers prefer the cheaper power of
new suppliers. Stranded costs result from investments that have
turned out to be misguided in the market's impersonal judgment.2
In electricity and other deregulated industries, like natural gas,
stranded costs arise from investments that utilities made years ago
while assuming that they could force their customers to buy the re-
sulting power at any price.
Deregulation is the great late-century gamble in American eco-
nomic organization. In two decades, we have dismantled many of the
New Deal institutions created to cure market failure and abuse. The
motivation for removing government controls is the belief that firms
will save billions of dollars if they are forced to compete, and that
regulation has proven too costly and inefficient.3 The stakes probably
centration will have anti-competitive effects, and whether government regulators have the will
and resources to address these questions.
2. See Sheila S. Hollis & Mary Ann Ralls, Stranded Costs: An Assessment of the Next
Great Energy Battle, Address at IBC's 3d Annual Industry Forum (Washington, D.C., June 23-
25, 1997) (on file with author).
3. FERC has estimated the annual savings from interstate (wholesale) electricity deregula-
tion at $3.8 to $5.4 billion. See Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through
Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of
Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,541 (1996)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 and 385). California, the United States' largest consumer of elec-
tricity, has mandated savings of roughly $5 billion over the multi-year phase-in of state deregu-
lation. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. A recent NRRI report cited a projection that
national savings might run between $80 and $100 billion a year. See KENNETH ROSE, AN
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE ON ELECTRIC UTILITY TRANSITION COSTS 2, 28-29 (1996).
Although NRRI does not expressly endorse this number, which appears in a report prepared
for the Enron Capital and Trade Resources group, a major entrant in electricity markets, it
makes the fair point that "( e ] ven if actual savings turn out to be one-half or one-quarter of this,
it is still quite respectable." Id. at 2 & n.3.
The projections of savings are often pronounced with a prophet's certainty, based more of-
ten on faith than proof. As FERC Chairwoman Moler announced the blessings of the electric-
ity designation orders, Nos. 888 and 889:
Today's action by the Commission will benefit the industry and consumers to the tune
of billions of dollars every year. They will give us an electric industry ready to enter
the 21st century. These rules will accelerate competition and bring lower prices and
more choices to energy customers.
The future is here-and the future is competition. It is a global trend, and in North
America, we are at the forefront in embracing it. There is no turning back.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, NEWS RELEASE: COMMISSION ORDERS SWEEPING
CHANGES FOR ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY (Apr. 24, 1996). A study conducted for the year 1976
estimated the total public welfare loss of economic overregulation at $66 billion. See MURRAY
WEIDENBAUM & ROBERT DEFINA, THE COST OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIvITy 2
(1978).
Economists have begun tallying the effects of deregulation. One effort listed two estimates
of "predicted" savings in natural gas, $3.4 billion or $1.5 billion a year. It recited the
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"[a]ssessed" benefits as "[s]ubstantial gains to consumers." Clifford Winston,EconomicDeregula-
tion: Days of Reckoning for Microeconomists, XXXIJ. ECON. LITERATURE 1263, 1274 (1993). An-
other study that looked at the deregulation of five industries, including natural gas, concluded
that "deregulation has generally been a successful story." KENNETH COSTELLO & ROBERT
GRANIERE, THE DEREGULATION EXPERIENCE: LESSONS FOR THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 2
(1997). Firms have "reduced their costs, lowered their prices, introduced new services and re-
configured old services to better accommodate consumer preferences, and deployed new
technologies and practices." Id. Costello and Graniere did find that these improvements have
had a skewed distribution. In natural gas, electric utilities have seen the biggest price drop,
followed by industrial customers, while commercial rates barely fell and residential rates actu-
ally rose by almost five percent in the period 1984-1994. See id. at 14-15.
Robert Crandall and Jerry Ellig, two researchers at the Center for Market Processes, have
made similar findings. See ROBERT CRANDALL & JERRY ELLIG, ECONOMIC DEREGULATION AND
CUSTOMER CHOICE: LESSONS FOR THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 3-5 (1997) (concluding that deregu-
lation lowers prices and provides benefit to consumers). Crandall and Ellig also studied five
deregulated industries, including natural gas, and found a dramatic price drop in each indus-
try, with prices falling "4-15% in the first two years and by at least 25%, sometimes 50%, over
ten years." See id. at 3. They attributed the greater benefit of industrial customers to their abil-
ityto buy "interruptible" rather than "firm" gas service. See id. at 11. The authors reported that
gas revenues were $38 billion less in 1995 than in 1984, even though consumption rose by 20%,
as another sign of increased efficiency. See id. at 17. In addition, they cited competition's inno-
vative benefits, such as the growth of market hubs and the proliferation of risk management
devices. See id. at 15. Another benefit of increased competition Crandall and Ellig found is
that transportation margins have been falling with deregulation, while distribution margins (in
largely unaffected state jurisdictions) have not fallen, although they have fluctuated somewhat
over the intervening years. See id. at 11-12. Finally, prices have begun to move together, a sign
that the formerly balkanized gas markets have become joined in a nationwide market for buy-
ers and sellers. See id. at 12. The authors concluded that "[t]he record show[ed] that deregula-
tion has generally led to lower prices, expanded output, and improved choices of service qual-
ity." Id. at 6; cf. ADAM THIERER, ENERGIZING AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR DEREGULATING THE
ELECTRICITYMARKET 5 (1997) (claiming equalization of "unjustifiable regional differences" as
one benefit of deregulation).
Speculativeness surrounds every savings projection because models must include assump-
tions not only about how well competition will work, but also about how regulated companies
would have acted had market structures stayed the same. See COSTELLO & GRANIERE, supra, at 4
(noting that measurement of the effect of such regulatory measures as price and entry controls,
and, by extension, the effect of deregulation, is a "difficult task," with"ex post analysis" requiring
comparison "between actual performance and predicted performance under the previous
market structure and regulatory regime"); Winston, supra, at 1270-71 (arguing that regulation
and deregulation have "never occurred simultaneously at the national level," so before after
comparisons of deregulation must fail, and good tests require a "counterfactual approach" that
includes "control not only for external economic factors, but for all characteristics of the indus-
try's environment, including prices and service quality, that have changed because of deregula-
tion") (citation omitted)). A number of possible sources of lower costs, including the newer
technologies of combined-cycle natural gas plants, lower fuel costs, and the likelihood of fewer
social programs, probably would lower costs for competitive or regulated firms. Deregulation
will only generate net savings if the generating market is indeed competitive, and if competition
does indeed provide the incentive for efficient risk-taking and planning at any given level of
technology and for whatever social policies remain imposed on electric companies.
The counterfactual problem is acknowledged by all serious students of regulation and de-
regulation. See Robert Hahn & John Hird, The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and Syn-
thesis, 8 YALEJ. REG. 233, 237 (1990) ("Perhaps the most difficult task in estimating the impact
of a regulatory change is specifying what would have happened in the absence of that
change."). Hahn and Hird identify two counterfactual biases in measurements of deregulation.
One is overstating benefits by assuming the change will result in an efficient competitive struc-
ture. The other is underestimating benefits by ignoring the changes in technology that de-
regulation may produce. See id. at 237-38.
For those who believe strongly in the efficiency of the marketplace, there is little doubt that
deregulation will bring a tremendous boost in economic activity and efficiency. There is an
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are nowhere greater than in the electricity industry, where deregula-
tion has been described aptly as "the most important economic initia-
tive [to be] taken up by Congress for the rest of the decade."' Elec-
tricity deregulation will be even more important at the state level.
The changes may finally end what some call the country's "last regu-
lated monopoly.,
5
In one industry, the savings and loan industry, the result of deregu-
lation has been quick and disastrous.6 Initial reports concerning
natural gas, the first energy deregulation, have been much more bull-
ish, but it takes time for the effects of such deep structural change to
be felt.8 Firms and customers need time to adjust their behavior, and
unmistakable aura of self-congratulation in many summations of the deregulation experience.
See, e.g., THIERER, supra, at I (calling regulation "an experiment in America's electricity market
that can be judged only as a failure"). As a society, we have cast our fate with these beliefs.
4. THIERER, supra note 3, at 9. Retail electric sales exceed three percent of U.S. GDP, and
the industry's annual revenues are far larger than those of the other deregulated industries. See
Matthew White, Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatoyy Reforms in Electricity Markets, in
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMICACrVITY (MICROECONOMIcS) 201-02 (1996).
5. RONALD BINZ ET AL., NAVIGATING A COURSE TO COMPETrTION: A CONSUMER PER-
SPECTIVE ON ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING 1 (1997) (hereinafter CPI REPORT].
6. Although estimates of total savings and loan losses vary as much as estimates of total
savings from electricity deregulation, no one has suggested that the losses will not be immense.
As of 1990, the losses may have run well over $300 billion. See Resolving the Savings and Loan
Crisis: Billions More and Additional Reforms Needed, Before the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., at 1 (1990) (statement of Charles Bowsher, Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States).
7. Consider, for instance, the contented remarks of Richard Pierce, one of the major in-
tellectual proponents of early and thorough natural gas deregulation:
The FERC can take pride in an extraordinary accomplishment. In most respects, the
beneficial effects of the transition have exceeded even initial optimistic expectations.
The effects of the transition have included significant rationalization of the gas trans-
portation and storage functions, in addition to the expected beneficial effects on the
gas sales market.... Moreover, the participants in the post-transition market, includ-
ing many who originally opposed the transition, have discovered that the post-
transition market can produce good results for service providers as well as consumers.
Richard Pierce, The State of the Transition to Competitive Markets in Natural Gas and Electricity, 15
ENERGY LJ. 323, 323-24 (1994) (citations omitted).
8. One reason for this lag is that tendencies toward concentration may be concealed for a
time. For instance, firms may take time to raise capital and devise a plan for market domina-
tion. It is only years after the consent decree split up AT&T that we are seeing mergers among
the Baby Bells. For example, it took until 1996 before Bell Atlantic announced its merger with
NYNEX, and Pacific Telesis merged with Southwestern Bell. SeeJonathon Marshall, Few May
Benefitfrom Megamergers of Utilities, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 11, 1996, at B3. One of the ripple effects
of this concentration among formerly regulated companies may be increased combination
among their unregulated competitors. Little more than six months after the two former re-
gional Bell mergers were announced, British Telecom decided to acquire MCI, see id., but its
merger has fallen apart and been superseded by one with Worldcom as MCI's suitor. It will be
hard to sort out the effects of deregulation until the new equilibrium of the power industry be-
comes clear.
Other commentators stress, however, that the transition into competition is also gradual.
They maintain that it takes time for new firms to enter the market, new products to emerge,
and other benefits of competition to mature. Strong believers in the market assume that inno-
vation and benefits will only multiply with time. See COSTELLO & GRANIERE, supra note 3, at 65
(predicting that "current estimates of future benefits from less regulation of the electric power
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potential entrants need time to decide whether to take advantage of
the market. A critical factor in the success or failure of electricity re-
structuring will be who pays the several-hundred-billion-dollar bill for
stranded costs.
The decision to deregulate electricity rests on the belief that regu-
lated electric companies were not acting efficiently and, as a result,
the costs of regulation were overwhelming its benefits. Deregulation
embodies a judgment that many large utilities have managed their
affairs imprudently. This imprudence is the reason that the lash of
competition needs to be applied to these companies, and the ineffi-
ciencies created by today's utilities give reason to expect that deregu-
lation will produce large public welfare gains. It is the depth of this
collective imprudence that makes deregulation so urgent.
Stranded costs present a fundamental inconsistency in the first two
major electricity deregulations. Both the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") and the California Public Utilities Commis-
sion ("CPUC") pointed to inefficiencies and discrimination by regu-
lated utilities when they explained why they had to import competi-
tion into the industry. Yet when they decided who should pay for
stranded costs-the costs caused by these inefficiencies-both agen-
cies acted as if utilities had no blame for their own high costs. Both
issued rules that will encourage full recovery of stranded costs. This
failure to match the mechanics of stranded costs with deregulation's
underlying rationale and purpose is the puzzle of early electricity de-
regulation.
One reason that stranded costs are so important is that they are a
barometer of how truly policymakers believe in competition. The
fate of these costs should decide whether the companies whose be-
havior necessitated deregulation will pay the price for their mistakes.
Conversely, a deregulation that shifts those costs to customers will de-
lay the switch to new generators. Cost recovery will bolster the mar-
ket position of companies whose failures and shortcomings required
deregulation.
Stranded costs' direct impact on public welfare should not be for-
gotten. Many in the industry claim that interstate and intrastate
industry are probably too low" because of the difficulty involved in understanding how a
.competitive environment" will operate, which produces an underestimation of technological
changes; markets will bring a drop in rent-seeking behavior and a rise in new services);
CRANDALL & ELLIG, supra note 3, at 4 (arguing that corporate cultures change more slowly than
pace of deregulation, so that competitive "changes and adjustments" (and continuing innova-
tions) will continue even ten years after rule changes); see also Winston, supra note 3, at 1271
(stating that deregulation's "full effects remain to be seen" in context, suggesting that benefits
will grow).
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stranded costs will total two-hundred to three-hundred-billion dol-
lars.9 The actual loss will vary with the timing and scope of state de-
regulations that remain in their infancy, but this penalty must fall
somewhere, and it is an awful burden to land in the wrong place.
Because FERC's and California's stranded cost measures occurred
in the earliest and most prominent electricity deregulations, 0 it is all
the more regrettable that both agencies treated the fate of electric-
ity's stranded costs as if it was just a question of the prudence (or, as
it is commonly termed in the electricity industry, "prudency") of in-
dividual assets. The relegation of stranded costs to largely decided
issues of single-asset prudence ignores the fact that deregulation
must be a judgment that companies facing large stranded costs have
made a series of poor decisions."
This Article has six main sections. After a general discussion of the
electricity industry in Part I, Part II discusses the fate stranded costs
would have suffered in a market system. Electric companies based
their investments on mistaken estimates of both supply and demand.
If they faced competition, these companies would have to pay for
these mistakes. Consumers would shift to other suppliers; utilities
would be saddled with a high proportion of the costs of outmoded
assets.
Part III looks at a second benchmark: the rules that FERC created
to deal with its first real stranded cost problem, that posed by natural
gas deregulation. Pipelines made mistakes very similar to those of
9. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
10. This Article is not a survey of state efforts. In general, there is some diversity in state
approaches, but most states have yet to implement their retail restructuring plans. See ENERGY
INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (EIA), THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER
INDUsTRY: AN UPDATE 67 (1996) [hereinafter EIA UPDATE] (reporting that 24 of 45
"jurisdictions" engaged in restructuring have formal proceedings "in progress," 18 are conduct-
ing information studies, and 3 had made "final" decisions as of late 1996). For details on early
state efforts at restructuring electric industries, see CPI REPORT, supra note 5, at 65-69; As Con-
gress Sets Sights on Electric Restructuring States Jump Ahead, INSIDE F.E.R.C.,Jan. 13, 1997, at 1, 11-
15 (detailing state experience with electric restructuring); Hollis & Rails, supra note 2, at 9-15.
Others have concluded that "most state commissions are moving along restructuring lines simi-
lar to the FERC in allocating stranded cost in the main part to the departing customer, [but]
some mavericks like California, Pennsylvania and New Hampshire, are proceeding along other
paths." Hollis & Rails, supra note 2, at 15. Not surprisingly, there is a correlation between
states with the highest average costs and having initiated serious reform efforts. See CPI RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 52, 70, 75-76.
11. It would be possible to advocate deregulation even if one believed that utilities have
acted very efficiently in the last few decades. For instance, one might take this approach if one
believed that a competitive market could better accommodate the technological shift to
smaller-scale generating plants. Regulation might have been suited to years when economies
of scale were reaped in large plants, but not to times when savings lie mainly in more complex
and risky innovation. It is clear, however, that the justification for deregulation has been
rooted in the inefficiencies and public welfare losses believed to exist in the regulated market,
and notjust from a desire to avoid problems in the future. See infra Part V.A. 1.
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electric companies. 2  Pipelines misread their supply market and
committed to buy uneconomic gas supplies, and they discriminated
against cheaper suppliers who wanted to rent pipeline space. In re-
sponse, FERC made pipelines give up two very valuable rights, their
minimum bill contracts and their monopoly over space on their
mainlines, without any direct compensation. Then the Commission
12. It is worth clarifying what it means to call pipelines' gas purchases "mistakes" or
"errors." The discussion treats pipeline take-or-pay strategies as "mistakes" or "errors" because
they ended up so far off the market. This Article uses the same standard for electricity invest-
ment decisions. This is the language of the market. What those words mean in a marketplace
is different from what many think they should mean in a regulatory world. The difference
speaks volumes about the two kinds of economic organization.
In a market, a mistake is a decision that does not pay out, even if the reasons for disaster
were utterly unforeseen at the time of decision. For instance, Ford turned down the minivan
because Henry Ford II didn't want to risk the capital, but the minivan turned into one of Lee
Iacocca's biggest successes when he moved to Chrysler. See DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE
RECKONING 561-66 (1986). All of the Big Three automobile companies ignored the small-car
threat in the late Fifties and early Sixties. These companies were quite willing to allow foreign
manufacturers to absorb what they viewed as a peripheral market and ignored the change in
market tastes. For a discussion of the Big Three's mistakes, see generally HALBERSTAM, supra
(providing lengthier case study that contrasts Ford and Nissan to explore what happened to
once-premier American automotive industry); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRY STRUCTURE, STRATEGY,
AND PUBLIC POLICY ch. 8 (1996).
IBM made decisions about its personal computers that everyone today views as giving away
the store, but that at the time appeared quite smart for a company whose good fortune had
been tied so thoroughly to a leased mainframe business. In so doing, IBM ceded control of the
computer chip and software markets for the personal computer to Intel and Microsoft. See gen-
erally PAUL CARROLL, BIG BLUES: THE UNMAKING OF IBM (1993) (describing IBM's almost
comical sequence of bad strategic decisions).
Another example comes from the early years of car and truck manufacturing. Railroads
hauled materials to build roads without realizing that cars, trucks, and buses would displace this
mode of transportation. See generally STEPHEN B. GODDARD, GETTINGTHERE (1994) (describing
shortsightedness of railroad industry in face of growth of motor vehicle industry). In his cri-
tique of the country's failure to develop an integrated, multi-modal transportation system,
Goddard notes the irony that trucks were viewed as adjuncts of the railroad, rather than com-
petitors, in the first decades of trucking. See id. at 60, 90.
In each of these cases, strategies that had been sound for years were subverted by unex-
pected market changes. Most of these changes were errors in forecasting both supply and de-
mand. In each case, established companies suffered large losses because the market acted
flexibly and efficiently to reward the new, small companies that guessed right (even though
these companies initially may have had no more idea than the others that they were right, or
why they were correct), and to punish beliefs that proved erroneous. The changes are easy to
see only in retrospect. If one thinks that predicting product demand is easy, consider how to
predict whether personal computers or network computers are the path of the future; or
whether there is a market in the United States for electric cars or high-speed trains. Given the
importance of the time value of money, add to those issues the problem of predicting when
those markets will be mature enough to offer profits to successful producers.
The very human desire to argue over blame for bad investments is irrelevant in a true market
system. An emphasis on blame and responsibility is a vestige of a regulatory regime, not a mar-
ket system. The mistake remains, whatever its origins, and such mistakes are a risk to the firm
in competitive structures. This is why investments earn profits-profit is a return for risk. And
the risk of guessing wrong on the future of the market is the quintessential long-term business
risk. Later sections of this Article will show that, although regulation did protect firms against
short-term competition, it did not remove the long-term risk that an agency would change the
regulatory structure and inject competition if the average firm strayed too far from certain
competitive benchmarks.
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made pipelines absorb a substantial part of their unrecoverable gas
costs. This loss allocation acknowledged that regulated companies
are private companies to which regulation left the entrepreneurial
function, and accordingly deserve the lion's share of responsibility
for management errors.
This natural gas comparison helps reveal the one-sided nature of
FERC's electricity remedies. If FERC structured electricity's cost re-
covery in the same way that it handled stranded gas costs, electric
utilities would pay more, and consumers of all types would pay less,
for unused, useless, and uncompetitive assets. In the natural gas sce-
nario, FERC made pipelines pay for many of their mistakes and
called this policy "equitable sharing." In electricity, in contrast,
FERC and the CPUC have not held electric companies responsible
for their high costs. The two agencies have paid more heed to pro-
ducer welfare-at best a residual factor in their statutory charge-
than consumer welfare.
With this background, Part IV surveys FERC's and California's
rules, and Part V looks at FERC's and California's justifications for
their utility-friendly approach to stranded costs. FERC suggested
three justifications for full pass-through of stranded electricity costs:
the regulatory bargain, financial integrity, and cost causation. Cali-
fornia relied primarily on the purported regulatory bargain and on
financial integrity. Yet government regulation did not promise to
protect electric companies if they made gross market errors; such
protection defeats the purpose of traditional utility regulation. Fur-
ther, neither financial integrity nor cost causation justifies protecting
these companies from their losses to the extent that the losses reflect
the companies' mistakes. In addition, efficiency is no reason to ex-
tend special government protection to compensate for these losses.
The Article concludes with some broader issues. Part VI.A explains
why the principle of cost responsibility should drive allocation of to-
day's losses. Not only is this the principle of efficient markets and of
FERC's natural gas deregulation, but cost recovery satisfies the realis-
tic expectations of utilities and their investors. Moreover, it is the
one approach that can promote efficiency without jettisoning fair-
ness.
Part VI.B shows that electric utilities might recover proportionately
more than pipelines under a cost- responsibility standard. The point
is not that utilities should be forced to absorb all stranded costs, thus
replacing one punitive, one-sided cost mechanism with another, but
that the contrary rule that has begun to emerge (that utilities should
bear none of their stranded costs) leaves companies unaccountable
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for their part in the great inefficiency of today's electric power. Nei-
ther extreme is good policy.
Many utilities can make a good case that a share of their over-
priced obligations was forced on them by statute and by regulation,
more so than was the case for natural gas pipelines; to this degree,
there may be a greater percentage of stranded costs for which they
truly should not be blamed. But a higher proportionate recovery
does not mean that utilities should pay nothing. A process that
threatens to make consumers pay all costs (and utility shareholders
none) ignores the mistakes electric companies did make and grossly
exaggerates the distortions attributable to regulation. FERC's and
California's choice to avoid allocating any responsibility to electric
companies (indeed, to not even estimate this responsibility in a ge-
neric way) deserves a place among the notable failures in American
administrative history. This Article hopes to restore some much-
needed balance to the debate over stranded costs.
Part VI.C considers the electricity experience in light of capture
theory, which predicts that special interests within a regulated field
can bend regulations for their own benefit. The failure by FERC and
the CPUC to even mention utility mistakes and discrimination as they
fashioned their stranded-cost remedies suggests that, if electric com-
panies did not "capture" deregulation itself, they did dominate deci-
sions about who should pay for the transition. They may have cap-
tured, at least in effect, the part of deregulation that matters most to
them.
The concluding section considers how to put electricity deregula-
tion back on the right track. Although FERC and the CPUC are un-
likely to redo their rules, these agencies have some room to interpret
their standards in a way that holds electric companies somewhat ac-
countable. Thus, these agencies can mitigate their mistakes. Much
more importantly, Congress and other states, to the extent that they
adopt restructuring rules, should avoid the pro-utility bias of Order
No. 888'3 and the CPUC's measures.
13. In general, the movement to deregulate industries like electricity assumes that there
should be a lot of turnover and new blood in the industry. This rare but permanent and gov-
ernment-compelled restructuring of regulated markets should not be confused with the ordi-
nary incremental risk that competition may press against a regulatory franchise.
It is true that FERC needs to keep an eye on the survival of some utilities if its regime is to
maximize consumer welfare. A highly unstable industry may not produce the best output at
the lowest cost over time. Additionally, a punitive regulatory regime might constitute a taking
of private property. See infra notes 403-12 and accompanying text. Takings arguments, how-
ever, are hard to support for assets acquired in a regulated industry whose investors are on no-
tice that their assets are regulated and that is subject to regulatory change.
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I. ELECTRICiTY'S COST PROBLEM
FERC gave a short history of the stranded cost problem in Order
No. 888. Its history is widely accepted in the electricity industry.
Into the Sixties, the industry looked like a success story. Private
companies provided ever-cheaper power in the public interest. Util-
ity costs kept falling with increases in generating scale. Companies
appropriated new technologies as they built ever-larger plants. Con-
sumers enjoyed falling real prices.4 The industry may not have been
operating at or even near its true potential, but paying less for a
commodity rarely seems cause for alarm. As is often the case in eco-
nomics, short-term patterns obscured broader historical trends.
When the country moved into the energy crisis of the Seventies,
which saw oil and gas prices that most assumed would keep rising and
great concern over resource depletion, utilities and their regulators
embraced large-scale generating plants, including many nuclear
plants, as a way to lower costs and increase security of supply.'5 This
bet on a rising energy market was as bad in electricity as in natural
gas. Oil and natural gas prices fell. The electricity industry's bet on
the technology of large-scale plants was no better. Nuclear plants
ended up costing much more than anyone expected.1 6 Under new
14. This happy past and the largely cozy match it produced between the companies and
their regulators may explain the complacency with which so many electric companies squan-
dered their money in huge capital investments in the early Seventies. The CPUC's staff titled a
chapter on the 1945-1965 period, "The Glory Days." CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COM-
MISSION, DIVISION OF STRATEGIC PLANNING, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRIC SERVICES INDUSTRY:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PAST, STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE 17 (1993) [hereinafter YELLOW RE-
PORT]. Power sales grew rapidly, companies adopted new technologies like high-voltage trans-
mission lines and facilities with better thermal efficiency and (perhaps best of all), as previously
mentioned, rates fell in real terms through much of this period. See id. at 20-24.
15. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,543 (1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35
and 385). The shift to large generating plants is striking. In 1948, only two plants in the
United States had a capacity of more than 500 megawatts; in 1972, there were 122 plants with
this capacity. SeeYELLOW REPORT, supra note 14, at 21. One motive in the Seventies was rising
fuel costs. The primary fuel increase was in oil, from the "shocks" of the energy crises of 1973
and 1979-82, but coal costs also rose because of real and anticipated fuel substitution and some
increased transportation costs. Natural gas costs rose in this period as well. See EIA, THE
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 1970-1991, at 33 (1993) [hereinafter
EIA REPORT].
16. One reason for the increased cost of nuclear facilities was enhanced safety regulation
after the catastrophe at Three Mile Island. Purely economic discussions of the electricity indus-
try may stray into treating the array of nuclear regulations as instances of overregulation, but
one major cause for expanded nuclear regulation was the industry's systematic underestima-
tion of the risk in complex nuclear plants. See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING
WITH HIGH-RISKTECHNOLOGIES (1984) (discussing nuclear plant risks). One has to admit that
even that great error had some regulatory roots in the extraordinarily misguided Price-
Anderson Act, which limited utility liability for any single nuclear plant disaster. See Pub. L. No.
85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994)).
Another major problem was that these large plants encountered operating and maintenance
costs much higher than expected. For nuclear plants, operation and maintenance costs in-
creased from $17 to $45 per kilowatt between 1974 and 1982; post-operational capital expendi-
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technologies, small plants became more efficient on an average-cost
basis than large plants. The change in electricity pricing was rapid
and pronounced. Much of the century had seen great improvements
in electricity generation and transmission. The industry had been
"one of the leading sectors of the economy in terms of technical in-
novation and productivity gain. ' 7 With greater and greater thermal
efficiency, the real cost of generating electricity, that is, the "amount
of heat input required to generate a kilowatt hour of electricity using
steam and turbines," had fallen 40 percent between 1925 and 1945
and another 35 percent before 1965.18 This trend, however, began to
reverse itself in the late Sixties. Between 1973 and 1982, the price
per kilowatt hour ("kWh") rose from 5.6 cents to 8.5 cents-a 51.8
percent gain.'
The result, as summarized in Order No. 888, is that plants in the
50-150 megawatt range now may generate electricity more efficiently
than the 500 megawatt plants that were so popular in the Seventies.2
Average costs for large coal plants run from four to seven cents per
kWh, and nuclear plants up to fifteen cents, but new, efficient natu-
ral-gas consuming plants may produce electricity for as little as three
to five cents.2 ' This technological evolution has wedged its way into
the costs of existing power companies, creating a division that reflects
some companies' more efficient response to the market than others,
tures jumped from $8.50 to $28 per kilowatt. See EIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 33. Some of
these costs were directly related to regulation. After the Three Mile Island accident, nuclear
plant construction costs climbed far beyond anyone's expectations. The average construction
cost per kilowatt of net summer capability for 11 plants built in 1968-71 was $161; for seven
plants built thereafter, $4,057. See id. at 35. Delay mounted along with costs. A series of nu-
clear plants that began operating in 1972 took only four years to build; the average construc-
tion time for plants coming on line after 1982 was twelve years. SeeYELLOW REPORT, supra note
14, at 37.
Other cost overruns occurred because utilities had chosen the wrong technologies. For in-
stance, plants larger than 600 megawatts had as much as five times the downtime (with much
more capital and equipment idled, even had the duration of the interruption been the same)
than 100 megawatt plants. SeeEIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 37.
17. EIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 36.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 33. The price increase that began in the Seventies was "even more remark-
able when viewed in its historical context." Id. Between 1960 and 1970, the cost of electricity
had fallen 30% in real terms. See id.
In California, average electricity prices rose between 1965 and 1981 from under two cents
per kilowatt-hour to more than five cents. See YELLOW REPORT, supra note 14, at 31. Today
California's average retail rates are over nine cents per kilowatt hour. See CPI REPORT, supra
note 5, at 11.
20. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544 & n.28 (claiming that optimal plant size fell
from 500 megawatts to between 50 and 150 megawatts with new combined cycle natural-gas
plants). For a discussion on the rapid addition of these large plants, see supra note 15 and ac-
companying text.
21. See 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,544 & nn.29-30 (1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 and
385).
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and in the process challenges the view that "everyone" made the
same mistakes in the last few decades. Another gap exists between
the costs of current companies as a group and those of new generat-
ing facilities. This gap in turn reflects the overall technology gap be-
tween regulated firms and their burgeoning marketplace competi-
tion.
If older plants are forced to compete with new, cheaper plants, and
if consumers are free to choose their power supplier, utilities with in-
efficient "stranded" plants could lose anywhere from $50 billion to as
much as $500 billion' when retail as well as wholesale (and thus state
as well as FERC-jurisdictional) costs are included. No one disputes
that the problem is enormous. The Edison Electric Institute, the in-
dustry's dominant trade group, believes that the figure falls in the
upper part of a fifty to two-hundred-billion dollar range.2 A recent
study by Resources Data International ("RDI") puts the number at
$202 billion.24 One prominent utility thinks the figure may be closer
to $300 billion.H These numbers may be somewhat exaggerated be-
cause they make little or no adjustment for mitigation26 and rely
22. This outlying projection comes from one of America's large economic consulting
firms, National Economic Research Associates ("NERA"). See EIA UPDATE, supra note 10, at 78-
79 (citing NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, REWRITING THE RULES OF THE ROAD:
RETAILWHEELING AND COMPETITION IN ELECTRIC GENERATION (1994)).
23. INITIAL COMMENTS OF EDISON ELEC. INST., DOCKET No. RM94-7-000, RECOVERY OF
STRANDED COSTS BY PUBLIC UTILITIES A.) TRASMrrTING UTILITIES at 28 (Dec. 9, 1994)
[hereinafter EEI COMMENTS; other comments in this FERC stranded cost proceeding will be
cited only by commenter and date]. The EIA's latest survey produced estimates ranging from
$10 billion to $500 billion, with Moody's estimating costs at $135 billion and NERA anticipating
$500 billion. See EIA UPDATE, supra note 10, at 78-79. It is not hard to deduce from these
numbers which side of the industry has retained NERA as its expert. An Oak Ridge National
Laboratory report found the "most plausible range for potential transition costs" to lie between
$72 billion and $104 billion. See LESTER BAXTER ET AL., STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS TRANSITION
COSTS IN THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 2 (1996) (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Energy Division
report).
24. See RDI, POWER MARKETS IN THE U.S. 1 (1997) [hereinafter RDI REPORT]. RDI's
breakdown by owner classification assigns $147 billion to investor-owned utilities, $33 billion to
municipal power, and $22 billion to cooperatives. See id. The distribution by source of costs is
$69 billion from generating assets, $53 billion in power purchases from other utilities, $49 bil-
lion in regulatory assets, and $42 billion in power purchase contracts from nonutility genera-
tors. See id.
25. See COMMENTS OF COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY 16 n.4 (citing App. A, Law and
Economics Report (Dec. 9, 1994)) [hereinafterCoMED COMMENTS] (suggesting range of $200
to $300 billion).
26. Any accurate number for stranded costs must include mitigation, including "those
variable or marginal costs that are avoided when generation is reduced and any revenue from
the sale of system (nongeneration) services." ROSE, supra note 3, at 14. Of course, the savings
from mitigation will be minimized by Order No. 888's failure to impose a portion of stranded
costs on utilities-as long as electric companies are likely to recover their full uneconomic
costs, their incentive to work hard at avoiding losses is muted at best. Cf. INGAA BACKGROUND
REPORT, COMPARISON OF GAS AND ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING COSTS 7 (1996) (noting
pipelines reduced "take-or-pay" liabilities in large part because Commission had given them
such great incentives to avoid costs).
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heavily on such imprecise contingencies as future fuel prices, the ef-
ficiency of new firms, and demand growth.2 7 No one denies, how-
ever, that stranded costs pose a major problem, perhaps the major
problem, in electricity deregulation. These hundreds of billions of
dollars in losses compare unfavorably with an industry-wide share-
holders' equity of roughly $161 billion, an installed capital base of
$525 billion, and average annual new investment of more than $25
billion.28
Most estimates of stranded costs assume that virtually all of the
problem lies in generating costs. That assumption is built into re-
forms that typically aim at spurring competition in generation, but
regulating (rather than replacing) the monopoly in distribution and
transmission. Early innovators like California are beginning to study
whether even portions of "distribution," including metering and
power aggregating functions, can be unbundled; if so, there will be
new categories of stranded costs. For the foreseeable future, how-
ever, the savings will occur via competition in generation.
Generation costs "clearly dominate overall utility costs," making up
roughly 66% of those costs in 199 4 .2 Estimates of stranded costs
generally include both wholesale and retail stranded costs on the as-
27. It is impossible to know, in advance, the exact size of the stranded cost problem be-
cause, among other things, the viability of older plants depends upon relative fuel prices over
their remaining lives, and the scope of loss depends so heavily on the still undetermined pass-
through treatments in the states. See, e.g., BAXTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 2 (estimates will vary
with "assumptions about future market prices, the portion of retail load that obtains market
prices, and the timing and pace of restructuring").
Without discussion or disagreement, FERC cited comments suggesting that interstate
stranded costs constituted roughly $10.4 billion of $114 billion in total investor-owned stranded
costs. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 61,628 & n.567. The reliability of such estimates de-
pends on much more than the best estimates of future market prices and fuel costs; the calcula-
tions must contain assumptions about possible mitigation strategies and, critically, the timing of
state reforms and speed with which entrants appear. RDI's latest study predicts that, if open
access is delayed by just two years, $202 billion in stranded costs would fall by $50 billion. See
RDI REPORT, supra note 24, Key Findings. Given the variation in state approaches and timing,
at least some major companies will recoup their primary stranded costs because they delay the
legislative or administrative process, not because they prove more efficient than expected.
The CPUC, in its restructuring order, noted that projections filed in that proceeding gave a
possible range of California's stranded costs from $8 billion to $32 billion. See CPUC, ORDER
INSTITUTING RULEMAKING ON THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSED POLICIES GOVERNING RESTRUG-
TURING CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRIC SERVICES INDUSTRY AND REFORMING REGULATION 125-26 (Dec.
29, 1995) (modified Jan. 10, 1996) [hereinafter CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER]. The Commis-
sion added, "[w]e do not adopt or endorse any of these estimates, but this wide range of esti-
mated costs illustrates our reservations about the administrative approach." Id. at 126 n.46.
The existence of large stranded costs reflects the savings available from deregulation, but the
cost gap between incumbent and entering firms "is not an indictment of the inefficiency of
regulation per se." White, supra note 4, at 236. Unraveling the efficiency meaning of stranded
costs requires a careful separation of today's unnecessary costs into (1) costs that utilities in-
curred voluntarily and (2) costs that regulators imposed.
28. See EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 10.
29. See BAXTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 4.
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sumption that the states will follow in FERC's footsteps and deregu-
late their retail marketsY3
Not surprisingly, the primary stranded costs in these estimates
come from outmoded generating plants.3 ' The RDI Report estimated
the industry's exposure for these costs at $69 billion.32 A second ma-
jor group of problem assets are contract obligations to buy power
from nonutility "Qualifying Facilities." The costs stranded under
these contracts-their above-market cost-may run to as much as $42
billion.3 Thus power supply contracts, not just old generating facili-
ties, are a major industry problem. Many of the contracts extend well
into the future.3 * A third group of problem assets are "regulatory as-
sets," which generally are accrued rights to recover the costs of vari-
ous regulatory measures. This category includes many costs already
guaranteed recovery. A fourth cost category often listed separately
covers exposure for nuclear plants, including decommissioning
costs. Some utilities still incur significant costs from nuclear power,
30. There may seem to be no logical reason why states would have to imitate FERC, or
each other, as (and if) they deregulate. States certainly vary on a wide range of factors, from
average income to land area and natural resources, to such laws as their income tax and meth-
ods of funding public education. States also compete with each other for new businesses and
residents, among other things. It will be very hard for any to resist deregulation as long as the
process is believed to sharply lower costs. In a society in which most things of value are traded
for money, it is hard to resist any change believed to produce substantial efficiencies. At the
most general level, one can say that the political environment has changed so that a wide vari-
ety of organizations, including FERC and bond agencies, will expect deregulated electricity
markets in much the same way (with only the particulars changed) as the World Bank has
forced many developing countries to adopt similar market reforms. An interesting parallel of
this process on the largest scale occurred within the international political system. See HENDRIK
SPRUYT, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS 153-80 (1994) (describing how nation-
states replaced city-league form of government, and how in the later Middle Ages, the world
organizational environment became inhospitable to city leagues).
31. FERC assumed "that stranded costs will be dominated by generating capacity" in its
initial notice of rulemaking. See Notice of Rulemaking, Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,274, 35,279 (1994) [hereinafter FERC
NOPR]. This does not seem to have been seriously disputed during the comment period. The
EEI lists the major categories of stranded costs as utility-owned generation, power purchase
contracts, and regulatory assets. See EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 82 (Answer to FERC
Question No. 3).
32. See RDI REPORT, supra note 24, at 1.
33. See id. RDI estimates the price of uneconomic contracts to buy power from other utili-
ties as even higher, at $54 billion. See id.
34. See id. at 4 ("This analysis shows that over 60% of the contracts do not expire until after
the year 2010."). Qualifying Facilities ("QF") contracts could have had an even more devastat-
ing impact on utilities had facilities and regulators not shifted to competitive bidding, which
injected a note of realism into what can be called the QF market. See EIA REPORT, supra note
15, at 24.
35. The CPUC has discussed four, not three, major categories of stranded costs: genera-
tion assets, nuclear power plant settlements, power purchase contracts, and regulatory obliga-
tions. See CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 114-16. It admitted, accurately, that
nuclear costs are a subset of stranded generation assets, see id. at 125, although they deserve
separate listing and, given the considerable amounts that utilities already have been forced to
absorb, separate consideration in the stranded cost debate. Nuclear plant costs tend to be
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even though many nuclear plant costs have been disallowed and writ-
ten off.
36
One of the oddities of Order No. 888 is that FERC did not make
any findings on the expected scope of the losses. The CPUC also
failed to make findings before it decided to deregulate California's
retail market. These agencies remedied a problem before they both-
ered to define it carefully. FERC did cite a few estimates of total
stranded costs, including retail costs, but it did not endorse anyone's
estimate (and the Commission rejected arguments that it cannot im-
pose any cost-recovery mechanism without a better picture of the
problem) .Y
Perceptions about the proper way to allocate stranded costs tend to
depend upon whether market conditions or regulatory changes are
seen as the real cause of the problem. The market factors are the
cost and technology changes already discussed. Clearly the changing
technological picture occurred in part because of new laws. In 1978,
Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory and Power Act
("PURPA"), 8 which it hoped would reduce foreign-fuel dependence
by making utilities buy electricity from alternative sources. 9 Con-
more prominent, of course, when states or utilities that rely heavily on nuclear power are in the
room. See PENNSYLVANIA PUC PETITION FOR REHEARING 9 (expressing "great concern at the
emerging threat of nuclear decommissioning costs to the vitality of the electric industry and
the national economy" [sic; a truer phrasing would be "state" economy]). Pennsylvania is stuck
with $12 billion in nuclear plants. See Hollis & Rails, supra note 2, at 12.
36. Cf. EEl COMMENTS, supra note 23, APPENDED REP. OF WILLIAM BAUMOL, PAUL L.
JOSKOW, & ALFRED KAHN, THE CHALLENGE FOR FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORS: TRANSITION
FROM REGULATION TO EFFICIENT COMPETITION IN ELECTRIC POWER 31 [hereinafter EEI
ECONOMISTS' REPORT] (claiming "popular misconception that [stranded] costs represent pre-
ponderantly the inflated book costs of nuclear plants").
37. For the Commission's brief summary of some other estimates and complaints about its
acting before making its own findings on the scope of the problem, see Order No. 888, 61 Fed.
Reg. 21,540, 21,628-29 & nn.566-69 (1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35 and 385). Partially to
justify acting without determining the scope of the problem, FERC did argue that"the signifi-
cance of such costs to the utilities that would face them may be great (and the prospect of not
recovering such costs could erode utilities' ability to attract capital and be very detrimental to a
diverse array of utility shareholders)." Id. at 21,630. Without some finding of the scope of the
problem, however, this hypothetical possibility is no justification for an industry-wide rule, as
opposed to one that might salvage companies for which stranded costs truly prove an insur-
mountable financial burden.
38. Pub. L. No 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645
(1994)). The EIA calls PURPA and "more stringent regulatory review of utility costs" at the
state level the "immediate causes of the recent rise in nonutility electric power generation."
EIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 19. This theory allows the EIA to claim that the causes of the
threat from competition are "legislative and regulatory." See id. The EIA claims that the dou-
bling of nonutilities' share of electric generation would not have occurred without PURPA. See
id. at 24.
39. See 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (citing the preservation of national security as a congressional
goal); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-685, at 12 (1994) (discussing the historical background of the
enactment of PURPA and noting that the energy shortages of the late Seventies prompted
Congress to conclude that diversity of national energy sources would increase the country's
energy security).
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gress assumed that monopoly utilities, sheltered as they were behind
regulatory entry barriers, were not diversifying as much as competi-
tive firms would. To remedy the problem, the Act made utilities buy
electricity from certain other sources ("Qualifying Facilities") as long
as that power could match the utilities' "avoided cost."4  Because
someone had to calculate avoided costs (or most companies would
claim to be cheaper than other suppliers), Congress gave this job to
state regulatory commissions."
After an initial lag, PURPA stimulated a lot of new electricity gen-
eration. In 1986, utilities built 80% of new capacity, and they built
50% as late as 1989. By 1990 and 1991, though, nonutilities were
• 42
providing the most new generation. In 1992's Energy Policy Act,
Congress boosted the pace of innovation by relaxing limitations on
ownership of generating plants, as well as expanding FERC's power
to make utilities move electricity from other suppliers.Y
PURPA was one of a series of statutes (including the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978) known as the National Energy Act of 1978 that
passed in response to the pressure of the Energy Crisis.44 In electric-
ity, the new policies reversed a growing trend toward monopoliza-
tion. Until the mid-century, manufacturers had supplied much of
their own power. Industrial facilities produced 15% of the country's
power in 1950. By 1973, however, their share had fallen to under
40. "The key provision of PURPA required electric utilities to interconnect with, and pur-
chase power from any facility meeting the criteria for a qualifying facility." EIA REPORT, supra
note 15, at 22. "it further required that the utility pay for that power at the utility's own incre-
mental or avoided cost of production." Id. There essentially were two kinds of qualifying facili-
ties under PURPA. cogenerators that produce electricity along with some other form of en-
ergy, and "small power producers" that use waste, renewable energy, or geothermal power as
primary energy sources. See id. at 4. The idea of nurturing alternative sources of power carries
within it the idea of expanding competition for existing generators. The natural reading of
this purpose, and its normal economic reading, is that an increase in diversity of supply would
increase competition. Nonetheless, at least one reading of PURPA, from a source loath to give
the government credit for anything, is that"PURPA was meant to be an environmental statute"
and that its role in increasing competition was "entirely accidental" and, for that, all the "more
remarkable." SeeTHIERER, supra note 3, at 20.
41. See 16 U.S.C. § 2625(a) (designating methods by which state regulatory authorities
shall determine cost of providing electrical service to each class of electrical consumers).
42. The pendulum has swung back toward utilities recently, so the long-term trend re-
mains unclear. See EIA REPORT, supra note 15, at vii. The latest EIA UPDATE found that nonu-
tilities added more generating capacity than utilities from 1990 through 1994, but that in 1995,
utilities again took the lead, and were projected to add the most power in the following three
years as well. See EIA UPDATE, supra note 10, at 13-15 (providing data on expansion of utilities
and nonutilities).
43. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 ("EPACT"), Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776; EIA
REPORT, supra note 15, at 20 (stating that EPACT allows FERC to open national electricity
transmission system to wholesale suppliers).
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 3391 (1994) (setting forth natural gas curtailment policies enacted in
1978).
1998]
THE AMERICAN UNiVERsrIy LAw REVIEw [Vol. 47:775
5%.45 In contrast, electric utilities' share of the power market peaked
in 1979, the year after PURPA, when these companies supplied 97%
of the country's electricity.46 The fact that not long ago non-utility
sources were building almost 80% of new generating capacity illus-
trates just how far the balance shifted.47
Most stranded costs will be intrastate retail costs whose fate will rest
with state utility commissions. This difference from natural gas exists
because electric utilities are much more vertically integrated than
natural gas pipelines. In spite of the importance of regional power
pools, electric companies still generate most electricity at plants in
their own service territories. Accordingly, the interstate costs
stranded by Order No. 888 may be one-tenth or less of all stranded
costs.4 8 The federal precedent of Order No. 888 nonetheless will
have a disproportionate effect on all stranded costs because states
look to FERC to design, as well as justify, the path of deregulation.49
In addition, FERC's claim of expanded jurisdiction over some retail
practices may expand its power into traditionally state-regulated ar-
eas." The threat of federal retail legislation, driven by Congress's
growing belief in the success of Order No. 888's wholesale deregula-
tion, will stay on the political horizon for some time to come.5'
Another aspect of stranded costs that deserves emphasis is how far
the losses vary among utilities. A few companies, including some of
45. SeeYELLOW REPORT, supra note 14, at 49.
46. See EIA REPORT, supra note 15, at vii.
47. See id. (noting that nonutilities added 80% of net additions to total electricity-
generating capacity in 1986).
48. In Order No. 888, FERC mentioned one study's conclusion that interstate stranded
costs would be less than one-tenth of the total stranded costs, or only $10.4 billion out of a total
cost of $114 billion in "potential investor-owned utility stranded investment." Order No. 888,
61 Fed. Reg. at 21,628 & n.567. Some commenters urged the Commission to gather more data
on the scope of the problem. See id. at 21,628. No one believed that stranded interstate costs
would come close to the retail stranded costs that utilities will incur after the states finish with
their measures.
49. It is no accident that so many states have begun pursuing their own open access meas-
ures after the Commission began itsjourney down this road. See infra note 203 and accompany-
ing text. The perceived success of Order No. 888 (perceived, somewhat ironically, before it
had taken full effect) and of federal natural-gas deregulation has fed a drive to replicate the
federal legislation and extend open access to retail power nationwide.
50. FERC's claim is "uncertain" both because of its dubious fit with the Commission's
statutory grant ofjurisdiction, and because the Commission's claim to direct retail jurisdiction
depends on state agencies lacking authority over the same area. See infra note 190. It remains
to be seen how many states fall into this residual category. For one account, see infra note 198.
51. For a summary of the state of electricity deregulation and the prospect that Congress
might try to extend its reach into retail jurisdiction, see Patrick Crow, U.S. Electricity Decontrol
Tops Energy Agenda for 105th Congress, OIL & GASJ., Mar. 24, 1997, at 19; Delay Hopeful, Bumpers
Pessimistic, Dingell Curious about Restructuring, INSIDE F.E.R.C., Apr. 14, 1997, at 3; Hollis & Rails,
supra note 2, at 17-18. Another summary of fairly recent congressional thinking can be found
in the EIA's December 1996 publication. SeeEIA UPDATE, supra note 10, at 43-48 (summarizing
several proposed energy restructuring bills that were pending before the 104th Congress).
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the largest utilities in the country, have huge stranded costs, but most
have relatively few. A crude sign of this uneven distribution is the
surprisingly wide variation in average kilowatt prices. Average elec-
tricity prices range from "3 to 5 cents in the Northwest to 9 to 11
cents in California.,12  These regional differences reflect wide differ-
ences in company efficiency. As few as 20 utilities may be responsible
for half of all stranded costs.-3 Even in a single state, under the same
52. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,550. The spread in average prices is glaring if one
puts the various states on the same page. See, e.g., Peter C. Christensen, Overview of Electricity
Generation and the Industry, 1-18, Presented at Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, Special
Institute on the Electricity Industry (Salt Lake City, Nov. 18-19, 1996) (on file with author) (chart of
average industrial sector cost by state in 1994, showing spread from $2.79/kilowatt in Washing-
ton State to $8.86 in Rhode Island); COMED COMMENTS, supra note 25, Appendix, Law and
Economics Report, tbl. 7 (1993 average revenue by customer class for selected large utilities).
The CPI reproduced RDI's rate ranking in a color chart that is perhaps the most effective way
to see just how wide the spread has become in average rates. See CPI REPORT, supra note 5, cht.
10 ("Average Retail Electric Rates, 1995 for Investor Owned Utilities"); id. cht. 24 (same infor-
mation for non-investor-owned utilities).
Utilities with the highest costs like to argue that these variations reflect the wide differences
in regulatory obligations among the states. Were that true, and if removing regulation put all
companies on an equal economic footing, all utilities might tend toward the same costs. Any
remaining differences could reflect regional differences in the physical conditions for generat-
ing and distributing electricity, as well as demand patterns-true market constraints. The con-
vergence of natural gas wellhead prices has been one of the notable features of that industry's
deregulation; whether this occurs for electricity generating costs is one of this industry's most
intriguing $64,000 questions.
Price differences due to unequal competence should narrow with competition as the market
is cleared of inefficient finns, but differences in regulatory variation should fall, too. To the
extent that cost differences reflect different state rules, one would expect deregulation to
"align prices with costs," but in the process may produce "a significant reshuffling of and an
increased variation in prices." Winston, supra note 3, at 1273. Both trends-price convergence
as competition sorts winners and losers, and price convergence as artificial regulatory con-
straints are abandoned-will occur at the same time. Moving in the other direction will be true
differences in firm skill and capability.
Economic purists cite the equalization of regional differences as one of the expected bene-
fits of deregulation, and try to base claims that Congress or FERC can deregulate even retail
costs on the need to speed the flow of interstate commerce. See THIERER, supra note 3, at 4, 8.
This Heritage Foundation report warns darkly of "bad actor" states that might "hinder inter-
state commerce" by "favoring incumbent producers" and urges "[m]inimal federal guidelines"
to prevent "'bad actor' states from using the process to discriminate against new rival produc-
ers." Id. at 7-8. There would be nothing "minimal" about this kind of regulation.
53. The major stranded cost problems are concentrated in California and some of the
older Northeastern and Atlantic Seaboard states. See RDI REPORT, supra note 24, cht. titled
"Investor Owned Utilities with the Highest Stranded Investment." Of the ten companies with
the greatest stranded costs, two are (two of the three) large California utilities, six are in a clus-
ter of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, one is Illinois' largest utility, and
one is in Texas. See id.; see also BAXTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 3 ("Only utilities in the upper
Rocky Mountain states and the Pacific Northwest appear to be at little or no risk. Utilities at
comparatively greater risk are concentrated in the Northeast, Midwest, Southwest, California,
and to a lesser extent in the Southeast."). These investor-owned stranded costs are greater than
RDI's estimated stranded costs for any publicly owned utilities.
In its February 7, 1997, study, RDI concluded that half of expected stranded costs, $100 bil-
lion, rest with a "small group of only 20 utilities." RDI REPORT, supra note 24, at 2. Given the
small number of utilities in most states, it is not surprising that this distribution of losses among
companies produces a similarly disproportionate concentration of the problem among states.
RDI believes that ten states have 86% of expected stranded costs, even though they produce
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regulatory body, some companies may be crippled by their stranded
costs while others have few or none.5
This variation is important because it suggests that today's uneco-
nomic investments were not the inevitable result of the best that
technology, know-how, and the art of prediction could offer ten or
twenty years ago. Similarly, the wide deviation in the proportionate
allocation of stranded costs-how a given company's losses are di-
vided among fossil-fuel plants, nuclear plants, qualifying-facility con-
tracts, and regulatory assets-is another sign that not all of the in-
vestments that appear so clearly as mistakes in hindsight were the
inevitable or compelled result of regulation. 5
The treatment of stranded costs will have major effects on every-
only 43% of the country's electricity. See id. at 3. The EIA has taken its own look at the great
variability in electricity prices and expected stranded costs by region. See EIA UPDATE, supra
note 10, at 80-81. As the EIA found, "[t]he distribution of these assets is quite polarized, with
New England and California being at maximum risk for one-third to one-half of their rate
base." Id. at 80. For a color chart portraying the RDI data, see CPI REPORT, supra note 5, cht.
38 ("RDI's Estimate of Net Stranded Investment").
It is impossible to estimate the spread of this problem across all utilities because of the un-
even pace of state deregulation. We are only now beginning to see how the bulk of the states
will restructure their electricity industries. The scope of stranded costs will depend upon what
measures each state imposes in its marketplace, and on the treatment each accords stranded
costs. One economist believes that the great spread in generating costs (and therefore in ex-
pected stranded costs) means that only a handful of high cost states, particularly California and
some Northeastern states, are sure to gain from deregulation. See White, supra note 4, at 219
(Figure 1: scatterplot of average generating cost of investor-owned utilities), 223 (Figure 2:
average price of investor-owned utilities by state), 226 (Figure 3: average generation costs of
investor-owned utilities by state), 228 (tbl. 3: price gap between entrants and incumbents by
State), 235 (tbl. 5: estimated consumer surplus from deregulation by state). White finds de-
regulation concentrated in states with high costs and predicts that gains for many other states
are likely to be "minimal." Even if White is right that deregulation occurs primarily in high-cost
states, estimates of total national savings will not be much reduced because savings will be con-
centrated in these states, too.
54. For utilities that did not incur stranded costs, naturally, this variation in costs makes
government protection for those that did all the more infuriating. See, e.g., Comments of Cen-
tral Illinois Light Company, at 5-8 (Aug. 4, 1995) [hereinafter CILCO Comments]. In Illinois,
one significant utility told FERC during Order No. 888 proceedings that it would have "little or
no" stranded costs. See id. at 4. In contrast, the RDI study of stranded costs ranked CoinEd,
Illinois' largest utility, as having the greatest stranded costs in the country, almost $10 billion
worth. See RDI REPORT, supra note 24, cht. titied "Investor Owned Utilities with the Highest
Stranded Investment."
The NRRI has cited a Moody's report that calculates that only 14 of 114 major companies
examined had estimated stranded costs of more than twice the value of their equity; 27 had
none, and 57 had exposure less than half of their equity. See ROSE, supra note 3, at 2 (citing
Stranded Costs Will Threaten Credit Quality of U.S. Electrics (Moody's Investors Serv., Aug. 1995)).
The stranded-cost debate often occurs as if the pass-through question is whether utilities
should have to absorb almost all of these losses. In fact, almost no one proposes 100% pass-
through. The total possible exposure is not a fair test of the various proposals for a shared or
balanced allocation of losses.
55. A utility's generation mix may also result from variations in state regulations and pres-
sures, but the company variations are so great (and at times exist even within the same state)
that the burden ought to be on the electric companies, not on consumers or regulators, to
show that stranded costs are the result of outside constraints, and not of firm errors.
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one who buys or produces electricity. It will determine the fate of
companies, the competitiveness of regions, and the income that con-
sumers and businesses have available to spend on things other than
power. It will affect the country's overall economic functioning. If
stranded costs fall entirely on electric companies, a number of them
will fail. If the losses fall entirely on consumers, the benefits of com-
petition will be greatly delayed. Depending upon the manner in
which the costs are billed, even inefficient companies may gain
enough strength to fend off new entrants.
Analyzing the stranded cost "price tag" to electric companies is one
way to measure the inefficiencies of the regulated regime. Another is
to look at how much can be saved, prospectively, by deregulation. If
the rationale for deregulation is at all valid, the savings from shifting
to the market, though difficult to quantify, will be large. FERC pre-
dicted that Order No. 888's opening the market to wholesale electric
57generation will save consumers between $3.8 and $5.4 billion a year.
California, in a figure that probably shows both great optimism and
the inefficiency of the state's three electric companies, predicts an-
nual savings in its borders of $4 to $5 billion.! Enthusiastic market
56. As the EIA somewhat laconically put it, "[si tates with high electricity rates, such as Cali-
fornia and those in the Northeast, had compelling reasons to promote competition in the hope
of making lower rates available to their consumers in general." EIA UPDATE, supra note 10, at
67.
57. SeeOrder No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,541, 21,550.
58. The $5 billion in California's predicted savings comes from multiplying the 20% rate
reduction intended by AB 1890, the California deregulation statute, to the bill's estimate of
total state electricity consumption at $23 billion a year. Mandated savings do not include in-
dustrial customers, but virtually all commenters assume that these customers-who are more
likely to have the ability to shift to alternative fuels, to generate their own power, and to drive
sophisticated bargains-will save even more than residential and small commercial customers.
Savings by larger industrial customers seem to have been the experience in the natural gas
market thus far. See Paul Bautista, Rise in Gas-Fired Power Generation Tracks Gains in Turbine Effi-
ciency, OIL & GAs J., Aug. 12, 1996, at 43, 44 (citing data collected by the Oil & Gas Journal
showing only 5% drop in average residential prices from 1984 to 1991, but 12% drop for com-
mercial, 40% for industrial, and 41% for electric utilities). But see CRANDALL & ELLIG, supra
note 3, at 11 (arguing that seemingly better treatment of industrial customers results from their
ability to buy power on interruptible basis, and thus reflects a real difference in transportation
cost rather than favoritism in gas pricing). This period begins and ends too soon to capture
the full effects of deregulation. Cf supra note 8 (discussing lag problem).
Though California is but one of the fifty states, it should be the state with some of the great-
est savings. The risk to its major utilities can be seen in the great spread between their average
power costs and national averages or even neighboring states. Predictably, California's two ma-
jor public utilities, SoCal and PG&E, are among the handful of companies with the greatest
stranded costs in the country. See RDI REPORT, supra note 24, cht. titled "Investor Owned Utili-
ties with the Highest Stranded Investment" (listing SoCal and PG&E as third and fourth respec-
tively on its list of companies with highest stranded costs). Although these utilities already have
filed for $6.5 billion dollars in rate reduction bonds, it will be some time before anyone knows
the full extent of their stranded costs because the CPUC has allowed them to apply each year
for a new infusion of transition funding. The companies have no intention of mailing their
final bill for some time. See infra notes 255-62 and accompanying text.
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disciples prophesy annual national savings of $50 billion and more.59
Vast changes in the cost and efficiency of the country's most basic
fuel, one that powers heat, light, manufacturing, and transportation,
turn upon how efficiently we handle this ongoing shift to deregula-
tion. This Article asserts that the stranded cost portion of the first
electricity deregulations rewarded inefficiency, delayed competition,
and shifted too many costs from utilities that made mistakes onto cus-
tomers who had little or no voice in these decisions.
II. ONE BENCHMARK: COMPETITION HOLDS FIRMS RESPONSIBLE
FOR MISTAKES
A good starting point for thinking about stranded costs is to con-
sider what would happen in a competitive market.60 The costs
stranded after Order No. 888's open access will be the costs that elec-
tric companies will not recover if they have to compete with modern,
cheaper plants and power suppliers. Utilities would not recoup these
costs in a "free" or open market.61 Even industry representatives ad-
mit that many current investments are uneconomic.62 Such bluntness
59. See COSTELLO & GRANIERE, supra note 3, at 62 n.105 (reporting studies with estimates
of annual savings between $60 billion and $108 billion).
60. Richard Pierce has analyzed the competitive and regulatory treatment of another
brand of stranded costs, excess capacity in nuclear plants, in his well-known article, The Regula-
tory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 497
(1984). Pierce agreed that such costs would not be recovered in a competitive market. See id.
at 506, 525-26, 530. The context of Pierce's article, however, makes it quite different from this
discussion. Pierce was concerned with an ongoing regulatory regime before it had been found
so inefficient that it needed to be deregulated. His purpose was to decide what treatment
would best ensure that utilities continued to run efficiently while still regulated. In contrast,
the current electricity stranded cost issues arise because regulators have decided to move into a
competitive market. Maintaining incentives for continuing regulation is not the issue. Utilities
do argue that regulators must allow them these costs so that investors will continue to fund the
portions of the market that remain regulated (distribution and transmission), so there is an
indirect regulatory interest. See infra Part V.B (discussing this capital-market threat).
The principles that kept Pierce away from the alternatives of full recovery or no recovery
were both rooted in regulatory concerns. Thus Pierce worried about the "Averch/Johnson"
incentive to overinvest in capital, and so came out against allowing full recovery. See Pierce,
supra, at 558. At the same time, he worried that no recovery in an ongoing regulatory regime
would be "an even worse policy choice" because it would push utilities to complete unneeded
plants and create a more general incentive to underinvest. See id. at 542, 558.
When the move is into a market that everyone assumes is competitive, correcting the over-
and under-investment problems of regulation should not be of such concern. Utilities seeking
full recovery naturally argue that denying them their stranded costs nonetheless will have a spil-
lover effect, and that capital will dry up for the industry anyway. For a discussion of this argu-
ment, see infra notes 465-67 and accompanying text.
61. Any consideration of what to do with uneconomic electric facilities "begins with a rec-
ognition that the competitive market will classify utility generation assets as either economic or
uneconomic, in whole or in part (such as at particular times of the day or year)." CPUC
DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 113.
62. The economists hired by EEI admit that "[i]f the generation component were unbun-
dled and priced at competitive wholesale rates, many utilities would be unable to recover a
large fraction of the costs associated with these power supply commitments." EEI ECONOMISTS'
1998] ELECTRICIY'S STRANDED COSTS
may not be surprising: a number of utilities seem to have decided
that they have to portray their predicament in the direst terms if they
are to make a compelling case for public relief. If this strategy ex-
plains the extraordinary level of protection these firms have secured
from FERC and the CPUC, one has to credit them for deft maneuver-
ing within their regulatory environment.63
REPORT, supra note 36, at 1.
63. Interestingly, because it was fairly clear that both FERC and the CPUC were going to
order some form of open access, utilities did not waste much time arguing that their services
were so economic that the regulated market should be left intact. For that reason, the record is
not full of arguments that today's large generators are so efficient that there will be few
stranded costs. Instead, anticipating market forces and knowing that many of their facilities will
have a problem competing, utilities were not at all bashful about stressing that they had a lot of
assets that would not survive in open competition.
What remains in dispute, of course, is why the costs of major utilities are uneconomic, and
how much of their inefficiency should be blamed on regulatory failures and requirements as
opposed to company error and overreaching. The failure to address these issues in Order No.
888 and in California's deregulation is the great weakness of both restructurings.
In a related contrast, electric companies put up nothing like the fight that pipelines waged
against deregulation. One reason may be that, with the support that the natural gas transition
has garnered as well as its overall success at survivingjudicial review, the smart money is against
challenging the deregulation of electricity generation itself.
Many of the surviving pipelines today support even more deregulation. A fair case can be
made either that pipelines have realized they can use their remaining monopoly positions to
their advantage in a partly competitive market, or that the survivors in that industry are the fit-
test who can expect to do well in the market battle. Given the close linkage between the natu-
ral gas and electricity industries-a linkage becoming ever tighter as companies merge across
industry lines-the growing optimism among pipelines about the open market may have
spread to electricity companies. Finally, it is always possible that most utilities believe they can
gain from competition. One feature of business planning that some observers have noticed is a
tendency to understate risks, see Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Fore-
casts: A Cognztive Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCl. 17 (1993), which in this context could
mean that the industry as a whole overestimates its ability to thrive in a deregulated market.
Whatever the reason that electric companies held their fire and concentrated on getting
compensated for transition, rather than raising the question whether there should be competi-
tion, their approach seems to have paid off in the early stranded-cost decisions. It is funny to
compare this electricity outcome with producers' apparent victory in natural gas deregulation.
FERC decided to stay out of those contract disputes and leave them to the courts, where pro-
ducers generally won if they got to trial. Yet FERC's numbers show that producers wrote off
over 80% of contract liabilities in settlements. In contrast, in Alberta, where there was a gov-
ernment-brokered resolution of take-or-pay contracts, one expert has estimated that producers
only had to write off half of their contract expectancies. See Campbell Watkins, Take-or-Pay Prob-
lems: Notes on Experience in the United States and Canada 16 (Dec. 13, 1995) (copy on file with The
American University Law Review).
Even more intriguing is the fact that FERC's notice of proposed rulemaking ("NOPR") for
Order No. 500 had proposed giving pipelines a "safe harbor" for take-or-pay costs; the safe har-
bor would have created a presumption of prudence for payments to extinguish those costs. See
Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981, 1021-12 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing FERC pro-
posals under NOPR for Order No. 436). Pipeline responses "were overwhelmingly negative"
because pipelines feared that the presumption would set a floor on their settlements. See id. at
1022. One reading of the electricity experience is that now we will see whether a safe harbor
offers better protection to utilities with a lot of power than their ability to force settlement
terms against parties who generally are not as organized or funded.
Electric companies seem to be getting even more than a presumptive safe harbor. Deregula-
tions like California's will create conclusive determinations of prudence. FERC's indication
that it will not retry the prudence of costs already "recovered" may effectively mean the same
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The use of a hypothetical competitive market as a template for
judging who should bear the stranded costs of deregulation seems
quite fair. After all, the push for deregulation has resulted from a
similar comparison of regulated markets to a very abstract model of
competition.6M Under competition, utilities' recovery would not be
affected by how good or how sophisticated their mistaken decisions
were when made. It is hard to think of any other private industry
with similarly high capital requirements (except perhaps for the de-
fense industry-and companies whose main customers are govern-
ments are not private in the ordinary sense) whose members have
been able to shift the risk and cost of errors with decades-long
lifespans onto customers.65 The Chicago School's belief that a single
thing. Thus the treatment accorded to electric utilities appears to be much better than even a
strong presumption in their favor. Of course, pipelines had less incentive to worry about need-
ing a safe harbor as long as they expected FERC to let them pass along all of their costs. Some
may have worried that in the harsh market, with competition from other fuels, they would have
been unable to pass along all prudent gas costs even if the costs were allowed (at least not with-
out the added assistance of nonbypassable fixed charges, a gift the pipelines may not have ex-
pected). These pipelines could have realized that even with a safe harbor, customers would
have more incentive to search for ways to fight pass-through when faced with higher costs.
64. For the conclusion that deregulation occurred as a result of an overall ideological or
cultural shift toward belief in the market, see MARTHA DERTHICK & PAUL J. QUIRK, THE
POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 14 n.34 (1985). Derthick and Quirk's model is drawn from John
Kingdon. See JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 1995)
(applying Michael Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17ADMIN. SCI. Q.
1 (1972)). A number of the case studies on which Kingdon relied to develop his model of po-
litical action were deregulation examples. Cf. Sam Peltzman, The Economic Theory of Regulation
after a Decade of Deregulation, in BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 1989, at 1 (1989). Peltz-
man tried to fit a number of deregulation experiences to capture theory, but with only partial
success. In contrast, the broader model of an underlying cultural change explains the speed,
spread, and force of deregulation quite well, even if it is hard to explain why culture changed at
this time.
65. For instance, airplane manufacturers require billions of dollars to design a new air-
plane, but historically the manufacturers have not been able to shift this risk to their airline
customers. The fact that some major markets bear very large risks does not mean that their
firms have to merge. This is the riddle behind the eternal debate over concentration and
competition. Although the United States once boasted a number of aircraft manufacturers, it
had only two manufacturers of major commercial airlines when this footnote first was written.
Now it has one. See Boeing, McDonnell OK Merger, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 16, 1996, at Al. The Boe-
ing/McDonnell merger suggests that, at least in the eyes of these two companies, the level of
resources needed to withstand that market's risks is extraordinary.
Merging partners invariably predict efficiencies from the merger and claim that whatever
their combined resources, that is the minimum amount of capital needed to compete effi-
ciently in their market. The combined company will start out with 200,000 employees and $48
billion in annual revenues. See id. At what point did two companies with joint assets this large
become too small to survive as competitors? Nothing in the merger announcement indicates
why their vast separate resources were not enough to compete, why these two giants were not
viable separately but will be together, or how the market will be invigorated by the loss of the
competition they have produced for decades. Economics lacks an accepted framework for
predicting the optimal firm size with much confidence, particularly as changes in technology,
substitute products, and international competition continually disrupt any given answer.
Manufacturers who design unattractive airplanes go out of business. Some of their risk is dif-
fused during the life of an aircraft by bulk purchase contracts, but the manufacturers generally
only find enough buyers to recover their costs, much less make a profit, if an airplane proves
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contract may capture all competitive gains over very long terms not-
withstanding,6 even manufacturers in markets that require extensive
capital investments face repeated, staggered contract expirations,
contract terms shorter than investment lives, risks from new competi-
tion, and all the related pressures of customer exit. These realities
are given when consumer sovereignty is the dynamic of a market.
If today's utilities functioned in a competitive market but had in-
vested in the plants they currently own, 67 their customers would not
patronize them. Over time, industrial, commercial, and even resi-
dential customers would shy away. New companies building smaller,
itself competitive over a number of years. They do not have a margin of contract protection
that lets them recoup production and design expenses if a better plane comes on the market.
Another example is the automotive industry. Cars also require billion-dollar investments.
This sunk cost is spread over countless small purchases, so that each car's price covers a very
small part of the manufacturer's capital investment. Sales are spread among widely-scattered
buyers, with this diffusion making it even harder to shift the risk of poor design. To put auto
buyers in the spot that consumers of electricity may be in after FERC and states like California
are finished with them, the government would have to have forced car buyers into large buying
clubs and made them enter tying contracts linking one year's purchase with three or four more
cars over the following fifteen or twenty years. The buyers would have to make this commit-
ment without knowing how product design, fuel prices, public transportation, and other factors
would change in that period. Customers would only be allowed to exit if they paid Ford, Gen-
eral Motors, or Chrysler for the revenues lost on the purchase of as many as four or five cars.
In other capital-intensive products, whether new computers, computer chips or software,
telephone systems, televisions or VCRs, manufacturers are unable to shift the risks of poor capi-
tal allocation, bad product design, or supercession by new technology onto their customers.
None of these industries have anything like the benefit that FERC and California have con-
ferred on electric utilities by letting them recover the costs of old plants that have been over-
come in the marketplace. Nor does any competitive industry.
66. In a world in which transaction costs are not insurmountable, it may be true that natu-
ral monopolies can be made competitive by subjecting them to a bidding process, even if for
very long-term contracts. See generally Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities, 11 J.L. & ECON.
55 (1968) (discussing deficiencies in the theory of natural monopoly and the possibilities for
competitive bidding in such markets). It may be ventured that the longer the contract term,
however, then the more diffuse the customers, the more sophisticated the industry, the higher
the transaction costs, and the likelier technological or other rapid change (including supply
prices in the energy industry) will make it less likely that a bidding model will approximate the
real world.
67. One of the strong currents of utility claims for stranded cost recovery flows on the ar-
gument, often implicit, that electric companies would not have made such dumb investments
had they not been forced to maneuver within a regulated framework. This argument relies for
its life-blood on the unproven predicate that today's uneconomic plants were in fact coerced by
regulation, and were not instead, at least in large part, the voluntary decisions of the companies
themselves. Presumably many new electricity generators believe they can avoid the errors of
the past because they have the benefit of history. The difference between old and new costs
would suggest that large-scale projects, whose costs include unusually long lifespans and high
fixed costs, are inefficient under current technology. The lesson new companies probably will
take from today's conditions is to keep the scale of their operations smaller and spread long-
term risks. For that reason too, they are not deterred by the mounting losses of existing utili-
ties. Right or wrong, they think they can avoid the overcommitments of their predecessors. If
the pendulum of technology swings back toward larger operations, these companies will find
themselves in the same boat as today's utilities, but in a deregulated market it will be much
clearer who gets stuck paying for mistakes. Or, at a minimum, no agency will be around to re-
ward losses (there certainly would be a lot of contract litigation over price and commitment
terms in electricity contracts, a different kind of dispute than today's regulatory scraps).
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low-cost gas generating plants would enter the market with a great
advantage over companies with nuclear and other expensive plants
and supply contracts.' All across the country, large, established elec-
tric companies would absorb a substantial part of the cost of bad de-
cisions. The failure of individual firms is a notable feature of compe-
tition,69 part of the process through which competition selects and
rewards the fittest firms. Making companies pay for their stranded
costs would provide the most incentive for new capital, because it
makes it easier for entrants to compete and secure market share.7'
The market would punish high-cost utilities even if their decisions
were as prudent as humanly possible when made. Generally, markets
do not care whether a wrong decision was well thought out, sup-
ported by all known facts, or no worse than the competition. Markets
indiscriminately punish long-term gambles that fail.7
With an efficiency gap of the size perceived by deregulation advo-
cates, and projections that new power can cost half or less of the av-
erage price of existing electricity, a competitive market would shift
consumers toward generators having the capital, know-how, and op-
erating skill to build and run smaller, cheaper plants. Among exist-
ing companies, utilities that had avoided long-term commitments, or
that had found other ways to hedge the risk inherent in heavy sunk
investments with long-term payouts, would do much better than
those that jumped into nuclear and other capital-intensive, second-
68. This assumption is built into Order No. 888. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text.
69. See LESTER THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 21 (1980) ("At the heart of capitalism and
competitive markets lies the doctrine of failure.").
70. The classic discussion of this process is in Joseph Schumpeter's entrepreneur-favoring
chapter on "creative destruction," an oxymoron of capitalism to most, but not to economists.
See generally JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY ch. VII (3d ed.
1950).
71. Conversely, as opponents of full pass-through noted in Order No. 888, allowing full
recovery will deter entrants. Some argued that utilities with pass-through protection could
"remarket (or 'dump') stranded capacity at artificially low prices (made possible by the subsidy
from the stranded costs recovery) and thereby gain a competitive advantage in other transac-
tions." Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,656 & n.838; see also Stephen L. Teichler, Generation,
Deregulation, and Market Power: Will Antitrust Laws Fill the Void?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 15, 1996,
at 34, 40 (suggesting that stranded cost recovery "may render utilities indifferent to contribu-
tions to capital cost and, in fact, provide an incentive to push prices as low as possible"). Given
full cost pass-through, today's utilities, which already have brand name advantages and long-
standing relations with their customers, will have more capital to fight and, in addition, will
have large, paid-for excess capacity that they can use to drop prices.
72. The prudence of capital investment decisions when made is irrelevant in a private mar-
ket, except as a signal that might prop up stock prices of the companies that, on average, make
the best decisions at the moment of decisionmaking. Stock buyers might reason that markets
do not get outstripped by unforseeable changes all that often. If this is true, then the best
companies should tend to be those that make the most efficient decisions at the moment of
investment, even if some major shifts in demand and supply are unpredictable so that some of
their major investments turn out to be bad mistakes.
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or third-best technologies. Electric companies that treated the dura-
tion of payout as a serious risk would do better than companies that
did not.
The powerful supporting apparatus of the market-its sales force,
advertising, customer networks, and communications systems-would
go to work publicizing the gap between low-cost new power and elec-
tricity from established companies. With so much money at stake,
new companies would spend lavishly to distribute this information;
3
customers would pay attention because energy bills are such signifi-
cant costs.
Utilities would argue that no one will risk capital again in large-
scale energy projects unless they got public relief for their losses.74
There would be an easy answer, however, to that claim: the billions
of dollars flooding the electricity market. Many well-financed organi-
zations are eager for the risks of electricity.7 5
73. SeeGeorge Stigler, The Economics of Information, 3J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). See generally
George Akerloff, The Market for "Lemons".: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J.
ECON. 488, 496-98 (1970) (arguing that merchants can profit by developing reputation for
honesty and providing information, implying that profit motive may cure information prob-
lems in developed economies).
74. Just this kind of argument apparently helped persuade FERC to allow electric utilities
full recovery of stranded costs in Order No. 888. Thus the Commission painted a picture of
utilities failing unless allowed to recover stranded costs:
First, the inability to seek recovery of stranded costs could impair the financial ability
of a utility to continue to provide reliable service. This will depend on the magnitude
of stranded costs and the prospect or lack thereof for recovering such costs.... [A
denial of recovery] could seriously erode a utility's access to capital markets, or could
drive the utility's cost of capital to unprecedented levels. This high cost of capital
could precipitate other customers leaving the system.... Such a spiral could be diffi-
cult to stop once begun. Second, if some customers are permitted to leave their sup-
pliers without paying for stranded costs, this may cause an excessive burden on the
remaining customers.
Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,642 & n.680. "The financial community commenters con-
firm our views in this regard.... [T]he prospect of a utility not recovering stranded costs could
erode a utility's ability to attract capital and thus imperil its continued financial stability." Id. at
21,642.
As this Article explains in Part V.B, not only does the only "evidence" that utilities actually
would fail without pass-through come from the very self-interested comments of utility share-
holders, but FERC had an easy solution for any real insolvency problem: As the losses would
come primarily from generating assets, a market that FERC believes is competitive for new ca-
pacity, the Commission could have required corporate unbundling between distribution, gen-
eration, and transmission assets. See infra notes 462-64 and accompanying text. To the extent
that some generating affiliates failed, they would be replaced (in deregulation's transaction-
cost-free view of the world) by competitors with much lower costs. Consumers and consumer
welfare, the Commission's template, should be little threatened by such a prospect.
75. As of early 1997, there were five proposed mergers between natural gas and electricity
companies with "values" of more than a billion dollars each. See Barbara Saunders, U.S.
Gas/Electric Megamergers May Slow as New Policies Teste, OIL & GAS J., Feb. 3, 1997, at 19-20
(discussing proposed mergers and providing value, core business types, and primary markets
served by each of the five companies). The resulting "BTU convergence" market "promises to
be the largest competitive U.S. enterprise spawned by the wave of deregulation that started in
the 1970s." Id. Still to come is an indication of how these mergers will be squared with the re-
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This competitive hypothetical does assume one feature of a regu-
lated world, namely, that new companies would have enough access
to transmission and distribution lines for the market to punish ineffi-
cient generators. If electricity transmission and distribution were
natural monopolies (permitting integrated utilities to use their
strictions on holding companies installed via the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,
precisely to break up the giant gas/electricity conglomerates that were dominating the power
industry. See id. at 20-21. For a summary of recent mergers, see CPI REPORT, supra note 5, at 15
(tbl. 2-2, "Major Pending IOU Mergers"), 45 (tbl. 4-2, "Completed IOU M&A Activity, 1986-
1995"), 46 (tbl. 4-3, "Major IOU M&A Activity 1994-1996" & tbl. 4-4, "Proposed Electric/Gas
Mergers").
The picture of concentration is one that cannot be drawn accurately based on just a few
years' mergers. In the Twenties, at the height of concentration, 16 holding companies con-
trolled two-thirds of all United States electrical power. See EIA UPDATE, supra note 10, at 5.
The great period of consolidation ran from 1917 through 1930; during that time, consolida-
tions "occurred at a rate of more than 200 per year, peaking at over 300 per year in the mid-
1920s." Id. at 89. This structural shift was followed by Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal divesti-
ture measures, and more than 750 companies were spun off between 1935 and 1950. See id.
From 1926 until 1975, mergers averaged a bit less than 15 a year, and from 1976 to 1995, about
3 a year. See id. The recent gas/electricity mergers have occurred in an industry that remains
fragmented. At the same time, some mergers are worse than others, particularly in markets
that are so geographically distinct, and recent mergers have included combinations of very
large companies. See id.
Into this mix legislators and regulators also will have to factor the possibility that regulation
may have maintained inefficient divisions among industry companies. "One school of thought
holds that in locations where fragmentation and overlapping service exist, consolidation would
improve the efficiency of companies." Id. Moreover, even in markets that have just one sup-
plier, a consolidation that produces four or five vigorous national electricity suppliers may be
the best medicine that "competition" and "the market" can provide. Regulators will have to pay
great attention to market features, from price trends to discrimination, from access to the
availability of information, if they are to be able to interpret the meaning of concentration.
76. Even most utilities seem willing to assume that these two aspects of the business lend
themselves to monopoly control. See, e.g., EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 6-7
(arguing that "[ i ] t is generally accepted that the distribution of electricity to retail customers"
has natural monopoly characteristics, as do "high voltage transmission networks," while in gen-
eration, "there are some economies of scale associated with generation of electricity, but that
part of the industry, considered in isolation, has never been a natural monopoly"). The
economists signing off on this report include William Baumol, the father of contestable market
theory, making this statement particularly significant.
One reason for electric companies' willingness to admit the monopoly characteristics of dis-
tribution and transmission may be that as long as regulators accept the economies-of-scale im-
plications of that power, they are likelier to protect both functions from competition. But cer-
tainly utilities that think they have comparative advantages in these services will claim to see
competitive tendencies here, too.
Some bold souls question whether transmission and distribution are natural monopolies. See
THIERER, supra note 3, at 10 (claiming natural-monopoly theory for distribution "is only conjec-
ture" and "evidence strongly suggest[s] that the electric industry was never a natural monopoly"
and asserting that, in the industry's early years, many firms built independent infrastructures
"while turning a profit"); see also Winston, supra note 3, at 1267 (arguing that the "prevalence
and importance of natural monopoly is vastly overstated"). See generally ROBERT BRADLEY, OIL,
GAS, AND GOVERNMENT (1996). Robert Bradley has argued that"[p]otential competition is the
omnipresent check on existing firms (including a 'natural monopolist')." Id. at 857. He sees no
reason why consumers could not get together and beat the power of any monopolist. See id. at
926-27. Bradley adds for good measure that even if markets like interstate pipeline markets are
noncompetitive, "voluntary contracts and market processes can prevent 'monopolistic' out-
comes." Id. at 914.
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power to exclude competing generators), this would not be the case.
But assuming that competitively priced power could find its way
through monopoly systems is a reasonable assumption for an age of
deregulation. The idea that generation can function competitively
even with disciplined monopoly power over transmission and distri-
bution is one of the core features of Order No. 888, as well as the key
assumption of open access.77
Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically, this "market" society
could have regulated distribution and transmission, but not genera-
tion. The structure would be very much like the unbundled, partially
deregulated open-access industry that is emerging. For that reason,
too, the market's role in generation could have played out through
an open access network.
One way or the other, the market would creep into all areas that
can support competition. Companies that made bad long-term in-
vestments in power plants and supply contracts would pay the price
of their errors, and today's big utilities would absorb the losses
stranded by new, more effective competitors.
III. THE SECOND BENCHMARK FERC APPLIED COST RESPONSIBILITY
TO MAKE PIPELINES PAY MANY STRANDED NATURAL GAS COSTS
A second benchmark for treating stranded costs comes from the
natural gas industry. That industry's combination of open access and
unbundling is the model for federal and state electricity deregula-
tion. The Commission decided to apply the same general principle
to stranded gas costs that the market applies-responsibility for in-
curring stranded costs.78 Because it found that assigning "blame" was
"difficult" and that "no one segment" was "wholly responsible"-a
finding that implicitly includes regulatory pressure among the con-
tributing factors to pipeline errors-the Commission shared respon-
sibility between pipelines and their customers.7
77. FERC has dropped the requirement that generators show a lack of market dominance
for new capacity because it believes this market is competitive. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg.
at 21,542, 21,549 & n.86, 21,533. At the same time, the Commission did not have enough evi-
dence to determine whether the existing generation market was competitive, id. at 21,553-55,
and it found that transmission remained a natural monopoly, id. at 21,549, so it clearly believed
that utilities retain power that must be regulated.
78. See Order No. 888-A, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,274, 12,276 (1997) [hereinafter Order No.
888-A].
79. See Order No. 636-C, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Gov-
erning Self-Implementing Transportation Under Part 284 and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipe-
lines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,204, 10,213 (1997) [hereinafter Order
No. 636-C] (holding all participants responsible "because no one segment of the industry
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This natural gas decision is particularly important because it was
the first industry in which the Commission had to allocate costs
stranded by deregulation." Thus FERC was free to devise the best
remedy from scratch. In addition, FERC has explicitly cited natural
gas as its model and justification for open access in electricity, so one
would expect natural gas principles to apply to electricity's stranded
costs as well. Finally, the natural gas orders are just a few years old,
making it less likely that the Commission has benefited from a fun-
damental improvement in market knowledge or information.8 1
FERC called its solution to stranded costs "equitable sharing."
The Commission held pipelines, which as private companies planned
their own investments, accountable for their mistakes.83 At the same
time, it made consumers pay some stranded costs in an implicit ac-
knowledgment that pipeline decisionmaking was distorted in part,
but only in part, by regulation."
A. Pipelines Received No Subsidy for Voided Minimum Bills or for
Open Access
The first two major gas deregulation orders, Order Nos. 3805 and
436," stripped pipelines of two valuable contract assets-in essence,
stranding those assets in toto in the name of deregulation-without
any direct compensation. In Order No. 380, FERC decided that the
minimum bills that pipelines had with gas customers existed because
of pipeline monopoly power and should be voided as "unjust and un-
reasonable" barriers to competition. 87 Minimum bills were guaran-
could be held accountable for the complex circumstances leading to the take-or-pay prob-
lem").
80. See Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,392 ("The Commission and the industry had
never previously faced a take-or-pay problem of this nature or magnitude.... [T] he Commis-
sion had no policy concerning whether and how pipelines were to recover those costs"). The
Commission cited novelty as one reason why the take-or-pay crisis was "extraordinary." See id.
81. These few years have given the Commission time to see the early returns on natural gas
deregulation, but to the extent that the Commission views those returns as signs of success,
which it does, they do not harbor a reason for abandoning natural gas principles. The Com-
mission has not said (at least, not publicly) that it thinks equitable sharing was the wrong ap-
proach for natural gas costs.
82. See Order No. 500, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline After Partial Wellhead Decon-
trol, 52 Fed. Reg. 30,334, 30,342 (1987) (there should be equitable sharing among all segments
of the industry).
83. See id.
84. See id. at 30,343 (allowing pipeline to recover some costs through surcharges).
85. Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum Commod-
ity Bill Provisions, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,778 (1984) (codified at 18 C.F.R pt. 154) (subsequent his-
tory omitted) [hereinafter Order No. 380].
86. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg.
42,408 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of 18 C.F.R.) (subsequent history omitted)
[hereinafter Order No. 436].
87. Order No. 380, 49 Fed. Reg. at 22,781-83 (explaining conclusion that minimum bills
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teed payments that some customers agreed to make even if they did
not take gas.8s The bills were valuable contract rights that helped
pipelines recover their full costs. 9 Voiding minimum bills ensured
that pipelines would recover less. Thus Order No. 380 stranded
some pipeline costs.
When pipelines continued to refuse to ship other companies' gas,
FERC issued Order No. 436." The Commission found that pipelines
were blocking third parties from using interstate gas lines,9 thus de-
feating Congress's goal of a competitive gas market.92 Control over
mainline pipes had great economic value, as did the ability to sell ex-
cess capacity to third parties; even more directly than with minimum
bills, this power ensured that pipelines would recover their long-term
costs. To foster competition, the Commission decided that pipelines
wanting to sell excess capacity to anyone would have to offer the
space to all outsiders on an open-access basis.3 The Commission
claimed that in this situation, too, it was forced to act to further com-
94petition.
act as a restraint on competition). The Commission claimed that:
[A] minimum commodity bill can serve as a barrier to competition. A customer is not
likely to purchase gas from an alternate supplier if it is required to pay for gas it does
not take from the original supplier. As such, a minimum commodity bill may inhibit
the natural gas price decreases that could otherwise result from competitive forces.
Id. at 22,779 (footnote omitted). This blockage "creates serious market distortions, insulates
pipelines and producers from price signals, hinders competition, and prevents pipelines and
distributors from pursuing a least-cost purchasing strategy." Id. at 22,782 (footnote omitted).
88. See id. at 22,779 (minimum commodity bills generally require customers to pay full
commodity price for a specified percentage regardless of actual use).
89. The disputed portions voided by FERC concerned guaranteed minimum payments for
gas. Though Order No. 380 often is discussed as if it voided minimum bills in toto, it voided
only the portions of those bills that recovered these costs. Variable gas costs had been a small
part of minimum bills until the late Seventies, when gas costs began to rise and pipelines began
to incur large risks as they contracted to take gas supplies off the market. SeeWisconsin Gas Co.
v. FERC, 770 F.2d 1144, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing trends in gas costs).
90. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 30 Fed. Reg.
42,408 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of 19 C.F.R.).
91. See id. at 42,420-21.
92. See id. at 42,420 (commenting that pipelines may be "negating one of the primary
Congressional mandates of the NGPA").
93. See id. at 42,410. Pipelines had a lot of extra space outside of peak hours, and the earn-
ings from this space were important to pipeline profitability. Therefore the ability to move
other companies' gas, particularly gas for swing customers who might not be willing to buy the
pipeline's high-priced gas, was becoming an increasingly important right in the natural gas in-
dustry. Although FERC did not directly order any pipeline to become an open access carrier-
and thus legally could say that it had not imposed common carrier status on gas pipelines, a
status that Congress had voted for oil pipelines in 1906 but rejected for gas pipelines in 1938-
this condition was nonetheless an extremely effective way of making sure that pipelines would
become open access carriers. As the D.C. Circuit would say, with only slight exaggeration, it
was like "the choice between the noose and the firing squad." Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC,
824 F.2d 981, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafterAGD 1]. Not surprisingly, every major pipe-
line became an open access carrier.
94. See Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. at 42,420.
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Order No. 436 also reduced the value of a pipeline's primary asset
(its space) by giving customers on open-access systems the right to
convert firm gas purchases into a right to ship the same volumes of
gas95 Thus pipelines would be forced to let competitors ship gas on
the same terms, thereby allowing these other firms to bring cheaper
gas to the pipelines' customers.
Often described as "unbundling" the pipeline's "merchant" role as
a gas seller from its job as a transporter,96 Order No. 436 was a dra-
matic restructuring of the way gas is sold in the United States. As
with electricity, so in natural gas open access created more stranded
costs. Not only did Order No. 436 make it harder for pipelines to re-
cover their gas costs, but open access produced a released capacity
market for mainline space that reduced many pipelines' revenues
from their bread-and-butter transportation services. Yet Order No.
436 did not include compensation for these changes.
The Commission did not point to individually imprudent pipeline
decisions in Order Nos. 380 and 436. Instead, it claimed that the
contract structures of minimum bills and closed access had produced
unjust, unreasonable and discriminatory rates across the industry.97
These restrictive practices were defeating Congress's quest for a
competitive gas sales market, the policy written into the Natural Gas
Policy Act of 1978, as well as the Natural Gas Act's general goal of
'Just and reasonable" rates.98 The gas orders illustrate the broad dis-
cretion the Commission enjoys to change asset recovery, even with-
out compensation, if necessary to foster competition.
Order Nos. 380 and 436 cannot be understood without including
the Commission's perception that pipelines had made mistakes that
would be stranded in a competitive market. Both orders rested on
the belief that the Commission had to act after the economic out-
come of the regulated market had become significantly worse than
the apparent competitive alternative,99 and the belief that regulated
95. See id. at 42,425-26 (if pipeline chooses to provide self-implementing transportation, it
must give customers option to convert their service from sales to transportation). A less com-
monly discussed pro-competition order, Order No. 451, required pipelines to renegotiate all
old gas supply contracts with a given producer if they tried to renegotiate even one (thus free-
ing a large amount of gas for renegotiation to market prices). See generally Ceiling Prices; Old
Gas Pricing Structure, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 18 C.F.R.)
[hereinafter Order No. 451].
96. See AGD 1, 824 F.2d at 994 ("The essence of Order No. 436 is a tendency... to
'unbundle' the pipelines' transportation and merchant roles.").
97. See Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. at 42,420-21.
98. See Order No. 380, 49 Fed. Reg. at 22,779, 22,781-82.
99. See id. at 22,779 (minimum commodity bills allowed pipelines to recover variable costs
not actually incurred while "inhibiting natural gas price decreases that could otherwise result
from competitive forces"); Order 436, 50 Fed. Reg. at 42,420 (aggravated price distortion led to
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companies were not entitled to special relief for being forced to
compete.
The finding that minimum bills and closed access were products of
market power and prevented just and reasonable rates (a separate
problem, as pipelines might have great power yet charge fair rates)
embodied a number of judgments: (1) the Commission could test
the regulated market against a hypothetical competitive market;
(2) under this standard, pipelines were making bad (uncompetitive)
decisions; (3) pipelines were using their power to protect business
they would lose under competition; and (4) the duty to protect 'just
and reasonable" rates did not permit full rate recovery.
In Order No. 380, the Commission claimed that minimum bills
prevented "price decreases," "competition," and "pursuing a least-
cost purchasing strategy."'00 Pipelines were imposing contract terms
that were unnecessarily expensive.' In other words, they were sad-
dling customers with obligations whose economic necessity had dis-
appeared. Similarly, in Order No. 436, FERC found that discrimina-
tion in pipeline access was preventing companies from participating
in the competitive wellhead market. 10 2 Pipelines had chosen to main-
tain an inefficient business structure that damaged consumer wel-
fare. '°3 In each case, the restructuring rested on the perception of a
gap between what competition could bring and the subpar perform-
ance of regulated firms.
B. Pipelines Bore Many Take-Or-Pay Losses
In Order Nos. 380 and 436, FERC imposed the costs of inefficient
practices on the pipelines that designed those practices. These or-
ders left pipelines with losses on gas costs and pipeline capacity in the
name of deregulation, fuller markets, and consumer welfare. Still
unresolved was what to do about pipelines' high-priced gas. Pipe-
lines had signed billions of dollars in long-term take-or-pay contracts
at very high prices and with large obligations to pay, even when pipe-
lines could not take the gas.
It is quite possible that the Commission never would have given
pipelines any relief for natural-gas deregulation if left to its own de-
vices. In Order No. 380, for instance, FERC rejected requests for
competitive pressures requiring change in regulations).
100. See Order No. 380,49 Fed. Reg. at 22,779, 22,782.
101. See id. at 22,781-82.
102. See Order No. 436, 50 Fed. Reg. at 42,420-21.
103. See id. at 42,421 (pipeline actions resulted in "unnecessarily high energy costs to con-
sumers and a large loss to the American economy in jobs, production, and net economic effi-
ciency").
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take-or-pay relief by noting that it did not have to act on that ques-
tion while deciding the fate of minimum bills."' In reviewing the
Order, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia let the
Commission off lightly because it assumed the Commission had only
deferred action. 0 In what would turn out to be a prophetic warning,
the court took pains to note that the Commission had not decided
whether "take-or-pay clauses should be prohibited."'
' 6
When FERC issued Order No. 436, which the court called a
"complete restructuring" 7 of the industry, it said nothing about the
take-or-pay issue. This time the reviewing court lost its sense of hu-
mor. FERC had claimed that it did not need to allow take-or-pay re-
lief because Order No. 436 would not increase pipeline liabilities,
and because pipelines were successfully negotiating their way out of
the contracts anyway.'08 In Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC ("AGD
1"), the inevitable appeal, a District of Columbia court vacated Order
No. 436 with unusually harsh language about trapped take-or-pay
costs'09 The temper of the court's comments is important for the
electricity stranded cost debate because they were so critical of
FERC's decision to make pipelines absorb their uneconomic gas
costs. Thus the ultimate, later judicial approval of FERC's final pol-
icy, which still left many of those costs with the pipelines, indicates
that FERC would be on solid ground if it forced electric utilities to
shoulder responsibility for uneconomic assets. In fact, FERC may be
104. See id. (minimum bill and take-or-pay issues not "inextricably linked"). FERC offered
several reasons why action might never be needed: minimum bills were not directly linked to
take-or-pay contracts, eliminating the bills would encourage competition, and the Order was
expected to spur renegotiation of many contracts. See Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 770 F.2d
1144, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
105. The court agreed that the take-or-pay problem was not so "inextricably" tied to mini-
mum bills that it had to be treated at the same time. See id. at 1159-60 ("An agency should not
be paralyzed by having to decide all relevant issues at the same time."). The Commission ques-
tioned its authority to change take-or-pay terms in NGPA contracts, and whether it could take
action only against NGA contracts. See Elimination of Variable Costs From Certain Pipeline
Minimum Commodity Bill Provisions, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,259, 31,265 (1984) [hereinafter Order
No. 380-A].
106. Wisconsin Gas, 770 F.2d at 1159.
107. Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981; 993 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
108. See id. at 1023.
109. The AGD I court accused FERC of "blindness" on the possible impact of open access
and a "tendency to elevate into affirmative benefits what are at best palliatives." Id. at 1025. In
language that played to the pipeline audience (and would overpopulate their later briefs), it
likened the "choice" to go open access to "the choice between the noose and the firing squad."
Id. at 1024. In the eyes of the court, the Commission's reasoning failed the requirement of rea-
soned decisionmaking; the court remanded Order No. 436 for reconsideration. See id. at 1025,
1030. Given the majority's intemperate language, the message that FERC had to do something
on the take-or-pay situation was inescapable. Judge Mikva concurred to state his even stronger
belief that, whatever FERC might think, inaction on take-or-pay was unacceptable. See id. at
1045 (MikvaJ., concurring) (positing that the Commission's options should "not include do-
ing nothing whatsoever to assuage the take-or-pay situation").
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required to do so. The link between these natural gas and electricity
issues, and the precedential value of the natural gas example, is close
and binding because Congress defined the key parts of FERC's natu-
ral gas and electricity mandates in virtually identical terms."'
Even with Order No. 436's remand, FERC still may have hoped to
avoid administrative relief for stranded gas costs. It began collecting
data on the take-or-pay problem as if it intended to come up with a
remedy, but it failed to issue a rule or order."' By the second appeal
of Order No. 436, two years later, the Commission still had done
nothing. 2 This time the court ordered FERC to issue a final deci-
sion on take-or-pay recovery within 60 days.13 To make its message
clear, the court accused the Commission of having "done nothing
that even purports to comply" with AGD 1.Y4 The judges charged the
Commission with a "half-explained cunctation" that showed it was
just buying time until the problem went away, "i.e., until such time as
the agency will have accomplished its purpose regardless of whether
it can warrant its authority.""5
After this second remand, FERC issued Order No. 500.116 This in-
termixing of take-or-pay relief with the minimum bill and open ac-
cess orders is significant because some of the economic costs that
Order Nos. 380 and 436 imposed on pipelines materialized as an in-
ability to pass along take-or-pay costs. It is true that pipelines re-
ceived no direct relief for those two orders. At the same time, take-
or-pay relief in Order No. 500 provided an indirect remedy for some
of the effects of Order Nos. 380 and 436, as well as for the high-cost
gas problem that pipelines would have had even if those orders had
not exacerbated the take-or-pay problem. What never will be known
is whether the Commission would have granted any take-or-pay relief
110. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a-b) (1994), with 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a-b) (1994). The Natural
Gas Act, passed in 1938, requires that all gas sold under its jurisdiction be sold at"just and rea-
sonable" rates and deems all rates and charges not satisfying this requirement "unlawful." 15
U.S.C. § 717c(a). It forbids granting any "undue preference or advantage" or maintaining
.unreasonable differenceEs] in rates, charges, service, facilities, or in any other respect, either
as between localities or as between classes of service." Id. § 717c(b). The Federal Power Act,
passed in 1935, has similar requirements. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a-b) (employing virtually identi-
cal language as 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a-b)).
111. SeeAmerican Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 888 F.2d 136, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
112. See id. The Commission had issued an interim rule but failed to present a final rule.
See id.
113. Seeid.
114. See id. at 147.
115. Set id. at 148. The court added that the Commission was pressuring everyone in the
natural gas industry to settle take-or-pay contracts "without its ever having taken a final, rea-
soned position on how this should be done." Id. at 151. FERC's inaction suggested that "the
Commission concluded long ago that it could notjustify its position." Id.
116. Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 52 Fed. Reg.
30,334 (1987) [hereinafter Order No. 5001.
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had the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia not repeatedly
reversed and remanded its orders. It is clear that FERC never tried to
let pipelines recover all of their stranded take-or-pay costs, the gen-
eral relief it has given electric companies.
In Order No. 500, FERC split responsibility for stranded gas costs
between pipelines and their customers. A similar approach to
stranded electricity costs would make utilities absorb many losses and
pass a share along to customers. FERC's gas remedy was to make
pipelines and their shareholders absorb between 25% and 50% of
high-priced natural-gas costs. If they absorbed these costs, FERC
would let them bill an equal amount, from 25% to 50%, to customers
in a fixed charge."7 Any residual costs (for instance, 50% if a pipe-
line chose to absorb just 25% and pass through 25%) could be added
to the ordinary rate and recouped if customers would buy the pipe-
line's expensive gas.1 8 Or a brave pipeline could ignore the sharing
mechanism and try to pass 100% of its costs through in volumetric
charges. " 9 Full volumetric pass-through was unlikely, however, be-
cause the pipelines' problem was how to get customers to buy their
expensive gas when open access was making much cheaper gas avail-
able. Even trying to bill such costs would guarantee bitter rate bat-
ties. Pipelines ultimately would seek equitable sharing for about 40%
of their stranded contract costs.
20
Though the sharing formula may seem to spread the burden
among just two industry parties-pipelines and their end consum-
ers-gas producers bore the greatest loss. In Order No. 500-H, FERC
tallied data submitted by pipelines to conclude that producers ab-
sorbed and wrote off over 80% of estimated take-or-pay costs.'
2
'
When coupled with Order No. 500 and pipeline market power, the
117. Not surprisingly, there was much litigation over the structure of this fixed charge. For
instance, FERC's initial allocation formula, which relied on the pattern of recent purchases,
was invalidated for breaching the filed rate doctrine. See American Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 893
F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
118. See Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,342-43 (discussing methods for pipelines to re-
coup take-or-pay costs from customers).
119. See id.
120. SeeRegulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 54 Fed. Reg.
52,344, 52,357 (1989) [hereinafter Order No. 500-H]. Pipelines absorbed another 40%, and
billed the rest as volume surcharges. See id. This is not 40% of total pipeline take-or-pay expo-
sure, because pipelines were able to use their leverage to negotiate away over 80% of that liabil-
ity. Equitable sharing only applied to whatever costs pipelines were unable to shift to produc-
ers. See infra note 121 (discussing FERC calculations of take-or-pay settlements).
121. See Order No. 500-H, 54 Fed. Reg. at 52,356. FERC calculated that over $44 billion in
take-or-pay liabilities settled forjust 18.6 cents on the dollar. See id. at 52,356 tbl. 5. These are
overly precise estimates of the savings. See American Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496, 1509
(D.C. Cir. 1990) ("The precision suggested by the figure 18.6 cents is illusory."). The numbers
are based on pipeline filings, however, and suggest the general impact of natural gas stranded
costs.
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Commission's early inaction on take-or-pay had the effect of spread-
ing gas costs on three parties.ln Shifting costs to producers was not
part of FERC's formal remedy-indeed, the Commission had as-
sumed that it did not have the power to rewrite most take-or-pay con-
tractsl--but it was happy to exploit this marketplace development.
The diffuse structure of gas production let pipelines shift many of
their problems back to producers without regulatory scrutiny.
FERC enacted Order No. 500's "equitable" formula without giving
its opinion on how much blame pipelines should bear for the mess
into which their purchases had gotten them and their customers. 24
Nor did FERC decide how much state and federal regulators had dis-
torted these pipeline decisions.ss To the contrary, the Commission
deliberately avoided findings of fault and blame.
In prudent-cost hearings over take-or-pay costs, the Commission
would have had to decide the extent to which pipelines were impru-
dent, under the fraud-and-abuse standard, for buying gas that they
could not resell without government help. All FERC would say pub-
licly was that this blame should be shared:
The causes of the pipelines' take-or-pay problems are many and
complex. It is undoubtedly true that some pipelines independently
entered into contracts incorporating both high prices and high
take-or-pay levels. At the same time, pipelines entered into con-
tracts, which were based on the anticipated demands of their cus-
tomers, and whose terms reflected those which producers were able
to obtain under the then prevailing market conditions.... The
Commission recognizes that it is difficult to assign blame for the pipeline in-
dustty's take-or-pay problems. In brief, no one segment of the natural
gas industry or particular circumstance appears wholly responsible
for the pipelines' excess inventories of gas. As a result, all segments
should shoulder some of the burden of resolving the problem. '
FERC was blunt about its desire to avoid allocating responsibility
more specifically:
In formulating the proposed policy, the Commission consciously
sought to avoid, to the extent possible, lengthy and potentially
122. One can argue that retail electricity deregulation will be different from FERO's natural
gas restructuring because Order No. 888 does not impose costs on retail customers. But given
the pass-through of wholesale gas costs to end-customers by local distribution companies, this
argument rests on too broad a generalization about the gas market.
123. See Order No. 380-A, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,259, 31,265 (1984) (producer take-or-pay issues
raise "an unsettled area of the Commission'sjurisdiction").
124. See Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,334.
125. As one federal court has recounted, it was "under pressure from the Commission" that
interstate pipelines "had typically purchased gas under contracts for very long terms." AGD 1,
824 F.2d at 995.
126. Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,337 (emphasis added).
19981
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REvIEw [Vol. 47:775
complex hearings involving an attempt to quantify and ascribe
blame for the accumulation of pipeline take-or-pay liabilities. In
the Commission's judgment, the principal objective should be to
design and implement procedures to deal quickly, effectively, and
positively with the take-or-pay problem. To this end, the Commis-
sion proposed a rebuttable presumption that a pipeline's agree-
ment to assume an equitable share of take-or-pay costs would be
sufficient to take account of any imprudence on the part of that
pipeline in incurring take-or-pay liability.
127
The Commission did not prohibit review of pipeline gas purchas-
ing, but it did the next best thing by ruling that the showing of
"imprudence" needed to overturn a pipeline's equitable sharing plan
would be "difficult.1 2  Moreover, the review would come with a
thinly veiled threat. In the hearing, the pipeline could ask to recover
all of its costs. No matter how much it had volunteered to absorb,
the pipeline would be entitled to all costs it could show were pru-
dent. 12' In this way, customers faced the risk that challenging a pipe-
line's Order No. 500 plan could increase the costs they ultimately
had to pay.'10
The most significant parts of Order No. 500 for the electricity de-
bate are the decision that stranded costs should be allocated in pro-
portion to responsibility for incurring such costs, and the decision to
make pipelines pay for much of their overpriced gas. The decision
that "responsibility" should be the watchword, so that pipelines could
not hide behind regulation or behind any "expectation" of a shel-
tered customer franchise, is clearest in Order No. 528-A. This Order
came into being because the courts struck down the formula FERC
had created to pass along the special Order No. 500 charge.' In the
process of refining the recovery mechanism, FERC stated Order No.
500's basic rationale bluntly. Order No. 528-A's explanations are
127. Id. at 30,341; see also id. at 30,342 ("The Commission believes it is necessary to expand
the proposed mechanism to provide for sharing of take-or-pay costs through market forces as
well as through voluntary agreement.").
128. See id. at 30,341.
129. See id. (explaining that pipeline's recovery would not be limited to amount initially
claimed).
130. FERC added another provision to help pipelines battle producers. In a
"transportation credit" provision, it determined that a pipeline"need not transport a particular
producer's gas unless that producer signs an affidavit offering to credit the transported gas
against the pipeline's take-or-pay liability to that producer." Id. at 30,338. For producers cap-
tive to a single pipeline, this provision legitimated blackmail. Many pipelines were refusing to
take or pay for any gas under their contracts. On singe-connected wells, producers had no
other way to get their gas to market, even if they only sought to mitigate their damages. With
the transportation credit, they could not sell their gas to another buyer pending litigation un-
less they extinguished the pipeline's liability. Pipelines could force smaller, weaker producers
to settle for very little value.
131. See supra note 117.
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particularly important because the Commission later would say that
this is where it announced its true rationale for equitable sharing.'
Order No. 528-A took a stand on Order No. 500's ground of re-
sponsibility for incurring uneconomic costs. It defined the
"fundamental principle [as being] that all segments of the indus-
try... should share in the costs of resolving pipeline take-or-pay ob-
ligations,"'3 and rested this application on an analysis of blame. The
Commission "has stated repeatedly that no single segment of the in-
dustry is to 'blame' for those transition costs."'34 Responsibility for
uneconomic contracts was the principle applied to the stranded
problem."'
Once again, in an unfortunate omission for those interested in
electricity, the Commission did not explain how it decided that not
just pipelines, but also "producers, [local distribution companies],
industrial end-users, and other consumers" were responsible for pipe-
lines' gas buying practices."6 But at least the principle was clear: the
Commission was looking at responsibility for the investment deci-
sions that had turned out to be uneconomic.
In addition to making it clear that responsibility-cost accountabil-
ity-was its guiding principle, Order No. 528-A contained a strong
reminder to pipelines that the Commission would not salvage take-
132. In Order No. 888-A, FERC said that Order No. 528-A gave the "fullest justification for
[Order No. 500's] absorption requirement." Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,393.
133. Mechanisms for Passthrough of Pipeline Take-or-Pay Buyout and Buydown Costs, 54
F.E.RtC. Reports 11 61,095, 61,303 (Jan. 31, 1991) [hereinafter Order No. 528-A].
134. Id.
135. FERC discussed two other ratemaking principles, but only because they bolstered and
did not replace investment responsibility. The Commission added that, "[flurthermore, all
segments of the industry have benefited from the transition to a more competitive market."
Id.; see also id. at 61,298 (stating that the Commission "is mindful that many have benefited sig-
nificantly from the development and maturation of the open-access transportation program").
This statement suggested that the Commission might impose some costs on parties who bene-
fited from the transition to competition, even if they were totally free of fault for pipelines' bad
investments.
FERO also claimed that equitable sharing emerged from a complex balance of benefits and
burdens: "[T]he Commission must use its expertise to consider, weigh, and balance the rela-
tive benefits and burdens on each segment of the industry." Id. at 61,299. This language in
turn suggested that the Commission might shift costs to avoid a disproportionate impact on any
one party. In the context of the "fundamental principle" that everyone was to blame, this made
good sense; the Commission should not allocate a shared responsibility in a way that penalizes
only one side in the industry, or that leaves any group scot-free.
FERC adjusted Order No. 528-A for "ability to pay" in another way. Although Order No. 500
allowed pipelines to recover, at most, 50% of their costs in a volumetric surcharge, the Com-
mission had raised that ceiling to 75% for "new costs not previously included in an Order No.
500 filing." Id. at 61,300. Its concern was that as customers switched out of firm gas sales by
either "switching to transportation ... or leaving the system altogether .... it may not be practi-
cable for these pipelines.., to recover those costs other than through a volumetric surcharge."
Id.
136. See id.
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or-pay contracts. FERC refused to protect pipelines even if the short-
comings in their contracts only became apparent because of regula-
tory changes that opened the gas market to competition. Pipelines
had argued, as electric companies do today, that they were entitled to
a "reasonable opportunity to recover all prudently incurred costs." 37
FERC's response was that this "'opportunity" did not shield them
from having to sell their product in a competitive market. FERC in-
dicated that "[pipelines] ignore two other equally well-established
principles: (1) that the Commission need not provide pipelines a
mechanism for guaranteed recovery of costs which market conditions
would not otherwise permit them to recover and (2) that current
ratepayers should only bear the legitimate costs of providing service
to them."1ss
In explaining that regulation does not mean immunity from com-
petition, the Commission drew a subtle distinction that it has ignored
in Order Nos. 888 and 888-A. The problem of unrecoverable gas
costs existed "because" of regulation, in the sense that pipelines
could have recovered even very uneconomic gas costs if they still had
minimum bills and still could restrict customers to bundled gas sales
and closed-access pipelines. Thus in the most fundamental sense,
regulatory changes that exposed pipelines to competition, such as
the NGPA and Order Nos. 380 and 436, "caused" pipelines' recovery
problem.
Yet regulation was only one of two conditions necessary for take-or-
pay costs to pose an industry-wide problem. All the orders did was
pave the way for other gas sellers to compete with merchant pipe-
lines. Neither FERC nor Congress prohibited pipelines from recov-
ering gas costs; deregulation is associated with losses because of al-
ready-existing pipeline anticompetitiveness. The Commission still set
rates that would allow full recovery of investment plus a reasonable
return, on one condition. It was not regulation alone, but the drastic
bloating of costs that put pipelines in jeopardy; Pipelines still had to
persuade customers to buy their gas. FERC pointed out that pipe-
lines' having to absorb gas costs "results ultimately from conditions in
the natural gas market.... not Commission decree."'"3  After all,
FERC had allowed pipelines the alternative of ignoring equitable
sharing and trying to pass through 100% of their costs in ordinary
137. Id. at 61,303.
138. Id. FERC noted that courts "have consistently held that the Commission need not pro-
tect pipelines from underrecoveries of costs resulting from market conditions." Id.
139. Id. The Commission continued, "[N]onetheless it is market conditions generally that
prevent open access pipelines from recovering a significant portion of their take-or-pay costs
through their commodity sales rates." Id.
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rates.4 Pipelines could not do so, of course, because their gas costs
were too far out of line with market prices.
In explaining equitable sharing, the Commission rejected several
arguments that it has since used to justify giving electric companies
full cost recovery. For instance, it said that equitable sharing, under
which pipelines paid many costs, was sufficient for problems of finan-
cial integrity. Equitable sharing allowed recovery of "a sufficiently
large percentage of the costs so that their financial viability and abil-
ity to provide service to their customers is not undermined., 4' FERC
has not attempted a similarly modulated, balanced approach in elec-
tricity.
Pipelines claimed that regulated companies have a right to all pru-
dently incurred costs. 42 This is important for electricity because, in
Order No. 888, FERC used this argument to justify full cost recovery.
In Order No. 528-A, in contrast, FERC reminded pipelines that even
prudent costs are not recoverable if they are not "used and useful.'
4 3
That assets be used and useful is an independent requirement sepa-
rate from prudence. FERC spoke very plainly in explaining that pru-
dence is not the end-all and be-all of regulation, noting that "the fact
that those costs may have been prudently incurred does not mean
that the pipeline must be given the guaranteed right to recover all of
those costs."'"
This holding represented FERC's response to pipeline arguments
that they should be guaranteed recoveries because their contracts
"may have been entered into to meet the reasonably anticipated
needs of the pipeline's customers.' '4 5 Pipelines argued that they were
victims of the fact that "the full anticipated needs may not have mate-
rialized in many instances.', 46 In Order No. 528-A, FERC rejected the
argument that a "reasonable expectation" of continued service was
enough to protect recovery if the assets a regulated firm bought to
provide that service turned out to be uneconomic. In direct conflict,
in Order No. 888, the Commission would build its recovery mecha-
nism directly on electric companies' "reasonable expectations" of a
continuing obligation to serve.
Order No. 528-A made as clear as words can convey that regulation
140. See id. (noting that pipelines had option to seek recovery of 100% of prudently in-
curred take-or-pay costs under Order No. 500).
141. Id. at 61,304.
142. See id. at 61,308 (discussing pipelines' proposed recovery principle).
143. See id. (discussing "used and useful" as a "second principle"); see also infra notes 415-21
and accompanying text.
144. Id. at 61,304.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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does not excuse industry participants from keeping up with market
conditions. Congress and the Commission had taken a series of steps
to remove regulations that protected pipelines and to bring in com-
petition. When FERC then said that the "ultimate[]" problem was
that "conditions in the natural gas market ... do not permit the pipe-
lines to recover all of their costs," 14 7 it did not mean that regulations
played no role in creating that exposure. Of course they did. The
market would not have mattered, no matter how great its potential,
without open access and unbundling and the changes the regulations
made in property rights. When regulatory fetters were released,
however, the underlying uncompetitiveness of pipeline gas purchases
was just as necessary to making take-or-pay costs unrecoverable. That
is what FERC meant when it said that pipelines had forgotten that
only "legitimate costs,""' costs satisfying the used and useful principle
as well as prudence, were recoverable. Even if pipeline costs were
prudent, pipelines still did not have a "guaranteed right to recover all
of those costs." 9 As the Commission then understood, pipelines
were trying to transform an "opportunity" to recover costs into a
"guaranteed" right of payment regardless of efficiency. And so the
pipelines disregarded a second principle: FERC does not have to
guarantee recovery of costs "which market conditions would not oth-
erwise permit them to recover. '' O
Regulated markets always exist in relation to the potential of un-
regulated competition. The regulated firm must make sure that it is
at least moving in the same direction as this partly hypothetical coun-
terpart. It is at risk that technology will change so rapidly, or its in-
vestments will turn out to be so uneconomic, that a large gap will
emerge between its prices and those that unregulated firms could
provide if they are allowed to compete. The potential of competi-
tion, as it evolves and transforms itself by technology, stalks every
regulated firm.
The argument that pipelines (or electric utilities) have protection
from parallel changes in this more potent market turns the regula-
tory framework on its head. Traditionally, the limits on rate caps de-
termine how far commissions can go in limiting, by imposing price
ceilings, the power exercised by regulated companies. This rate
power exists to protect consumers. The allowed rate is to be a proxy
for the competitive price. Nothing in this measure to protect con-
147. Id. at 61,303.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 61,304.
150. Id. at 61,303.
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sumers suggests that the rate also becomes a price floor that protects
regulated companies against competition if their investments turn
out to be so inefficient that billions of dollars in assets will be idled by
the simple act of letting customers choose their suppliers. The thrust
of Order Nos. 380, 436, and 500 is that pipelines remain at risk under
an ongoing, long-term comparison with competitive markets. The
Commission's job is not to insure pipelines-or electric companies-
against competition by transforming structures created to protect
consumers into a shield for monopoly power.
C. Order No. 636 Did Not Change the Primary Gas Recovery Rules
No discussion of natural-gas restructuring is complete without
mentioning Order No. 636. In an order moving up on its second
appeal, FERC opted for a very different approach than equitable
sharing. Like Order Nos. 380 and 436, Order No. 636 was driven by
FERC's determination that pipeline practices were blocking a com-
petitive gas sales market. This time FERC found that open access
shippers were not getting the same quality transportation as direct
customers for firm pipeline space. Bundled service was "operating,
and [would] continue to operate, in a manner that causes consider-
able competitive harm to all segments of the natural gas industry. ' 1
The remedy was to unbundle, or split up, transportation from the
other pipeline services.'
One would have expected FERC to continue its Order Nos. 380,
436, and 500 precedents and make pipelines (as the source of un-
competitive practices) pay a heavy share of the resulting stranded
costs. This did not happen. In Order No. 636, FERC identified four
kinds of stranded 3 costs: unrecovered purchase adjustments, gas
151. Order 636, Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-
Implementing Transportation Under Part 284 of the Commission's Regulations and Regula-
tion of Natural Gas Pipelines after Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267, 13,276
(Apr. 16, 1992) (subsequent history omitted) [hereinafter Order No. 636].
152. Id. at 13,269-70:
Simply put, efficiency in the now national gas market can be realized only when the
purchasers of a commodity know, in a timely manner, the prices of the distinct ele-
ments associated with the full range of services needed to purchase and then deliver
gas from the wellhead to the burnertip.
In brief, this rule requires pipelines to unbundle [i.e., separate] their sales service
from their transportation services at an upstream point near the production area and
to provide all transportation services on a basis that is equal in quality for all gas sup-
plies ....
153. FERC only applied the term "stranded" to the third category of costs, physical facilities
made useless by the unbundling of transportation from other services. As employed in this Ar-
ticle, "stranded" denotes obligations or losses unrecoverable after deregulation, thus rendering
all four categories of costs "stranded" by Order No. 636. See id. at 13,307.
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buy-down and buy-out costs, the cost of facilities made unnecessary by
unbundling, and the cost of new facilities like the meters and pipes
required to unbundle.'-M Pipelines did not have to absorb any of
these costs.
FERC agreed to let pipelines direct bill the two gas charges', It
did not explain why it gave pipelines a much more favorable treat-
ment for their transportation/field service unbundling than, say, for
uncoupling the transportation/merchant roles in Order No. 436, but
its motivation may have been the belief that these new costs were
slight. The Commission redefined Order No. 500 as if it had been a
special case needed to "encourage pipelines to share some of the cost
of the extraordinary take-or-pay liabilities of the early and mid-
1980's."'' 6 In contrast, the Commission "does not anticipate that
pipeline gas supply costs that are incurred as a result of implement-
ing this rule will approach the order of magnitude of the take-or-pay
liability of that era.' 57 If that is the case, Order No. 636's stranded
cost decisions should not be strong precedent for the
"extraordinarily" large stranded costs in electricity.
The Commission's few casual remarks that Order No. 636's transi-
tion costs were not as extraordinary as those in the earlier gas restruc-
turing offer little guidance: the Commission did not suggest how
"extraordinary" should be defined. How big is too big? The empha-
sis on the insignificance of stranded costs under Order No. 636 is
perilously close to an argument that the courts should turn a blind
eye to a lack of principle because even an erroneous rule won't do
much damage.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the
Commission's new treatment for these latest gas costs and asked, at a
minimum, for a better explanation of the deviation 9  The recently-
154. See id.
155. See id. at 13,307-08.
156. Id. at 13,308 (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. Another reason for Order No. 636's deviation from the elaborate natural-gas prece-
dent may be that most commentators appear to have supported full pass-through. See id. at
13,309. One does not have to accept the assertions of capture theory to believe that a lack of
opposition to an industry position makes an agency much more likely to allow the relief. The
deregulation orders were issued in a beleaguered atmosphere, with appeal a certainty and judi-
cial hostility likely, so it would not be surprising if remedies that seemed uncontroversial would
look particularly attractive.
FERC also protected the stranded facilities and new facility expenses. With almost no discus-
sion, it stated that stranded costs from the breakup of bundled sales and the transition costs of
new facilities would be recoverable like any prudently incurred costs. See id. at 13,307-09.
159. The court believed that the rationale for Order No. 500's cost sharing "substantially
applie[d]" to Order No. 636 GSR costs. See United Distrib. Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1188
(D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1723 (1997). The petitioners had put it stronger, noting
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issued Order No. 636-C reiterates FERC's determination to give pipe-
lines full recovery for post-636 stranded gas costs. The Commission's
declaration that the "opportunity to recover the full amount of their
prudently incurred costs" is the "bedrock ratemaking principle " '6°
emphasizes that it has adopted a new approach. In Order No. 500, of
course, the "fundamental principle" was responsibility for overpriced
gas contracts. FERC went out of its way in that Order to reject the
view that pipelines have a right to recover costs that turn out to be
very uneconomic, even if they had been prudently incurred.
In Order No. 500, when FERC held that "all segments" of the in-
dustry were to blame and should share take-or-pay costs, it avoided
deciding the degree to which regulators were responsible for pipe-
line carelessness and inefficiency. In Order No. 636, FERC pre-
tended that it did make this determination. Its new view of Order
No. 500 is that pipelines had to bear some losses only because their
gas-cost problem "was caused more by general market conditions [i.e.,
by pipelines' failure to predict where the market was going] than by
any regulatory action.' 61 Order No. 636-C pretended that post-636
stranded costs were, in contrast, entirely products of regulatory ac-
tion. Most take-or-pay costs had been resolved by the time of Order
No. 636 (thus implying that the "market" problem had been re-
solved) .62 Order No. 636 "upset this relatively stable situation and
created a new jeopardy for the recovery of pipeline gas supply."'63
The Commission also distinguished Order No. 500 as a rule that ad-
dresses a problem "the Commission and the industry had never pre-
viously faced," a problem threatening "massive costs" and an
"extraordinary nature. '' '
No matter how FERC tries to reconcile Order No. 636-C with Or-
der No. 500, it cannot bridge the gap between those two Orders.
Whether courts in fact permit such a rewriting of history will depend
"the remarkable similarities between Order No. 636 GSR costs and Order No. 436 take-or-pay
costs." Id. The court rejected FERC's argument that the Commission could pass through all
GSR costs because they were so small, less than one-fifth the allocated take-or-pay costs. See id.
at 1189.
160. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-
Implementing Transportation Under Part 284 of the Commissions Regulations, 78 F.E.R.C.
1 61,186,61,787 (Feb. 27, 1997) [hereinafter Order No. 636-C].
161. Id. at 61,785 (emphasis added).
162. See id.
163. Id. at 61,786. FERC traced the new problem to several parts of Order No. 636. It
blamed not just the Order's unbundling, but also its having made pipelines give up storage ca-
pacity and having forced downstream pipelines to unbundle, "resulting in the loss of the down-
stream pipelines as sales customers." Id.
164. See id. at 61,784. This sounds like a hint that FERC may now regret the innovative ex-
periment of equitable sharing.
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upon the range of discretion they cede to FERC. Are FERC's powers
broad enough to let the Commission make an entirely contradictory
balance of firm and consumer interests in nearly identical situations?
It is certainly not true that prudent recovery is the sole or bedrock
principle of ratemaking. As the Commission acknowledged in Order
No. 528-A, prudency is but one of two screens traditionally applied to
regulated costs. Even prudent costs are unrecoverable if the assets
are not used and useful.'65 These are independent requisites for cost
recovery.
More fundamentally, FERC decidedly did not say in Order No. 500
that cost-sharing was justified because take-or-pay costs were "caused
more by general market conditions than by any regulatory action.
'' 6
Both natural gas and electricity stranded cost problems exist only be-
cause of two related changes, one regulatory and one "economic."
The regulatory cause is the removal of certain barriers, thus requir-
ing regulated companies to compete. The market causes are mana-
gerial mistakes in long-term investment and planning.
In natural gas restructuring, FERC studiously avoided denying that
regulation had contributed to the problem-it only noted that it had
not prohibited recovery "by decree.', 67 Take-or-pay costs were a prob-
lem because Order No. 380 voided minimum bills and Order No.
436 then required open access. No one involved in this process
could believe that the transformation of the market facing pipelines
was only market-caused.
Conversely, the Commission is just as wrong that Order No. 636's
costs are stranded only because of regulatory changes. If pipelines
had developed competitive sales, field, and transportation services
while under regulation, they would recover their costs fully even after
deregulation. A problem exists for exactly the same reason as for
Order No. 500: the Commission removed regulatory protection that
shielded uneconomic costs, and pipeline costs were so uneconomic
that they could not survive competition without government subsidy.
It was in this context that FERC criticized pipelines for ignoring the
principle that it would not guarantee them "recovery of costs which
market conditions would not otherwise permit," and that ratepayers
should bear only "the legitimate costs," market-proven costs, of pro-
viding service.
In any event, Order No. 636 should not be good precedent for the
utilities. The most obvious difference is that electricity's stranded
165. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
166. Order No. 636-C, 78 F.E.R.C. at 61,785.
167. See Order No. 528-A, 54 F.E.R.C. at 61,303.
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costs are not the small, unextraordinary creatures that' FERC says it
sees in the Order No. 636 transition. Second, Order No. 636 came
after FERC already had made pipelines pay very large stranded costs,
notjust by voiding minimum bills and ending their capacity monopo-
lies, but also by making them pay many take-or-pay costs. Even if
FERC was right in Order No. 636 to allow full pass-throfilgh of its costs
(at least, if prudent), the Commission already had given pipelines the
lion's share of the transition losses. Third, though FERC reaffirmed
its Order No. 636 reasoning in Order No. 636-C, the Order is on ap-
peal again.
The unsettled status of these tail-end '68 natural gas issues should
not divert attention from the main message of natural gas restructur-
ing: cost responsibility should be the deciding principle in allocating
the major stranded gas costs. To the extent that pipelines' failure to
forecast "market conditions" produced their problems, the Commis-
sion made them pay the price even if they had been lulled, seduced,
led, or coerced into their errors by the regulatory structure. The
Commission rejected the idea of passing these inefficiencies on to
customers, whether through minimum bills, closed access, or 100%
recovery of prudent take-or-pay costs. Rewarding uncompetitive de-
cisions would intolerably delay the move to competition and was not
warranted when pipelines had overcommitted for gas supplies and
were discriminating in their use of their space. FERC did not shield
pipelines from marketplace competition. They were not treated as
stakeholders in the regulatory fabric.
IV. THE EARLIEST ELECTRICITY STRANDED-COST RULES IGNORE
COST RESPONSIBILITY
The structure, purpose, and rationale of electricity deregulation,
with its diagnosis of a malaise that only competition can cure and the
medicine of open access, has been drawn from FERC's lessons in the
natural gas market."9 In electricity as in gas, FERC found that regu-
lated firms were imposing billions of dollars in welfare losses
(compared to a competitive market), that this problem forced the
Commission to act, and that the best remedy was to subject firms to
market forces.
168. Tail-end, that is, unless the switch to market-based rates in mainline transportation
produces a dramatic realignment of the transportation end of the business and strands the sig-
nificant core mainline capacity of many pipelines.
169. See Donald Santa, Jr. & Clifford Sikora, Open Access and Transition Costs: Will The Electric
Industry Transition Track the Natural Gas Industry Restructuring?, 15 ENERGY tJ. 273, 299-300
(1994) (discussing how FERC's initial steps under EPAct "paralleled the steps" in Order Nos.
436 and 636, with criteria for nondiscriminatory access influenced by Order No. 636).
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Nonetheless, in electricity, unlike natural gas, the Commission has
rewarded rather than punished utilities for having power that costs
more than customers want to pay. It has mandated full recovery of
stranded costs and delayed the benefits of competition so that utili-
ties may recoup the costs of the very assets that supposedly cause such
a great welfare loss. In contrast to natural gas, FERC has not pun-
ished utilities even though it found that one of the major impedi-
ments to competition was the utilities' discrimination against new,
cheaper electricity generators. This indulgence for electricity
stranded costs is inconsistent with the responsibility that lies with
electric companies for buying uncompetitive plant and contracts and
for refusing to open their lines to new power.
California has taken a similar approach. It has strained to protect
the three companies responsible for the very high cost of its power.
A. Order No. 888 Rewards High Electricity Costs
Order No. 888 creates an open access interstate transmission sys-
tem through which competitively generated wholesale electricity can
flow. Order No. 888's stated goal is "to remove impediments to
competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring
more efficient, lower cost power to the Nation's electricity custom-
ers. 70 In general, federal electricity deregulation adopts the same
institutional mechanisms used to restructure natural gas. FERC ex-
tended its natural-gas rules, as any organization might when faced
with the uncertainty of a new environment, mimicking what it be-
lieves are successful innovations that it recently adopted in a similar
situation. 1
The Commission's rationale is identical to its Order No. 436 theory
that open access will transmit competition from a producing market
to consumers at the other end of a distribution system. The means to
create competition are the same as in Order No. 436, too, "open ac-
cess nondiscriminatory transmission tariffs."'' n The underlying impe-
tus to action is the same: inefficient investment decisions by regu-
lated utilities and discriminatory denials of access against cheaper
170. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,541.
171. For an organizational theory offering various reasons why firms will tend to adopt simi-
lar or "isomorphic" organizational structures, see Paul Dimaggio & Walter Powell, The Iron Cage
Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields 64, in THE
NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIs (Walter Powell & Paul Dimaggio eds.,
1991). Energy restructuring fits this model with one change; rather than new firms adopting
the rules and practices that seem to have worked for existing firms, here single agencies choose
to expand new, apparently successful rules to additional industries. Uniformity persists because
people copy rules that seem to work in social life.
172. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,540.
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suppliers, in this case in the generation rather than gas purchase
market:
We have identified a fundamental, generic problem in the electric
industry: owners, controllers, and operators of monopoly transmis-
sion facilities that also own power generation facilities have the in-
centive to engage, and have engaged, in unduly discriminatory
practices in the provision of transmission services by denying third
parties transmission services that are comparable to the transmis-
sion services that they are providing, or are capable of providing,
for their own power sales and purchases. 73
The Commission's authority to order open access to remedy the
situation is the same, right down to its expressly relying on the same
appellate decision that confirmed FERC's power to press interstate
'74pipelines to become open access.
The early pages of Order No. 888 detail the inefficiencies that
FERC attributes to regulated electricity. Electric utilities and their
customers coexisted comfortably into the Sixties because the econo-
mies of scale in big plants lowered costs and prices. 175 With prices fal-
ling, there seemed to be little reason to worry about efficiency and
competition. When utilities expanded into nuclear and other large-
scale plants in the Seventies and early Eighties, however, they made
the several mistakes described in Part I of this Article. One, they as-
sumed continuous increases in demand. Demand did not keep ris-
ing, so much new capacity was not needed. 76 Two, they did not pro-
tect themselves against sharp cost increases, and interest rates,
inflation, and bad planning sharply raised the costs of building
plants. 77 Three, they misread technology. Bigger plants turned out
173. Id. at 21,566; see also id. at 21,560, 21,567. The quoted language treats only the prob-
lem of discrimination; for a treatment of the separate problem that utilities seemed unlikely to
make competitive investment decisions, see infra note 180 and accompanying text.
174. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,560-61 (discussing AGD 1).
175. See id. at 21,543 & n.6. The Commission added technological improvements and
"moderate" increases in input prices as contributing factors. See id.; see also Bernard S. Black &
Richard U. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating the United
States Electricity Industry, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 1339, 1344 (1993) (noting that regulatory structure
was accepted into late Sixties because "the real price of electric power declined steadily be-
cause of a constant stream of technological advances"). The real price declines did not mean,
of course, that regulated power was efficient in any real sense during this period, only that the
prices did not pinch. Electric companies may have been generating power at costs well above
their production possibilities frontier. Consumers showed little interest in regulatory issues
into the Sixties because real prices still were falling. SeePAULJOSKOW & RjCHARD SCHMALENSEE,
MARgiETSFORPOWER: ANANALYSiSOFELECrRICUTIL~rYDREGULATION 5 (1983); Alfred Kahn,
Can Regulation and Competition Coexist? Solutions to the Stranded Cost Problem and Other Conundra,
7 ELEc.J. 23 (1994) ("I can't believe we would be witnessing the changes we are witnessing to-
day if the industry had been able to continue the performance of the '50s and '60s, when the
average price of electricity in the United States dropped over 40% in real terms.").
176. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,543 & nn.12-13.
177. See id. at 21,543-44. The planning for nuclear plants, for instance, turned out to be
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to be more costly in operation; their downtime and maintenance
raised costs, and under new technologies, 50 to 150 megawatt plants
wound up cheaper than 500 megawatt plants. 7 1 Many of today's most
expensive plants are nuclear plants built with very large overruns; be-
tween 1985 and 1992, utilities had to write off at least $22.4 billion in
nuclear plant investment.'9
Even with the adjustments already made for nuclear plants, FERC
found that the national electric industry maintains facilities and sup-
ply contracts that cost far too much. Customers captive to older
plants may be paying two to three times as much as necessary for
their power.
The Commission had to deregulate wholesale interstate electricity
because it believed that regulated utilities not only acted uncompeti-
tively in the past, but that they would not behave competitively in the
future if regulated. This is why FERC found, looking forward, that it
had become "increasingly clear that the potential consumer benefits
that could be derived from... technological advances could be real-
ized only if more efficient generating plants could obtain access to
the regional transmission grids."'' s Regulated utilities will not adopt
the most efficient technologies voluntarily.
Current performance is so inefficient that the Commission believes
opening interstate transmission systems to competition can save con-
sumers between $3.8 and $5.4 billion a year. 8' Innovation and a bet-
ter use of existing assets should bring more gains,82 and these are but
a small part of the savings that would accrue from state retail deregu-
lation.
Electricity open-access naturally will create large losses. Customers
shifting to new firms have to abandon their traditional suppliers.
wildly inept, with overruns of as much as 1000%. See Pierce, supra note 60, at 504. As with vir-
tually every other kind of stranded cost, here too there are wide differences of opinion on
whether the companies or regulators are to blame for the problem.
178. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,543-44.
179. See id. at 21,544 & n.19. The EEI estimates the write-off during the Eighties at $16 bil-
lion. See EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 12-13. The problems with nuclear plants were ex-
traordinary. Some plants overran budgets by a factor of ten. SeeBlack & Pierce, supra note 175,
at 1346. The total disallowance ended up being roughly 30% of all nuclear plant costs. See id.
180. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,546.
181. See id. at 21,541, 21,550. One of the most interesting aspects of deregulation is how
little utilities have fought the conclusion that electricity can be generated much more cheaply
than regulated companies have accomplished in recent years. The EEl's economic experts
admitted bluntly that, with open competition, "many utilities would be unable to recover a
large fraction of the costs associated with these power supply commitments." EEl ECONOMISTS'
REPORT, supra note 36, at 1; see also Kahn, supra note 175, at 3 (arguing that, without careful
deregulation, "some electric utilities may end up like the airlines, which lost more money in
three years than the industry had made in its entire history").
182. SeeOrder No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,541, 21,550.
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FERC has decided to let utilities recover the resulting stranded costs
(measured by the "revenues lost") from each departing customer.
Order No. 888 made the recovery of "legitimate, prudent and verifi-
able stranded costs" a purpose coequal to achieving open, nondis-
criminatory access.' In words that pipelines longed to hear, the Or-
der emphasized utilities' reliance on the regulatory scheme (as well
as society's need for solvent utilities) in making their now-unwanted
investments. FERC decided that stranded cost recovery is "critical to
the successful transition of the electric industry to a competitive,
open access environment. '
Order No. 888 ues contract rights to protect utilities from their
losses. It grafts a right to recover stranded costs onto all wholesale
requirements contracts signed before the open-access rulemaking
notice, as long as the contracts are silent about stranded costs.Iss For
these contracts, utilities can file to recover the revenues lost from
each departing customer."' To earn this protection, an electric
company will have to show that it had a "reasonable expectation" of
continuing to serve the customer.18 7 The Commission in essence has
improved (from the utility's perspective) the rate bargain in these
183. See id. at 21,540.
184. Id. at 21,630.
185. Utilities with wholesale requirements contracts dated beforeJuly 11, 1994 (the date of
FERC's electricity open access NOPR) whose contracts reimbursed stranded costs will recover
by the contract terms. Those whose contracts prohibit recovery will not recover. See id. at
21,639-44, 21,664. Contracts after this date will have to have an express recovery provision for
any costs to be imposed on the departing customer. See id. at 21,638-39.
186. Presumably it will be the rare cost that an electric company cannot "verify." This leaves
the requirements that costs be "legitimate" and "prudent" (and whether these two words might
intend separate standards). The Commission refused to "make a blanket assumption that all
claimed stranded costs will have been prudently incurred." Id. at 21,664. Nonetheless, it seems
unlikely that the Commission will allow much battle over prudence. It reassured utilities that
.we do not intend to relitigate the prudence of costs previously recovered." Id.
In spite of FERC's use of the word "recovered," as if it was just following the filed-rate doc-
trine, its assurance and general standards for stranded costs make it unlikely that it will reliti-
gate the prudence of costs allowed in the ratebase, even if not yet"recovered." Finally, given
the strong assurances of stranded cost recovery in Order No. 888, it is hard to imagine that the
Commission would find any costs that otherwise satisfy the Order still are not "legitimate."
187. See id. at 21,630. This restriction should not be overemphasized; Order No. 888 did not
decide what to do with utilities that could not show a "reasonable expectation" of continuing
service, so these costs too may end up being recoverable from at least some customers. See id.
at 21,653-54. On the other hand, this standard suggests a lot of litigation over at least two of its
aspects. First, was there a reasonable expectation at all-does the utility have a right to an Or-
der No. 888 recovery? Second, if so, how long does the expectation last? The duration of ex-
pectations will be another fertile field for litigation.
Although FERC has welcomed stranded cost recovery generically and has indicated that it
will not relitigate already-decided prudence questions, the "reasonable expectation" standard
will allow one kind of prudence litigation. The issue will be the prudence of a utility's expecta-
tion of continuing to serve a departing customer, however, not the cost prudence of the plant it
built to do so.
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contracts.8 8
The Commission has tried to claim jurisdiction to apply similar
rules to costs stranded by retail-turned-wholesale customers."" In ad-
dition, though it generally will not allocate costs stranded by retail
wheeling, the Commission says that it will do so whenever a state
commission does not have authority over stranded retail costs. 9"
Although there are limits to Order No. 888's recovery mecha-
nism-for instance, it will not apply if a utility loses a customer to self-
generation, co-generation, or by switching to a competitor without
using open access g'-the Order will protect utilities' major capital
investments in interstate electricity supply. This high level of protec-
tion is underlined by the Commission's assurance that it will not let
customers relitigate the prudence of costs already "recovered."'9'
FERC's eagerness to defend financial "integrity" also will not be satis-
188. For a persistent attack upon Order No. 888 as an abrogation of contracts (an attack
that proved ineffective for pipelines in gas restructuring), see Request for Rehearing of the
Vermont Department of Public Service 35-38 (May 24, 1996).
189. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,644-46.
190. See id. at 21,647-51. Both this and FERC's assertion of jurisdiction over retail-turned-
wholesale customers-decisions that would expand the Commission's exercise of power within
the industry-are sure to spark vehement appeals by the states, in spite of pro forma profes-
sions of a desire to work with the Commission. Otherwise, the Commission will have effectively
used changes in the electricity market brought about in large part by its own orders to expand
the services under its jurisdiction. Although deregulation generally is not consistent with the
model of an agency single-mindedly seeking to expand its power, if that was the Commission's
concern its restructuring would look like an extraordinarily indirect and clever way to manipu-
late itsjurisdiction.
For characteristic state responses, see COMMENTS OF THE NAT'L ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTIL.
COMM'RS 16-25 (Dec. 9, 1994) [hereinafter NARUC COMMENTS]; COMMENTS OF THE PUB.
UTILS. COMM'N OF THE STATE OF CAL. 6 (Aug. 3, 1995) ("FERC is employing a legal fiction in
asserting that the availability of open access wholesale tariffs converts the character of the
stranded costs of the generation built to serve retail customers and other retail costs such as
purchased power and regulatory assets from 'retail' to 'wholesale.'").
The federal/state relation over retail costs may become the most important question for the
long-term direction of electricity deregulation, but it is beyond the scope of this Article. The
issue is beginning to come up in a different forum with proposed federal legislation that would,
in essence, graft the principles of Order No. 888's wholesale open access onto intrastate retail
electricity. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. As for FERC's own stab at imperialism,
one whose legality almost certainly will end up being decided by the courts, it is amusing to
note that FERC tried to justify its power grab as"based on a policy decision by this Commission
that it will step in to fill a regulatory 'gap' that could result in no effective forum." Order No.
888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,375. This may be the worstjustification FERC could offer. It certainly
is true that its claim of retail jurisdiction rests more on policy than on law, and it is true that
statutes like the Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act were passed in good part because Con-
gress wanted to "plug" a gap within state regulation that had been opened by certain Supreme
Court decisions, but the strongest objections to this expanded FERC power arejurisdictiona4
not policy, arguments. A fair reading and likely criticism of the Commission's retail designs is
that it is trying to act as a master social planner and correct apparent irrationalities in the regu-
latory scheme without regard to jurisdiction. This "policy decision" passage is sure to be fea-
tured prominendy in the briefs of critics.
191. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,630.
192. See id. at 21,664; Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,391.
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fled unless the Order protects a number of costs that otherwise would
be at risk. Electricity customers will end up paying for assets they do
not want to use because much cheaper power is available.
In Order No. 888-A, the Commission tried to defend its failure to
require equitable sharing, under which utilities would pay for some
of their uneconomic plant and contracts, by arguing, inter alia, that it
has protected very few costs. It pointed to the many options to bypass
systems by self-generation, cogeneration, and the like; 93 to the fact
that some prudence review remains fair game;'9 and to the risks cre-
ated by the "reasonable expectations"1 95 test. It insisted that
"[aillowing full recovery of stranded costs under Order No. 888 is
not equivalent to allowing 100 percent recovery of the costs of all un-
economic assets.1 99
These palliatives seem very much beside the point. Order No. 888
must assume that most stranded costs will pass the prudence test.
Most either are already "recovered," in which case the Commission
will not relitigate prudence, or fall into a category of costs that have
been partially recovered. It is hard to imagine the Commission rul-
ing that a category of costs substantially recovered in the past must be
unrecoverable in the future. This decision in effect immunizes that
category of costs. The Commission has not disallowed costs stranded
by other means, like self-generation; these costs may be recoverable
too, just not through the exit fee."7 And Order No. 888 makes its
"reasonable expectations" test most utility-friendly by suggesting that
an exclusive service area, with a mandatory obligation to serve all cus-
tomers, will satisfy the test "easily."'98
193. SeeOrder No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,374,12,381-82, 12,391.
194. See id. at 12,391.
195. See id. at 12,374, 12,378 (insisting that Order No. 888 offers only an "opportunity," not
a "guarantee," of cost recovery, and claiming that the reasonable expectations test imposes a
"heavy burden" on electric companies).
196. Id. at 12,391. In one page of Order No. 888-A, FERC claimed three major limits on
cost recovery. First, as mentioned in the text, the order does not cover losses from self-
generation and other customer exits that do not rely on Order No. 888. Second, the Order
only applies to pre-July 11, 1994 wholesale requirements contracts-and then only if they do
not already have a stranded-cost mechanism-plus to some retail-turned-wholesale costs.
Third, electric companies must satisfy the reasonable expectations test. See id. at 12,374.
197. See id. at 12,382. The fact that Order No. 888 does not pass such costs along"does not
mean that the Commission may not, in appropriate circumstances, permit their recovery
through traditional ratemaking means." Id. FERC will address such costs on a "case-by-case
basis" and look at "many factors," including "whether the utility is selling at cost-based or mar-
ket-based rates and the transitional period to more competitive bulk power markets." Id.
198. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,651 & n.772. The NRRI has counted 23 states that
make "specific service area assignments under territorial exclusivity statutes," and 38 that man-
date that utilities serve all customers. See ROSE, supra note 3, at 41. This decision is counterbal-
anced, but only in part, by FERO's decision that notice-of-termination clauses will create a re-
buttable presumption of no reasonable expectation. See infra note 530 and accompanying text.
19981
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:775
Order Nos. 888 and 888-A remain overwhelmingly utility- friendly.
If these Orders did not protect most stranded costs, they would de-
feat the Commission's stated concerns about utility financial integ-
rity.'" They grant utilities a windfall by eliminating responsibility for
excessive costs as a factor in the pass-through decision. Thus, the fac-
tor that caused the turn to deregulation has been shunted off the
stage before the stranded-cost recovery ritual is enacted.
One structural difference between the natural gas and electricity
industries suggests that Order No. 888 may have less immediate im-
pact on electricity than Order No. 436 had on natural gas. The elec-
tricity industry is much more integrated than its natural gas counter-
part.2° Utilities have tended to build their own generation facilities
One of the interesting tests will be what the Commission does when it faces a utility that had a
guaranteed service area, but signed contracts with notice of termination clauses. Here, as else-
where, the test is supposed to be 'factual," so the answer may be, 'almost anything."
199. See infra Part V.B (discussing utilities' financial integrity).
200. See Pierce, supra note 7, at 337-38, 342-49 (discussing integration as characteristic dis-
tinguishing electricity from natural gas); see also Santa & Sikora, supra note 169, at 279 (dis-
cussing industry structures).
It is interesting how little the Commission has made of the integrated structure of the indus-
try. Natural gas was a heavily integrated industry, too. Though there were many independent
producers, pipelines handled everything from the wellhead forward in a structure that today
looks quite inefficient. Vertical integration may be the result of government franchise, as it is
an easy way for the regulator and regulated alike to make sure that jurisdictional companies
hold the reins to the industry. It is more economic to regulate an integrated industry. Some
economists have come to believe that firms only integrate ("making," rather than "buying,"
products and services) if they find it more efficient to do so. This is a simplification of Oliver
Williamson's transactions cost economics. See, e.g., OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) (building on Ronald Coase's The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386 (1937), reprinted inRONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THELAW 33-55
(1988)).
The first question one might ask an economist is, why would integration persist if it is not ef-
ficient? Or, if integration is common, in what way does it serve efficiency? EEl's economists
opine that "complementarities between generation and transmission [are] the primary rea-
son[s] [that], until recently, those two functions have been performed by single, vertically inte-
grated entities in virtually every electric power system in the world." EEl ECONOMISTS' REPORT,
supra note 36, at 7. These economists also warn that deregulation may sacrifice the benefits of
this integration unless it is handled very carefully. See id. at 27-29.
If utilities reap economies from integration, forcing them apart (as in natural gas unbun-
dling) may raise costs and lower efficiency. SeeJeffrey Leitzinger, Why Deregulate Electric Utili-
ties?, Address at the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, at 4, 12 (Nov.
1995) (on file with author) (asserting that there are"plenty of reasons to believe that there ex-
ist significant economies of scope and coordination in operating generation in T&D as an inte-
grated activity"). Leitzinger also notes that "economies associated with the integration of deliv-
ery and commodity services are significant." Id. at 12. See generally Kahn, supra note 175, at 9 ("1
know of no way of weighing the social benefits of competition against the benefits in principle
of centralized responsibility for reliability of supply, coordination of investments and opera-
tions and wholehearted cooperation, such as occurs in power pools, among non-competing,
geographically separated, vertically integrated franchised monopolies."). It is sobering to recall
that little more than a decade ago, Paul Joskow and Richard Schmalensee were warning that it
.would be wrong to assume" that generation, transmission, and distribution "segments" of elec-
tric companies "can be operated independently from one another, by separate firms coordinat-
ing their activities using only the price system, without any loss in economic efficiency."
JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 175, at 25. This very complex topic encompasses
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nearby. Thus the major electricity stranded cost issues will belong to
state commissions. 0 In natural gas, on the other hand, even when
"economies of scale of individual products, economies of scope (economies of multiproduct
production) across different products, and economies associated with vertical integration." Id.
at 28. "[V]ertical and horizontal disintegration may increase the competitiveness of wholesale
markets, (but] significant costs may thus be associated with any such restructuring." Id. at 214.
Moreover, in a reminder for a time when overly large generating plants are such a problem,
Joskow and Schmalensee observed that the industry was filled with too many small companies
(for an economist's taste, at least), so that "there are too many separate utilities that are too
small to realize all economies of scale and coordination internally." See id. at 83. Plants were
being built "of less than optimal scale," see id. at 85, and mergers among small utilities "should
be encouraged," see id. at 219. This need for horizontal scale is different from the current
quest for vertical unbundling. Assuming that too many generating plants are indeed too small,
relaxation of government controls combined with the vitality of market forces should produce
a series of mergers designed to capture scale economies in generation. As with the other unan-
swered questions about deregulation, we will have to wait and see.
For an interesting, related argument that there is little efficiency gain in most horizontal
electricity mergers, but that gains may be realized by mergers that offer vertical integration, see
generally Raymond Hartman, The Efficiency Effects of Electric Utility Mergers: Lessons From Statist ical
Cost Analysis, 17 ENERGYLJ. 425 (1996).
201. SeeEEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 6. With the bias that predictably invades rulemak-
ing, electric companies pressed FERC to assume jurisdiction over as many retail costs as possi-
ble. Many of their comments were written using a code that urged the Commission to adopt
"backstop"jurisdiction. See id.; see also SUPPLEMENTAL COMMENTS OF PAC. GAS & ELEC. 2 (Feb.
16, 1996).
Electric companies cannot come out and say what they really want from the Commission,
which is to step into their fight and force state commissions to give at least as favorable a treat-
ment to intrastate stranded costs as the one the Commission has designed for interstate costs.
Instead, euphemisms abound. See, e.g., COMMENTS OF PAC. GAS & ELEC. 14 (Aug. 4, 1995)
(calling for "consistency" between state and federal treatments); COMMENTS OF S. CAL. EDISON
Co. 9 (Dec. 9, 1994) (asking FERC to make sure states have "effective standards" for their re-
covery mechanisms); see also THIERER, supra note 3, at 8 (calling for "minimal" regulation to
prevent "bad actor" states from impeding flow of interstate commerce); id. at 29-30 (urging
FERC to assert jurisdiction to prevent states from "hinderfing] interstate commerce" by
"favorfing] incumbent producers"). The argument is stretched when made by groups that tra-
ditionally urge states' rights in hopes of reducing federal intervention, but here urge Congress
to assume a very broad power over an area (retail electricity) traditionally left to states in the
belief that Congress will use this power to reimburse their stranded costs. See ADAM THIERER,
HERITAGEFOUNDATION REPORT, ELEcTRICITYDEREGULATION AND FEDERALISM: HOW CONGRESS
AND THE STATES CAN WORK TOGETHER TO DEREGULATE SUcCESSFULLY 22 (1997) (straining to
reconcile federalism with fedetal standards for electricity deregulation, including stranded cost
recovery).
Of course, the companies are eager to have FERC dictate the terms of stranded cost recovery
only because the Commission had decided to let them recover their costs. Had the Commis-
sion instead used Order No. 888 to select a sharing mechanism that fell heavily on utilities, or
made utilities absorb the full costs, the same companies would be protesting that the Commis-
sion cannot possibly have jurisdiction over any part of the traditionally state retail costs. Given
Order No. 888's favorable language, backstop jurisdiction really means that the states would be
free to decide the treatment of stranded costs only as long as the result is at least as favorable as
Order No. 888.
It was just as predictable that electric companies would favor no limit on the duration of the
recovery period, a running reassessment of stranded costs until all have been recovered, the
widest possible presumption that a service franchise conclusively proves a "reasonable expecta-
tion" of serving a customer, with virtually no weight given to contract notice provisions, and so
forth. Or that they would urge reliance on the regulatory compact as justification for 100%
cost recovery without addressing the extent to which stranded costs result from their own mis-
takes and gaming the system. This does not mean that other interest groups were less partisan,
just that the Commission should not expect much help from the parties it polices.
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pipelines offered the "bundled" service of delivered gas, the gas gen-
erally came from other states. For that reason, FERC's deregulation
of interstate electricity will reform a smaller part of that industry than
its open access orders did in natural gas.Y
Even though its reform in electricity is on a smaller scale than that
in natural gas, the Commission's actions will have an important effect
on the larger industry. The path the Commission cleared in natural
gas has been very influential, and its steps in electricity will be simi-
larly followed. To name but the most important example, FERC's
NOPR on open access spurred California to institute its restructur-
ing.0 3 Order No. 888 has the potential for even greater mischief if it
becomes the basis for a federal retail bill.
B. California Indulged its Electric Companies
California, the leader in state deregulation, has taken a similarly
deferential view of stranded costs. One reason California's example is
important is that, with Pacific Gas and Electric Company ("PG&E")
and Southern California Edison Company ("SoCal") within its bor-
ders, it has two of the utilities with the largest stranded costs in the
country.2Y4 The state is one of the most important markets for elec-
tricity: it consumes roughly 15% of the country's electricity, second
only to Texas. 5
202. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
203. See CPUC, ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING AND ORDER INSTITUTING INVESTIGATION 37
(Apr. 20, 1994) [hereinafter CPUC ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING] (stating that "[t3he re-
forms enacted by Congress in 1992 took the first important steps to fulfill that promise" of a
competitive market).
In Order No. 888, FERC listed twelve states that had retail wheeling legislation or pilot pro-
grams "underway" after FERC issued its open-access notice of rulemaking. See 61 Fed. Reg. at
21,550 n.101. Fourteen other states were investigating retail wheeling in early 1996, and 47
public utilities had filed open access tariffs. See id. By the end of 1996, almost all states had be-
gun some kind of preliminary investigation into restructuring. See EIA UPDATE, supra note 10,
at 67.
204. See id. at 80-81.
205. EIA, ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY tbl. 47 (June 1997) (in 1997, California consumed
51,693 million kilowatt hours of electricity, Texas 64,073 million, Ohio 40,642 million, Pennsyl-
vania 33,109 million, and New York 32,902 million). Texas' consumption (in light of its
smaller population) can presumably be explained in large part by the concentration of the na-
tion's refining industry, a major center for self-generation, along the Texas Gulf Coast. Inter-
estingly, the rankings do not mirror either population or gross state product perfectly. For in-
stance, California far outstrips Texas in population (31.6 million to 18.7 million); NewYork has
nearly as many people as Texas with 18.1 million; and Florida and then Pennsylvania follow
these states. At present, Ohio is not in the top five states in population. See BURFAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1996, tbl. 27 (Resident Population)
(1996). In output, California was again the leader, but NewYork had a larger gross state prod-
uct than Texas, Illinois was number four, and Florida and Pennsylvania were higher than Ohio.
See id. tbl. 689 (Gross State Product). Not surprisingly, given California's status as the retail
front-runner, many states "appear to be waiting to see how successful California will be at over-
coming the numerous contractual, organizational, and logistical issues that remain." White,
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California's electric market faces many difficulties, in particular
because its electricity costs are higher than most other states. In
1993, CPUC staff found that the state's average cost of electricity was
roughly 50% above the national average.06 As CPUC Chairman
Gregory Conlon has admitted, the state restructured "not out of de-
sire, but of necessity."20 7 According to the utilities, one reason for
their high costs is that the CPUC left them with too many public in-
terest responsibilities, all of which cost money.0 There seems little
dispute that the CPUC got heavily involved in standards for power
generation. California became a "leader in energy conservation" two
decades ago.'" It was, in its staff's words, "aggressive" in pushing its
QF program.2 0 The CPUC also pushed demand-side management
heavily.
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An obvious alternative cause for such expensive power is that the
three large companies that supply most of California's power have
dominated the regulatory process and used it poorly. The finding
that regulation "blunted" efficiency makes sense only if the CPUC be-
lieved that the state's large utilities fundamentally failed in their duty
to provide low-cost power.
California's experiment got fully underway with a deregulation or-
der issued on December 20, 199522 The Order followed several
years of staff work, hearings, comments by major stakeholders, and
some legislative guidance. It included a promise that utilities would
recover all of their stranded costs.
The CPUC said that it had to act because rates were just too high.
"Our debates have revealed the broadest consensus that our rates are
too high .... ,21 "Despite their many differences, stakeholders over-
whelmingly agreed on one thing-the Commission must fundamen-
supra note 4, at 210.
206. CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 83, 192.
207. CPUC Chairman Gregory Conlon, Address at ABA Annual Convention (S.F. Aug. 5,
1997).
208. See SoCal et al., Memorandum of Understanding, in Rulemaking Proceeding R-94-04-
031 and Investigation 1.94-04-032, at 10 (Sept. 18, 1995) (urging recovery of all prudent"past
investments and obligations made to fulfill its historical obligation to serve"). SoCal describes
agency-fostered investments as including general power contracts, QF contracts, regulatory as-
sets and decommissioning. See id.; see also EIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 7 (estimate of avoided
cost upon which California QF prices rest "was originally quite high because of the high oil and
gas prices paid by electric utilities in the late 1970's and early 1980's"); cf. EEI EcONOMISTs'
REPORT, supra note 36, at 12 ("[E]specially in states in the Northeast and in California, these
planning processes forced utilities to purchase power at prices higher than they would other-
wise have had to pay.").
209. SeeYELLOW REPORT, supra note 14, at 46.
210. See id. at 50, 66.
211. See id. at 71-72, 90-91.
212. See CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27.
213. Id. at 6; see also id. at 110.
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tally reform California's regulatory policy governing investor-owned
utilities., 214 This conclusion mirrored FERC's singling out California
for having very expensive power in Order No. 888.5
The Commission seemed reluctant to publicize why California has
such high electricity costs. The deregulation Order reads as if every-
one agrees that there is a serious problem with California's regulated
electricity industry, but no one wants to say what it is. The Order
does not specifically discuss the inefficiencies of the CPUC'sjurisdic-
tional generating plants and supply contracts, or any reason why Cali-
fornia's electric costs have been so high. This may not be surprising:
any explanation would have to include a discussion of how such a
great problem could have developed on its watch.
The CPUC did note at a few points that monopoly power had to be
restricted, and it justified the new Independent System Operator
("ISO") as an antidote to discrimination. Thus the Commission did
suggest, though sotto voce, that utility discrimination against new,
cheaper generation was one cause of the state's abnormally high
electricity costs.
2 1 6
If discrimination is one problem, careless investment decisions
214. Id. app. B, at 3.
215. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,550 (noting that cost of electricity varies from 3
to 5 cents in the Northwest to 9 to 11 cents in California); cf EIA UPDATE, supra note 10, at 67
(including California among states whose high electricity cost had provided "compelling rea-
sons to promote competition"). Seegenerally supra notes 19, 52-53 and accompanying text.
216. See CPU DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 189 (noting that the ISO"lessens the
potential for owners of the transmission system to favor their own generation facilities over
nonutility facilities." Unlike FERC, however, the Commission did not expressly find that such
discrimination had occurred. It issued another finding that the "abuse of market power re-
duces the societal efficiencies of competition." Id. at 192. Yet it discusses the problem of mar-
ket power without directly finding that utilities abused that power. The CPUC decided that
divestiture is the only remedy that can counter the utility's "ability" to engage in cross-
subsidization but again without saying that this had occurred. See id. at 193. It endorsed the
broad conclusion of law that "[ w] e cannot have a. fully competitive market for generation un-
less and until we eliminate any significant lingering ability of the monopoly utility to distort
prices or restrict competition in the new competitive market." Id. at 208. Here, too, though,
the CPUC implied that anticompetitive utility practices are part of the problem without making
any finding of when, where, and how these practices had occurred. Hunting through the
CPUC Order for the true reasons why regulation did not work in California could turn into a
popular parlor game, for there are hints here and there, coy little statements, but never a clear
statement. The CPUC order seems to be so diffused with the joy of"getting-to-yes" that per-
haps the Commission felt there was no need to explain the reasons that deregulation arose in
the first place.
It cannot be said that FERC's Order No. 888 is much more candid about the severity of the
problems that led to deregulation, but at least FERC stated clearly that discrimination had and
would continue to occur and that, in its view, allowing new entrants was necessary for genera-
tors to build the most efficient plant. The CPUC order and its companion, AB 1890, operate
much more mysteriously as they embark on a major industry restructuring because of wildly
inefficient utility decisions, which created a cost differential they repeatedly recite in their find-
ings about high costs, but without once discussing the facts that would suggest that utilities were
to blame in such large part.
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must be another. After reciting how California's costs are 50% above
national averages, the CPUC noted that "[o]verall, the existence of
an incentive, such as shareholders' financial rewards and penalties,
could encourage utility managers to do a better job.21 7 Managers
can only do a better job, of course, if they have been doing poorly.
This language seems to concede that utility investing decisions were
not as efficient as they should have been. Like the Commission's lan-
guage about discrimination, however, so too this reference to ineffi-
ciencies is strangely muted. The CPUC never worked this fundamen-
tal point into its treatment of stranded costs.
Whatever it may lack in depth of consideration, the CPUC more
than made up by enthusiasm for reform. It embraced competition
eagerly: "Competition in the electricity market will deliver desirable
market characteristics that have not been delivered by the regulated
market regime of the past. 2 '8 To create competition, the CPUC or-
dered sweeping changes in California's power industry. First, the
operational control (though not ownership) of the transmission grid
will go to an independent entity, one not controlled by any electric
company, the ISO.29 The ISO will "coordinate the daily schedul-
ing, 20 and be responsible for the "dispatch and delivery of power
over the transmission system. '' 2
Second, another new organization, the Power Exchange, will run a
continuous state-wide auction for the lowest priced power.2 All utili-
ties will have to sell their power into this pool during the transition
years.2 The separation of utilities from their own generation will be
enforced by the rule that they cannot buy power directly from their
own facilities during the transition, though they may end up using
217. See id. at 83.
218. Id. at 192. This is the optimistic view. California's two major consumer groups, Utility
Reform Network ("TURN") and Utility Consumers' Action Network ("UCAN"), asked FERC to
block approval of restructuring because the large utilities will be able to dominate the new
market. See Protest of TURN and UCAN, FERC Docket Nos. EC96-19-003, ER96-1663-003 I
(June 5, 1997) (asking Commission not to approve applications to form ISO and PX unless
substantial alterations to market structure and protocol were made).
219. See CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 11 (discussing ISO).
220. Id. at 15.
221. Id. at 25, 32 (ISO has responsibility to preserve reliability and achieve low costs).
222. See id. at 12.
223. See id. at 51. In the Commission's words:
On the day it begins to function the Power Exchange will be the market institution in
which all generators are able to compete on the basis of short run incremental elec-
tricity costs in an open setting and on what is literally a level playing field. Equally im-
portant, all buyers of electric energy will derive basic consumer protection in their
ability to freely monitor the results of that competition ....
Id. at 54. The Power Exchange "will function as a clearinghouse by providing a transparent
market for generation with hourly or half-hourly price signals evident to immediate users and
long-term investors." Id. at 47.
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their own power if their affiliates submit the lowest-priced bid to the
Power Exchange.2 24 Both the Power Exchange and the ISO were to
be in operation by January 1, 1998, a date slightly extended, so this
structural revolution has already begun.m
Third, rates for the two functions that the CPUC believes will re-
main natural monopolies, distribution and transmission, will be
shifted from cost-of-service to a performance basis. In a decision that
puts the CPUC ahead of FERC, the California Commission decided
that "[e]xisting cost-of-service regulation has become too complex
and difficult in many ways to allow us to regulate the utilities properly
in this fast-moving industry., 2 6 Its solution is a rate "measured
against established benchmarks." 7
These changes will unbundle generation, distribution, and trans-
mission. With the ISO, utilities will continue to own transmission as-
sets, but they will no longer operate them.2 25 In a nutshell, the system
should work as follows:
Utilities will continue to control and operate their distribution sys-
tem, to own and operate their generation assets (subject to some
incentive for divestiture), and to procure generation services for
their energy service customers. They will also continue to own, but
not operate, their transmission facilities.m
As an added precaution to ensure more competition in generating,
the major utilities will be forced to divest at least half of their fossil-
fuel generating plants.2 '0 SoCal has filed plans to sell all of its nonnu-
clear plants;' PG&E will sell four plants that comprise half of its fos-
sil-fuel generating and reportedly intends to sell more.23
Functionally, these changes are intended to produce a competitive,
state-wide power pool with new companies entering the generating
224. See id. at 208.
225. See id. at 218-28.
226. Id. at 82.
227. Id. One can add the definition of these not-established benchmarks to the list of issues
that are likely to engender a great deal of litigation.
228. See id. at 93.
229. Id. at 207.
230. See id. at 100-01.
231. See SOCAL APPLICATION FOR AUTHORITY TO SELL GAS-FIRED ELECTRICAL GENERATION
FACILITIES, ExECuTIvE SUMMARY 2 (Nov. 27, 1996). SoCal's application covers 12 plants in
Southern California, see id. at 1, but not SoCal's two coal generating units, see id. at 2.
232. See PG&E APPLICATION FORAUTHORIZATION TO SELL CERTAIN GENERATING PLANTS AND
RELATED ASSETS PURSUANT TO PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE SECTION 851 at 1, 5 (Nov. 15, 1996)
(proposing divestiture of four plants that comprise half of PG&E's fossil fuel generation).
233. SeeJonathon Marshall, PG&E Decides to Sell 4 More Power Plants, S.F. CHRON., June 25,
1997, at B2 (reporting PG&E plan to sell plants in Antioch, Pittsburg, San Francisco and re-
gions of Lake and Sonoma counties in preparation for competitive electricity market).
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market.m It is this competition on which the CPUC is banking to es-
cape California's high-cost electricity. With the Commission now
moving into retail unbundling, competition should make itself felt all
the way to the end consumer in the form of lower costs.
California's restructuring followed an unusual path. After an initial
proposal and a series of public hearings, the CPUC invited major
parties to submit joint position papers. SoCal and some like-minded
groups filed a Memorandum of Understanding in September 19 9 5 ; s
certain large consumer and environmental groups responded the fol-
lowing month; 6 and some major customer groups submitted their
own statement a few days later.27 When the CPUC ordered deregula-
tion in December, it had a very precise idea of the areas of agree-
ment among the major players. The process let the CPUC know how
234. See Sheila Hollis & Stephen Teichler, Collision or Coexistence?: The FERC, the CPUC and
Electricity Restructuring, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 1, 1995, at 2. Though the overall goal of injecting
competition as far as possible into the electric industry is the same, deep differences exist be-
tween FERC's approach and that proposed by CPUC. As Sheila Hollis and Stephen Teichler
have stated:
The FERC invites buyers to shop for generation; the CPUC majority would have genera-
tors competing among themselues for the right to serve a single aggregate market.
The CPUC would measure stranded costs on an asset basis-comparing book values to
market values in a competitive environment.... The FERC prefers a"revenues lost"
approach that compares the revenue a utility reasonably expected to receive from a
given customer against the price the utility could command for that power on the
open market.
For cost recovery the CPUC would bill all current retail consumers through a
"competitive transition cost" (CTC) surcharge. But the FERC would assign stranded
costs individually to certain departing customers (those without notice provisions in
their contracts).
Id. at 2. As California moves into retail deregulation, the difference between buyer and genera-
tion choice will disappear. In addition, FERC has rested recovery on the "reasonable expecta-
tions" standard that is irrelevant under the CPUC's mechanism-in effect, the CPUC is assum-
ing that the State's utilities had a reasonable expectation of recovering all stranded costs, at
least to the extent that such costs are not extinguished by the positive asset value of competitive
fossil-fuel plant. See id. at 1-2.
Both approaches carry a heavy pro-recovery assumption, but one cannot be sure which will
turn out to be more favorable until both commissions show how they will apply their rules. No
one knows where the balance will fall between competitive and uncompetitive fossil-fuel assets
for California's utilities, or the kind of prices the Power Exchange will produce; on the other
hand, we have yet to see how stringent FERC's "reasonable expectations" test will be in prac-
tice. Nor do we know how seriously either Commission will apply its mitigation requirement.
The CPUC's 10% reduction in return on equity also must be factored into any study of com-
parative impact. What is clear is that both approaches are more utility-friendly than equitable
sharing.
235. See SoCal et al., Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 208, at 1 (identifying par-
ties to MOU as SoCal, California Manufacturers Association, Independent Energy Producers,
and Californians for Competitive Electricity).
236. See UTILITIES CONSUMER ACTION NETWORK, FRAMEWORK FOR RESTRUCTURING IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 15 (1995).
237. SeeCUSTOMER STATEMENT OFPRINCIPLES (1995) (on file with the author).
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to structure deregulation in order to minimize challenges. To a
large degree, its Order tracks proposals that emerged in the com-
238
ment process.
In addition, the CPUC acted under unusual legislative scrutiny.
When the stock prices of the state's utilities plunged in 1994 after the
CPUC's notice of restructuring, 9 the legislature expressed concern
that the CPUC had not "developed a sufficient factual record" for de-
regulation.240  The legislature ordered the Commission not to issue
any "interim, final, or effective order" until it held more hearings
and, among other things, quantified transition costs and their alloca-
tion among shareholders and ratepayers.2 4 ' The CPUC thus con-
ceived deregulation under great pressure to ensure that the state's
utilities were protected financially.
In its restructuring of December 20, 1995, the CPUC rewarded
utilities by putting the highest possible value on their financial
health.242  This favoritism may be an inducement, and reward, for
their general willingness to not oppose deregulation. One goal of
the Commission's initial notice of rulemaking was to "exploit alterna-
tives to litigation as much as possible. 2 4  The goal was supported by
the Commission's assertion that "the litigious, adversarial environ-
ment of the hearing room [i.e., ordinary administrative process] is ill-
238. It cannot be said that the CPUC rubber-stamped any side's recommendations. The
Commission gave the utilities almost everything they wanted on stranded costs, and endorsed
the idea of an ISO, but it rejected utility suggestions that access to a power pool should occur
through direct access and voluntary choice, rather than through the compulsory structure of
the Power Exchange. See CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 29. Commissioner
Knight dissented in part to urge that direct access should coexist With a voluntary, not manda-
tory, power pool. See id. at 3 (Jessie J. Knight, Jr., Commissioner, dissenting). In terms of
stranded costs, at least one major player, the CPUC's internal Division of Ratepayer Advocates
(DRA), opposed full stranded-cost recovery, but their concerns did not prevail. See DRA
COMMENTS ON THE HEARINGS CONCERNING POTENTIAL UNECONOMIC COSTS IN ELECTRIC
RESTRUCTURING 2 (1995) (full recovery will not meet Commission's goal of reducing electric
costs); see also DRA BRIEF ON LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING ISSUES 5
(1995) ("Utility shareholders have already been compensated for the competitive risk that
changes in market conditions may make a once prudent investment uneconomic.").
239. See SOCAL RESPONSE TO ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING AND ORDER INSTITUTING
INVESTIGATION, EXECUT[vE SUMMARY 3 (1994) ("In the two weeks following the Commission's
issuance of the Blue Book proposal, the value of California utility investors' holdings fell by
more than $2.3 billion."). The share value of California's three investor-owned utilities fell
from $30 billion to $18 billion, a drop of 40% in the six months after the CPUC announced its
plan to deregulate. SeeWhite, supra note 4, at 209.
240. Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 143, at 2 (Sept. 15, 1994), reprinted in CPUC
DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, app. D, at 2.
241. Id. at 3.
242. See, e.g., CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 3-4 ("To assure the continued
financial integrity of California's investor owned and financial utilities, and give them an op-
portunity to be vital participants in the restructured market following the transition, we will
allow them to recover 100 percent of the CTC.").
243. CPUC ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING, supra note 203, at 7.
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suited to policy development. '24 This is an interesting position for
an agency that, like other agencies, supposedly has special expertise
to create policy in hearing rooms.
Utilities' litigation forbearance came with a very high price, if it is
what encouraged the CPUC to endorse full cost recovery.2 5 The
CPUC allowed 100% recovery of stranded (or "transition") costs in a
nonbypassable "Competitive Transition Charge" ("CTC") .246  Two
principles seem to explain this treatment of stranded costs: (1) a de-
cision to protect utilities' reliance on the regulatory scheme;247 and
(2) a great concern with their financial integrity.
24
8
The CPUC attempted to satisfy customers and competition when it
asserted that the principles of its transition cost treatment benefit
ratepayers, "at least to some degree," and penalize shareholders by
249providing a lower recovery than under traditional regulation.
These reassurances sound like CPUC damage control, however,
rather than any evidence that the agency engaged in balanced deci-
sionmaking. Given the actual terms of cost recovery, it is unlikely
that ratepayer interests and shareholder responsibility played a seri-
ous role in the stranded cost deliberations.
The Commission identified two adjustments that allegedly put
some burden on shareholders. First, it reduced the rate of return al-
lowed on investment-related equity by 10 percent. Second, the
Commission permitted recovery on fossil-fuel plant costs only after
computing the net asset value of uneconomic plants against other
plants.2 5 ' For instance, if PG&E has both fossil-fuel plants that are
worth more than their book value and others that are worth less be-
cause they are stranded by competition, PG&E will recover only to
244. Id. at 7-8.
245. If it was cooperation that gained California's utilities their stranded cost treatment,
then the California experience suggests that natural gas pipelines would have been far better
off to work with FERC in 1984 and 1985 by suggesting radical deregulation measures, but hold-
ing out for full recovery for their stranded costs as the price of their support.
246. See CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 3 (intending CTC that is "neutral,
fair to various classes of ratepayers, and does not increase rates beyond the revenue require-
ments").
247. See infra notes 333-35 and accompanying text.
248. See infra notes 452-55 and accompanying text.
249. See CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 121.
250. See id. at 123 (explaining that there should be return for debt component equal to util-
ity's embedded cost of debt); id. at 209 ("The principles that ratepayers should benefit from
our treatment of transition costs and that utilities should have proper incentives can be ac-
commodated in a recovery mechanism that reduces the return on investment-related transition
costs."); zd. at 211 (describing "90% of the embedded cost of debt as a reasonable rate of re-
turn" on the equity portion of fossil fuel generation assets).
251. See id. at 114 (stating that it would be unfair to require customers to pay for high-cost
generation without benefiting from low-cost generation and netting assets as method of com-
pensating ratepayers).
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the extent that its poorly performing facilities overwhelm its smart
investment decisions.
Neither of these conditions should give consumers or competition
much comfort. The Commission admitted that stranded costs are as-
sets that would not earn a return in a competitive market.23 In fact, if
truly unused, the utility should not recoup its principal. Further-
more, it is hardly a punishment to shave a mere 10% off the return
on facilities that the market would idle at great loss. If California's
costs are so high because its utilities have not responded to proper
incentives and, in addition, have discriminated against cheaper
power, these are not assets that would have been treated favorably
even had regulation continued. If the investments were disallowed,
they would not be balanced against other, smarter investments.
The net asset balance, where applicable, may be less favorable for
utilities than Order No. 888's lost-revenue measure, but the mecha-
nism has limited reach. The calculation will not affect the major
category of loss, QF contract obligations, nor will it include nuclear
decommissioning costs. California's utilities should have large net
losses. One recent study concludes that the state's two largest utilities
have the third and fourth largest stranded costs in the country, total-
ing roughly $16 billion dollars.s
One of the many problems with California's cost protection is that,
like the FERC, the CPUC has inserted a remedy without defining the
scope of the problem. The utilities persuaded the Commission to let
them measure assets on a "market-based" scale,' 5 rather than on an
"administrative" basis. 6 An administrative basis would have required
the companies to submit a single claim for their expected loss,
252. See PG&E COMPETITION TRANSITION CHARGE 3-9 (1996) [hereinafter PG&E TRAN-
SITION CHARGE] (prepared statement of Richard A. Weingarten) (discussing PG&E's sunk-cost
assets in relation to fossil generation). The Commission added a third protection for consum-
ers by putting a cap on current rates after inflation has been considered. See CPUC DE-
REGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 142. The mandated reduction of rates in AB 1890, how-
ever, moots this provision.
253. See CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 113 (competitive market will classify
assets as economic or uneconomic).
254. In RDI's February 7, 1997, report, SoCal and PG&E ranked third and fourth in the list
of private utility stranded costs. See RDI REPORT, supra note 24, tbl. "Investor Owned Utilities
with the Highest Stranded Investment" (listing SoCal's stranded investment at $8,330,110,000
and PG&E's at $7,834,815,000). PG&E has now filed estimates ranging from $8.4 billion to
$14.1 billion, with its mid-range number being $11.4 billion. See PG&E TRANSITION CHARGE,
supra note 252, at E-2.
255. See SOCAL TRANSITION COST POLICY 5 (1996) [hereinafter TRANSITION COST POLICY]
(observing that CPUC opted for "market-based" approach to transition costs, which calculates
costs retroactively by measuring the difference with evolving power prices).
256. See id. (quoting D. 95-12-063, as modified by D. 96-01-009, [mimeol, at 19, that an
"administrative" approach "requires long-term forecasts of market prices and assumptions
about existing and future QF obligations, discount rates, capacity factors, and other variables").
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thereby creating a binding estimate of the needed subsidy. 2 7  The
market-based scale, on the other hand, allows the companies to re-
turn each year for more relief.5' The numbers will be immense:
SoCal asked the Commission to recognize $3.5 billion in stranded
costs for 1998 alone.25s The utility projects a "transition cost revenue
requirement" of $11.2 billion from 1998 to 2001, and an additional
$10.8 billion before 2030.2w PG&E has calculated its 1998 exposure$34 261
at $3.4 billion, and its total costs at $11.4 billion. Most parties
(including the utilities) believe that California's stranded costs are
likely to total roughly $28 billion.262
AB 1890,211 the deregulation bill passed by the California legisla-
ture on August 31, 1996,26 will exacerbate the damage caused by the
CPUC's stranded cost provision. Some legislation was necessary to
clarify the CPUC's authority, so some parts of the bill are just ena-
bling clauses, but the bill adds new terms as well, including rate re-
ductions and a fixed period for stranded cost recovery.265 In a prime
257. See id. SoCal claimed that the rate freeze has made it "not necessary to develop com-
prehensive estimates of future transition costs for ratemaking purposes." SOCAL COST RE-
CONERYPLAN 5 (1996). Similarly, PG&E concluded that the overall cost recovery structure does
not require "up-front" estimates of the value of its generation assets because the CTC compo-
nent of rates is determined residually. See PG&E CosT RECOVERY PLAN 13 (1996) (hereinafter
PG&E CosT RECOVERY PLAN].
258. The great advantage of this approach for utilities is that, assuming that their total
stranded cost number is going to be very large, they do not have to apply for it all at once. By
the time they file for their third or fourth year of recovery, the principles that will control the
outcome-principles that are very favorable to these companies-already will be enshrined as
precedent. Critics will have less support to challenge stranded costs early on because the true
amount of the wealth transfer will be obscured by the lack of an overall estimate of total cost
recovery.
The CPUC since has required the utilities to estimate their total transition-cost exposure, but
this requirement is empty because the estimates are not binding. The estimates are not likely
to constrain the utilities. See SoCAL TRANSrrION COST POLICY, supra note 255, at 4 (losses on
generation, power contracts and nuclear power plants cannot be known until respective market
prices are known).
259. See id. at 1 (estimating 1998 "transition cost revenue requirement" at $3.5 billion, with
$1.620 billion from QF contracts, $1.350 billion for nuclear costs, and $340 million for fossil-
fuel costs).
260. See SoCAL FUTURE TRANSITION COST ESTIMATES 8 & tbl. 11-1 (1996) (providing esti-
mates for years 1998-2030). Even when assumptions vary about plant valuation, SoCal's num-
bers remain almost the same. See id. at 19.
261. See PG&E TRANSITION CHARGE, supra note 252, at Ex-3. PG&E's total actually ranges
from $8.4 billion to $14.1 billion, depending upon market prices over the recovery period. See
id. at 1-15.
262. See, e.g., Enron Drops Home Marke4 S.F. EXAM., Apr. 23, 1998, at B3.
263. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330 (West Supp. 1997), as amended by stats. 1986, c. 854 (AB
1890, § 10).
264. Id.
265. In a fair summary of AB 1890, SoCal describes AB 1890's "primary impact" on transi-
tion cost recovery as follows:
[It] changes the schedule for recovery, mandates a rate freeze for all customers cou-
pled with a rate reduction for some customers, creates a new means, other than CTC,
to recover transition costs through the Rate Reduction Bonds, and creates a fire wall
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example of what can go wrong when politics is mixed with econom-
ics, the bill passed unanimously.
AB 1890 confirms the CPUC's two major innovations, the ISO to
operate transmission grids and the Power Exchange to form the state-
wide auctioning pool for power.2 The legislature heartily endorsed
the idea of moving to a competitive market.267 To make sure that
competition is transmitted to end consumers, billing will be unbun-
dled.26 The CPUC has encouraged companies to install meters to
support innovative billing structures,6 9 and it plans an aggressive
education program to encourage consumers to take advantage of the
wider range of choices.270
In one major change, the legislature extended a rate ceiling im-
posed by the CPUC to include an at-least-10% rate reduction for
between certain classes of customers to protect them from cost shifting.
SOCAL TRANSITION COST POLICY, supra note 255, at 9 (citations omitted).
266. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 333(1) (1) (stating that "competition will best be introduced
by the creation of an Independent System Operator and an Independent Power Exchange").
267. Seeid. § 330(d)-(e).
[T]he interests of ratepayers and the state as a whole will be best served by moving
from the regulatory framework existing January 1, 1997, in which retail electricity is
provided principally by electrical corporations subject to an obligation to provide ul-
timate consumers in exclusive service territories with reliable electric service at regu-
lated rates, to a framework under which competition would be allowed in the supply
of electric power and all customers would be allowed to have the right to choose their
supplier of electric power....
(e) Competition in the electric generation market will encourage innovation, effi-
ciency, and better service from all market participants, and will permit the reduction
of costly regulatory oversight.
Id.; see also id. § 330 (1) (2) ("Generation of electricity should be open to competition and utility
generation should be transitioned from regulated status to unregulated status through means
of commission-approved market valuation mechanisms.").
268. The CPUC ordered the three main utilities to separate their transmission and distribu-
tion in Order D.96-10-074. See generally Interim Opinion on Public Purpose Programs, Dec.
R.94-04-031, 1.94-04-032 (1996). AB 1890 requires each utility to unbundle by filing a"cost re-
covery" plan that "provide [s] for identification and separation of individual rate components
such as charges for energy, transmission, distribution, public benefit programs, and recovery of
uneconomic costs." CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 368(b). The purpose of unbundling is to let cus-
tomers who buy power from other suppliers make sure that they pay no more for the services
they still purchase from the old suppliers than customers who stay with their original, formerly
regulated company. See id.
269. The CPUC decided not to require new meters from current utilities. See Opinion on
the Unbundling of Revenue Cycle Services, Dec. No. 97-05-039 at 5 (1997). This Order re-
quires utilities to enter agreements so that any supplier will be able to send customers a con-
solidated bill. See id. at 8. Customers will not be penalized for choosing a new supplier by find-
ing that they have to pay multiple bills, a problem that has bedeviled telephone deregulation.
These measures in turn responded to a "concern that direct access opportunities to residential
and small commercial customers in 1998 might be severely limited if we fail to allow energy
providers to provide" billing, metering, and related services. See id. at 8.
270. See id. at 29 ("Consumer education and consumer protection rules are necessary re-
gardless of the Commission's policy on unbundling."). The CPUC has authorized spending
$89 million on consumer education in the first ten months of full competition. See Conlon,
supra note 207.
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residential and small commercial customers.2 ' In so doing, it ig-
nored one of the major messages of deregulation champions: that it
is a mistake for central planners to try to dictate market factors like
272
costs and prices. Market advocates are right to point out that man-
dating specific economic terms is a lapse into reregulation.2
AB 1890 requires a minimum rate reduction, from June 10, 1996
rates, of 10% for residential and small commercial customers,274 and
states an "intent' to achieve an overall reduction for those groups of
at least 20%.2 5 The savings are to continue from 1998 until the ear-
lier of March 31, 2002, or when all "generation-related" stranded
costs have been recovered.276  With the bill listing California's total
annual spending on electricity at $23 billion, AB 1890 expects to
produce almost $5 billion in savings, per year.7
The legislature did not identify the source of these savings. Nor did
it show that the savings actually can be achieved. Instead AB 1890
creates a fudging mechanism. The state will loan utilities billions to
cover transition costs and rate reduction through the California In-
frastructure and Economic Development Bank.278 The bonds will en-
able the legislature, which endorsed ISOs and the Power Exchange
271. But see SoCal Application for Financing Order Authorizing the Issuance of Rate Reduc-
tion Bonds and 10 Percent Rate Reduction Effective January 1, 1998, App. No. 97-05-018, Exec.
Summary, at 2 (1997) (hereinafter SoCal Rate Reduction Application] (claiming that ten per-
cent rate reduction is "contingent" upon issuance of Rate Reduction Bonds); see also id. at 6
($2.6 billion in bonds "will be sufficient to provide the revenue requirement reduction savings
necessary for the 10 percent rate reduction"); SDG&E Application for Authority to Finance a
10% Rate Reduction Through the Issuance of Rate Reduction Bonds, at 2 (1997) [hereinafter
SDG&E Rate Reduction Application] (asserting that 10 percent reduction is contingent upon
issuance of Rate Reduction Bonds). PG&E says that the bonds arose "[i]n recognition that
residential and small commercial customers do not have the financial leverage and ability indi-
vidually to finance the payment of their transition cost obligations in a cost effective manner
through access to capital markets." PG&E COST RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 257, at 2.
272. See infra note 301 and accompanying text.
273. See CRANDALL & ELLIG, supra note 3, at 5 ("Legislators and regulators should resist the
temptation to elaborately plan either the structure of markets or the transition process."). It is
fair to add that market advocates often fail to distinguish pro-competitive regulation that main-
tains the conditions for competition from rules (like California's mandated rate reduction)
that spit into the wind of economic realities, a very different matter.
274. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(w) (West Supp. 1997).
275. See id. § 330(a). The savings to be realized depends upon whether rate reductions for
industrial customers at least match the mandatory percentages for residential and small com-
mercial customers. Virtually all commenters assume, however, that industrial users will be able
to better the benefits extracted by residential and small commercial users because of their
greater sophistication and resources. Some of this advantage may reflect large customers' abil-
ity to buy power on an interruptible basis, with its lower costs. See CRANDALL & ELLIG, supra
note 3, at 11 (pointing to interruptible power as reason large gas customers secured greater
rate reductions from gas deregulation).
276. SeeCAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 368(a).
277. At least, this will be the result if California achieves the 20% reduction that the legisla-
ture identified as the "intent" of its electricity deregulation.
278. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 841.
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due to the great savings they will produce, to fabricate the savings (in
the short run) if competition does not work. In a state with manda-
tory term limits, the bonds will shift the risk that deregulation will not
work onto other politicians' watch. Bond-supported lower rates will
make today's politicians look good while they are in office; the real
279test will occur under their successors.
The bonds will take their place in the growing securitization mar-
ket (which will be swamped by stranded-cost bonds if many states fol-
low California's lead). The utilities will create new subsidiaries, cor-
porately shielded from the risk of utility bankruptcy, and will transfer
the right to customer payments to these corporations. They in turn
will assign their rights to the California Infrastructure Bank, which
will issue bonds secured by the stream of payments from future elec-
tricity bills. Neither the utilities nor the state will stand behind the
bonds-in essence, customers as a group will be responsible for each
other's default.2Y0 The high security of utility bill payments should
permit very low interest rates.
California's three major utilities have filed requests for $7.3 billion
in rate reduction bonds so far.28 1 Although the utilities claim that
they have included a margin so that these funds should be more than
enough, California's decision to require only annual stranded-cost
applications leaves room for the companies to come back for more.
Although the state will not be liable for the rate reduction bonds,
279. And so the State that gave birth to Ronald Reagan's political career seems to have en-
acted another borrow-now, pay-later statute. It can be argued that Reagan's budgets worked
only if lower taxes spurred extraordinary growth; likewise, California's lower rates and stranded
cost recovery will work only if deregulation spurs great savings through existing utility plants
(so that stranded costs are minimized).
280. See SoCal Rate Reduction Application, supra note 271, at 7-10 (describing bond struc-
ture); see also PG&E Rate Reduction Bond Financing (1997) [hereinafter PG&E Rate Reduc-
tion Financing] (providing overview of proposed financing transaction); SDG&E Rate Applica-
tion, supra note 271, at 5-6 (explaining bond structure). If other states adopt the same
procedures, electric-bill secured bonds will quickly become the largest player in the burgeon-
ing securitization market. SeePG&E Rate Reduction Bond Financing, supra, tbl. 4-A.
For a brief description of this market, which currently focuses on credit card obligations,
home equity loans, and automobile loans, see id. at 4-1 to 4-14. For an attack on securitization
as giving utilities an irrevocable, up-front payment for costs that would have been uncertain
even under regulation, see generally IPALCO ENTERS., INC., A WHITE PAPER, THE SECURI-
TIZATION SWINDLE (May 1997).
281. See SoCal Rate Reduction Application, supra note 271, at 1 (seeking "up to" $3 billion
in Rate Reduction Bonds); PG&E Rate Reduction Application, at 1 (1997) (seeking "up to"
$3.5 billion dollars in Rate Reduction Bonds); SDG&E Rate Reduction Application, supra note
271, at 17 (seeking up to $800 million in rate reduction bonds).
Stranded costs may have a very long life. Although fossil-fuel generation assets have to be re-
covered by December 31, 2001, see CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 367(a), this limit does not include
.power purchase contract obligations," the major category of stranded costs for the big utilities,
which shall "continue for the duration of the contract," id.-§ 367(a) (2), or nuclear decommis-
sioning costs, see id. § 379.
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the borrowing exploits state power to borrow against the future for
current rate reductions. The purpose of deregulation should be to
generate real cost savings, simply not to reallocate unyielding costs
across time by clever financing. If competition produces very large
savings, utilities will be able to keep their rates at least 10% below
their last regulated rates, and at the same time repay their bonds.
But if competition does not have much effect or, worse, if unbun-
dling produces diseconomies because vertically integrated companies
have been dismantled, then prices will shoot up as soon as the rate
caps expire. Consumers who changed their consumption patterns in
the interim will have received exactly the wrong signals. PG&E al-
ready has announced that it wants a $700 million rate increase to
212take effect once the mandated reductions expire.
A mandated rate reduction could be worthwhile as a tax extracted
from monopoly suppliers-as a forced guarantee from utilities of sav-
ings from competition-but it becomes a much riskier venture when
rates fall by shifting costs into the future through state-supported
bonds. Moreover, the mandated reduction lasts only until March
2002 or until a utility recovers all of its generation-related losses,
whichever comes sooner.83 In contrast, recovery for the largest cate-
gory of loss, that from QF contracts, can extend for the life of the
contracts.2"4 Thus the rate caps will expire long before stranded-cost
recovery is over. If competition produces great savings over time, the
bonds may facilitate a smoother rate reduction. But if savings do not
materialize, the temporary reduction will be a short-lived artifice.
It would have been far wiser to let competition set prices from the
beginning of deregulation. To the extent that the legislature sus-
pects that current costs are inflated, those costs should have been
disallowed. Instead, the combination of full cost recovery and rates
lowered through bonding blesses uneconomic costs, all in return for
the mere hope that competition will more than offset this sacrifice.
In keeping with the solicitude the legislature shows for rate reduc-
tion bonds, AB 1890 endorses full stranded cost recovery. With their
optimistic expectations of savings, one would think that California's
legislators would have been particularly mindful of the need to pre-
282. SeeJonathan Marshall, PG&E WillSeek Big Rate Hikes, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 16, 1997, at Cl.
Given the full recovery of stranded costs, it seems quite likely that "[t]he summary effect of
regulatory reform in California to date, and probably well past 2002, is essentially zero for con-
sumers and potential entrants." White, supra note 4, at 245. Residential and small commercial
consumers will enjoy their short-lived ten percent mandated rate reduction, but they will end
up repaying even these savings once rates are uncapped.
283. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 367(5).
284. See id. § 367(2).
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vent utilities from billing the cost of no-longer-useful facilities. Their
continued funding of anticompetitive obligations is inconsistent with
switching to a competitive market, and these old obligations are
blockages to competition. For great savings to be extracted in a short
time, it is particularly important to free consumers from costly older
plant and supply contracts.
Unfortunately, California's legislature exculpated the state's utili-
ties even though their poor investments inflated electricity bills. Tak-
ing the lead from the CPUC, AB 1890 stresses utility reliance:
"Consistent with federal and state policies, California electrical cor-
porations invested in power plants and entered into contractual obli-
gations in order to provide reliable electrical service on a nondis-
criminatory basis to all consumers within their service territories who
requested service."28 5 Against this background, AB 1890 concludes:
It is proper to allow electrical corporations an opportunity to con-
tinue to recover, over a reasonable transition period, those costs
and categories of costs for generation-related assets and obliga-
tions, including costs associated with any subsequent renegotiation
or buyout of existing generation-related contracts, that the com-
mission, prior to December 20, 1995, had authorized for collection
in rates and that may not be recoverable in market prices in a competitive
generation market.
216
The Legislature even classified worker hardships and retraining as
transition costs, thus mollifying another major political group but
raising the costs of transition and delaying its impact still more.287
AB 1890 says it just allows utilities an "opportunity,'28 to recover
transition costs, but it does much more. It guarantees recovery by let-
ting utilities bill these costs in the fixed, "nonbypassable CTC," rather
than simply adding them to a variable rate that would have to com-
plete with power from new, competitive electricity suppliers. Thus it
is no surprise to find the major utilities citing the law as a significant
change that guarantees their stranded costs.2 9
285. Id. § 330(p).
286. Id. § 330(s) (emphasis added). The bill continues by stating that utilities are entitled
to recover additional costs deemed reasonable and necessary to maintain existing facilities
through December 31, 2001). See id. In addition, with transition funded by bonds, the legisla-
ture magnanimously added that the transition would "provide the investors in these electrical
corporations with a fair opportunity to fully recover the costs associated with commission ap-
proved generation-related assets and obligations." Id. § 330(t).
287. See id. §§ 330(u), 375 (noting the hardships that electrical restructuring will cause for
employees and including compensation in transition costs).
288. See id. § 330(s) ("It is proper to allow electrical corporations a fair opportunity to re-
cover.., costs for generation-related assets and obligations....").
289. See SOCGAL TRANsITION COST POLICY, supra note 255, at 2 ("Recovery of transition costs,
consistent with AB 1890, is now a matter of law.").
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AB 1890 does create one small risk by limiting the period for re-
covering some stranded costs. Once the Commission identifies non-
recoverable costs, the costs pertaining to fossil-fuel plants "shall be
recovered from all customers on a nonbypassable basis" by December
31, 2001.2 However, the uneconomic portion of power supply con-
tracts, the largest part of California's stranded costs, can be recovered
over the life of those contracts.2' The same goes for nuclear de-
commissioning costs.2 2 There is no sign that California's utilities will
fall short of full recovery because of the limited recovery period for
fossil-fuel plant losses.23
Room does remain for some penalties. For instance, the CPUC
might take a very aggressive position on the costs it thinks that PG&E,
SoCal, and SDG&E can recover at "market prices in a competitive
generation market.''2 4 If the CPUC treats a lot of costs that are not
really competitive as recoverable, thereby minimizing its recognition
of transition costs, utilities may find that the Commission has created
billions of dollars in losses.2'
An agency that has been so yielding to utility companies thus far,
however, is unlikely to reverse course and hold them to stringent
proof in hearings over stranded costs. No doubt the hearings will be
full of strong-sounding language that ratepayers must benefit and
shareholders must pay some stranded costs. Nevertheless, utilities
are likely to recover virtually all of their losses. The CPUC's strictures
against litigation in its April 1994 Order Instituting Rulemaking and
Investigation suggest that it has no stomach for protracted battle.2
The CPUC is likely to stick to the decision it already has made: Utili-
ties will be bailed out for power that is roughly half again as costly as
national electricity and is costing ratepayers nearly $5 billion extra a
year, one fifth of their total bill.
Like Order No. 888 and the CPUC's restructuring, AB 1890 con-
290. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 367.
291. Seeid.§367(a)(2).
292. See id. § 379.
293. To help ensure that all costs are recovered, AB 1890 removed the existing cap on an-
nual recovery of nuclear power plant costs. See id. § 368(d).
In a June 12, 1997, order on applications for transition costs, the CPUC-although noting
that AB 1890 does not make transition costs wholly without risk-stated its belief that
[t]ransition cost recovery is now mandated by law and there is no reason to assume that the
frozen rates will not result in sufficient headroom to fully recover transition costs." Decision
97-06-060, at 33, 41 (June 12, 1997).
294. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 367.
295. If AB 1890's judicial review provision is enforceable, it may heighten the risk of large
stranded costs. The legislature made the Commission's determination of the amount of
stranded generation assets "final," so that it "may not be rescinded, altered or amended." Id.
§ 367(b).
296. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
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tradicts the principles FERC developed in the natural gas deregula-
tion orders and flies in the face of the general logic of deregulation.
Consumers will bear the costs of facilities they cannot use, so they
may as well ignore new suppliers. If consumers have to pay stranded
costs anyway, they may as well use inefficient, older power sources
because the price of those facilities often will be cheaper than paying
for their stranded costs plus new generation.f7 Second, utilities that
built inefficient plants will be rewarded for decisions that competitive
markets would punish. Utilities will be free to use their CTC subsidy
to undercut power from new generating capacity and in the process
will undermine new companies.m
The CPUC's decision to shield stranded assets does not fit the
thrust of deregulation any more than similar arguments justify Order
No. 888. The problems that motivated California's deregulation
were not that utilities had service obligations and relied on a regula-
tory franchise. California's deregulation arose because utilities built
uneconomic plants and entered into uneconomic supply contracts.
Utilities did not respond to the risk that these great capital commit-
ments might prove unwise. If utilities had focused on smaller scale,
non-nuclear facilities, California would have much less need for de-
regulation. In addition, the utilities tried to block cheaper power.2
Neither the fact of regulation nor the obligation to serve necessitated
uneconomic plants and uneconomic supply contracts. Yet this wel-
fare-minimizing behavior is the reason the CPUC finds itself restruc-
297. See Teichler, supra note 71, at 7 (utilities could impose a stranded-cost penalty high
enough to force customers to remain). In addition, utilities may subsidize one operation via
stranded costs from another. See id. at 5-6 (power companies can beat competitor's prices for
large industrial users and compensate by taking the difference from residential customers who
cannot afford to seek power elsewhere).
One way to see this risk is to look at the world that will face the departing customer, particu-
larly with an exit fee as in the Order No. 888 model. Having to pay for unused capacity will
create a tremendous barrier against leaving. Another possibility is utility cost-shifting that uses
stranded costs to subsidize other operations. If utilities can foist costs that should fit into ordi-
nary rates into stranded costs, they can price their other power below its actual cost. See id. at 7.
The disincentive to leave older power sources exists for customers as a group in California.
In one funny illustration of the problem of collective action, the use of a CTC not linked to
individual customers breaks the direct tie between a customer's power decision and the choice
of suppliers. Put another way, the marginal contribution to the CTC that any given customer
will experience by staying or leaving may be too small to be felt. But the uncompetitiveness of
full recovery will be experienced in another way, because the billions of dollars recovered will
give the incumbents the money to stave off entrants, if they choose to use their stranded cost
bonds to keep their owr rates artificially low.
298. See id. at 6.
299. See Order 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,702-04 (listing allegations of utilities that were
.exercising transmission dominance"). Among the Order's examples were claims that PG&E
used dilatory tactics and effectively refused to deal, see id. at 21,704, and that SoCal and SDG&E
refused to supply power to various cities and curtailed cities from buying cheaper power. See id.
at 21,704-05.
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turing the state's electricity markets.
A fair examination of the process through which California's utili-
ties built today's facilities would unearth significant formal and in-
formal CPUC involvement in what now are clearly investment mis-
takes. This is the view of many participants in the electricity
deregulation debate. If this view is correct and if losses should be
allocated by responsibility, then the CPUC could have allowed the re-
lated part of stranded costs into each company's ratebase. Such regu-
latory complicity does not, however, justify allowing a full recovery
that protects all of these costs (even if with a minor shave on certain
returns on equity and fossil-fuel asset balancing) without regard to
utility responsibility.
What is missing in California's stranded cost treatment, as in Order
No. 888, is an incorporation of the responsibility that utilities, as pri-
vate companies with control over the type of plant they build, should
bear for their own mistakes. Big, inefficient generating plants were
not an inevitable result of regulation; nor were all unwanted supply
contracts forced on unwilling power companies by regulators. This is
supported by the fact that California's costs are half again as much as
the national average, and well over the costs in its neighboring
statesY ' Nor was discrimination against competitive generation,
300. See Black & Pierce, supra note 175, at 1341 (state commissions and legislatures bear
much blame for uneconomic power contracts and excesses in environmental regulation);
Pierce, supra note 60, at 523-24, 530 (surveying the varying degrees of state commission author-
ity over nuclear plant investments).
301. Some part of these high costs may well be due, as regulatory compact advocates argue,
to California's having a more extensive set of noneconomic obligations for its utilities. The
electric companies certainly believe this argument.
Many [stakeholders] argued that.. . the contracts utilities signed with qualifying facili-
ties over the past decade as part of this Commission's competitive procurement pro-
gram are uneconomic; that the costs related to all forms of regulation in California
are higher than in other states; and that legislative and Commission mandates are
more extensive and costly than those imposed on utilities in other states.
CPUC ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING, supra note 203, at 35 n.30; see also EEl ECONOMISTS'
REPORT, supra note 36, at 12 (claiming that integrated resource planning, [e]specially in states
in the Northeast and in California... forced utilities to purchase power at prices higher than
they would otherwise have had to pay").
If regulation is the only reason why these companies have such high costs, the solution is to
decide whether the cost of those regulations exceeds their benefits. If so, then the regulations
should be removed-there is no need to restructure an entire industry. Moreover, if these
regulations do make sense, presumably they should be applied to new generating companies as
well, and this may push those companies' costs up to old levels.
The most intense deregulation debate over whether the reason new companies have lower
costs was their avoidance of governmentally imposed, socially desirable subsidies came up in
the lengthy fight over AT&T's divestiture. AT&T argued, with some justification, that competi-
tors like MCI were "skimming the cream" off an integrated system that, among other things,
subsidized low-income users and local calls. See DERTHICK & QUIRK, supra note 64, at 174-202.
See generally PETER TEMIN & Louis GALVNMBOS, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM: A STUDY IN PRICES
AND POLrrICS (1987).
One of the problems with both FERC's and the CPUC's attempts to ignore questions about
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when it did appear, an inevitable response of regulated companies.
These are the two fundamental causes of the state's problems, but
they have been given no weight in the recovery mechanism.
It is worth reiterating what California's CTC charge will accom-
plish. Stranded costs, by definition, are the costs of assets that cannot
compete in an open market. The CPUC has been very blunt that
many of these assets would generate losses in a competitive market.m
The CTC charge is a government intervention to guarantee recovery
of costs that customers will not pay voluntarily. Not only can such re-
covery defeat lower prices, as the CPUC candidly admitted,-"5 but it is
inconsistent with what must be the underlying justification for de-
regulation: the finding that utilities have not been operating effi-
ciently. 4
V. THE PRINCIPLES THAT FERC AND CALIFORNIA OFFER
AS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FULL STRANDED-COST
RECOVERYARE BADLY FLAWED
FERC's and California's favoritism toward electricity's stranded
costs rests on a series of factors that are particularly ill-equipped to
allocate such costs. The primary rationale, adopted by both commis-
sions, is that utilities bought the wrong assets under a pre-existing
regulatory bargain. This unwritten deal allegedly promised the com-
responsibility for stranded costs is that they have avoided the healthy debate that should occur
over the costs and benefits of the noneconomic constraints imposed on utilities.
302. See, e.g., CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 194-95 (transition costs arise
because assets are "uneconomic").
303. See id. at 142-43 (noting that if the surcharge exceeds price decreases, consumer elec-
tricity costs will increase).
304. Reality may finally have begun to set in for California's deregulation now that the time
has arrived and customers are seeing rate reduction bonds show up on their bills. Chairman
Gregory Conlon continues to predict that consumers will enjoy cuts of "30 to 35 percent" once
the stranded-cost period is over. See George Raine, Deflating Deregulation, S.F. EXAM, Mar. 29,
1998, at D1. His prediction evinces an extraordinary faith that competition will produce sharp
price cuts. Others predict that consumers are unlikely to see savings. Consumer advocate Har-
vey Rosenfield, campaigning for a ballot measure to overturn California's stranded cost treat-
ment and to impose a 20% rate cut, calls the treatment "the greatest heist in California history."
Id. col. 3. Even State Senator Steve Peace, who "guided" the deregulation bill through the leg-
islature, admits that smaller ratepayers "should 'dispose of the illusion' that the change was in-
tended to benefit them." Id. "Peace said the bill was designed for large users, but the Legisla-
ture did not want to exclude smaller customers." Id.
Even though California has been spending heavily to educate consumers, it does not seem to
have found a way to bring competition to small commercial or retail consumers-a problem
that continues to bedevil telephone and natural gas deregulation too. The economics of full
stranded-cost recovery may be posing an insurmountable barrier to entrants. Enron, expected
to be one of the most aggressive marketers to retail customers, just pulled out of the residential
market. See Enron Drops Home Market, supra note 262, at B1. Not only that, but short-run con-
centration has increased as the CPUC has approved a merger between SDG&E and SoCal, re-
ducing two of the State's three major utilities to one. See Utilities Deal Okd by CPUC, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 27, 1998, at C1.
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panies the right to recover all costs from their customers.
Another recurrent theme is "financial integrity," as if the nation's
power supply would be imperiled without forced cost recoupment.
"Cost causation" is a factor stressed by FERC that seems to confuse
the allocation of costs across customers with the allocation between a
utility and its customers.
None of these factors fits the purpose of regulation or its offspring,
deregulation, nor do they justify supplanting the cost responsibility
that would impose these losses on the companies themselves.30 Not
only is cost responsibility the market's ordinary mechanism for risk
allocation, but it ensures the most efficient result for a process whose
goal is supposed to be a restoration of efficiency.
A. Regulation Never Has Guaranteed Sharply Uncompetitive Investments
The most frequent argument for full stranded-cost recovery is that
electric companies provided service under a "regulatory compact"
that guarantees recovery of these costs.3 This argument transforms a
market structure designed to protect consumers from abusive mo-
nopolies into insurance that all costs these monopolists incur in serv-
ing their customers will be recovered."' At times the theory twists re-
ality so far as to pretend that customers will not suffer by paying for
100% of electric companies' unused and unwanted assets."05
305. Order No. 888's treatment of stranded costs is a sharp break from its natural gas
treatment. One can question whether FERC, which has claimed that natural gas presented an
.extraordinary" p7oblem that justified equitable sharing, has offered any persuasive distinction
between the two industries. See generally John Burritt McArthur, The Irreconcilable Differences Be-
tween FERC's Natural Gas and Electricity Stranded-Cost Treatments, 46 BUFFALO L. REV.
(forthcoming winter 1998).
306. See, e.g., Order 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,426 (denying stranded cost recovery"would vio-
late the preexisting regulatory compact.").
307. Utilities will argue that prudence tests will prevent recovery of really careless costs. Yet
deregulation rests upon a finding that a very large part of the nation's power plant, much of it
already included in ratebases and being recovered bill by bill, is much too inefficient (and, at
least implicitly, that competitive firms would have acted more wisely). Restructuring makes
sense on the assumption that competitive firms would have done better over the past two dec-
ades. Deregulation already bears the judgment that electric companies have not been prudent
enough because deregulating presumes that ensuring competition for the future will avoid the
mistakes that utilities made in the past.
Yet the industry's fundamental cost problem, this root justification for deregulation, a prob-
lem that is embodied by stranded costs, has escaped the contours of prudency review. It is this
cost problem that should be fitted to a stranded cost mechanism.
308. It is only in this fictitious world that anyone could argue that full recovery of billions of
dollars in stranded costs is in the "long-run" interests of consumers too. See COMED COMMENTS,
supra note 25, at 23-24 ("Recovery of stranded costs is in the long-term interests of rate payers
since it will reassure investors and keep down the costs of capital to utilities."). ComEd's argu-
ment requires that the discounted present value of the supposed long-term savings from lower
interest rates (caused, in turn, by investor appreciation for stranded recovery) exceed consum-
ers' absorption of costs that CoinEd estimates as tending toward $200 billion. See ROSE, supra
note 3, at 28 (claiming that the cost of capital will rise due to the higher risk of deregulation,
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The regulatory-compact argument portrays regulation as a trade.
Utilities assume an obligation to serve all customers and accept rate
caps.3" In exchange, they get a franchise secure from competition
and a sheltered market in which to earn the return allowed on their
assets.
310
Power-company briefs offer many versions of the regulatory bar-
gain. One company claims that stranded costs result from "the ex-
tent and nature of the investments [that] were made to satisfy regula-
tory orders and service requirements.01' The EEI subtly transforms
these costs into "systems costs, 3 12 "costs to fulfill a variety of public
priorities and policies established by Congress and state and federal
regulators, 313 and "costs [that] were largely incurred with the full in-
volvement and approval-and sometimes at the mandate-of regula-
tors. '3 14
but will be offset by the lower costs from market prices and noting that expected benefits to
consumers is $80 to $100 billion per year while stranded costs are estimated at $135 billion in
total); cf. EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 41 (admitting that increase in capital costs
will not totally offset short-term gains in allocative efficiency). This utility position fits one cari-
cature of agency life: "A rate increase that would be rather obvious exploitation ... in a setting
of economic infighting unrestrained by government is magically converted into help for the
customers as well as the industry." MURRAY EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS 59
(1985).
309. See EIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 29:
Electric utilities and State commissions historically have often seemed to implicitly
agree to an arrangement, in which utilities have an obligation to serve virtually all of
the electricity demand in their service territory at the regulated price. In return,
commissions allow utilities to charge prices that will earn them a fair rate of return on
their investment.
310. For claims that the cap on rates was consideration for guaranteed rate recovery, see,
for example, COMMENTS OF UNITED UTILITY SHAREHOLDERS ASS'N OF AM. 2 (Aug. 2, 1995)
[hereinafter UUSAA COMMENTS] (claiming that investors expected stability in returns in ex-
change for the limits on returns); COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN SOC'Y OF UTILITY INVESTORS 2
(Dec. 5, 1994) [hereinafter ASUI COMMENTS] (claiming that investors relied on regulation to
ensure that the "authorized rate of return" would in turn ensure the "integrity of investment");
infra notes 316-18 and accompanying text; see also COMED COMMENTS, supra note 25, at 10
(claiming stranded cost recovery is mandated by constitutional protection against government
takings).
311. COMED COMMENTS, supra note 25, LAw & ECONOMICS REPORT, at 15.
312. EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 1.
313. Id. at 2.
314. EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 4. When one adopts the one-sided view
that all uneconomic utility costs are purely the result of agencies that, paradoxically, at best re-
viewed and approved decisions designed by the companies whom this theory absolves of all
responsibility, the results are contagious. We predictably find the same partiality when the
EEI's economists describe the wide variation in rates across the country, see id. at 6, a factor that
persuaded the CPUC (among other agencies) that something was wrong with its suppliers' per-
formance. Economists generally are quite ready to pronounce the convergence of rates, as in
deregulated natural gas, a sign that firms finally are acting efficiently. See CRANDALL & ELLIG,
supra note 3, at 12 (discussing the benefits consumers reap from the convergence of gas
prices). When dealing with the wide variation in existing electricity costs, though, the EEI's
economists list nearly every possible real-cost and regulatory cause. See EEI ECONOMISTS'
REPORT, supra note 36, at 6 (listing "differences in fuel and construction costs, taxes, environ-
mental requirements and in the mix of customers, load factors and service area density"). The
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The claim extends to what it is that regulation offered electric
companies. It is correct that the traditional regulated market allowed
utilities an "opportunity" to earn their allowed return. So too, due
process protects utilities from arbitrary changes that would remove
all possibility of recouping costs. Utility comments rarely go far be-
yond this point, though, before they expand the opportunity of a re-
turn, an opportunity that was to be tempered by competition, into a
promise and guarantee that utilities will recover their costs. In this
way, the argument circumvents regulation's most fundamental pur-
pose, its goal of ensuring just and reasonable rates that will serve con-
sumer welfare. Thus we find references to "[t]he legal and public
policy context in which the regulatory process operates... to provide
guarantees to the parties to the regulatory contract"; 315 to the earnings
opportunity "promised investors in order to attract capital" by regula-
tion;1 6 to an alleged promise to "restrict competition to permit the
opportunity to earn a stable amount" ;317 and to the "implicit" promise
of a "stable customer base. 318 Shareholder groups speak bullishly of
a system that included "[a]voidance of the costs and inconveniences
of competition,""1 9 a system that allegedly let utilities invest without
"the rigors of competition in mind."320
Another part of the regulatory-bargain argument emphasizes the
cap on utilities' rates of return. Utilities and their investors suppos-
edly accepted this ceiling as the price for recovering their prudent
costs.32 These assertions are sprinkled liberally with claims that the
economists fail to mention, however, the factors that should stand out like a sore thumb to any
economist, variations in efficiency and ability to manipulate the regulatory regime.
One of the disappointments of the EEI report is its vagueness. Although much of economics
is very theoretical, the science has advanced because it argues about measurable things like
prices and the number of unemployed. Thus economists so often can help policymakers by
bringing facts to bear to refine, narrow, or even disprove policy assumptions. The EEl Econo-
mists'R port is based, however, on the assumption that utilities made no mistakes. There is not
a single fact to support this assumption, or the related assumption that regulation is the true
cause of all stranded costs. The report is simply special interest pleading-albeit from very
prominent mouths with sophisticated economic rhetoric. But cf. SOCAL TRANSITION COST
POLICY, supra note 255, at 3 (claiming that AB 1890 "acknowledged" that "many of today's high
costs result from past regulatory promises made by the Commission regarding the timing of the
recovery of depreciation and taxes, past requirements to diversify sources of power by signing
long-term contracts that in hindsight have high costs, and the costs incurred by utilities (most
notably those associated with QFs and nuclear power) that were reviewed and deemed reason-
able when incurred.").
315. COMED COMMENTS, supra note 25, LAW & ECONOMICS REPORT, at 18-19.
316. EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 17.
317. Id. at 13.
318. Id. at 43; cf. EIA REPORT, supra note 309.
319. ASUI COMMENTS, supra note 310, at 1.
320. UUSAA COMMENTS, supra note 310, at 2.
321. See, e.g., COMED COMMENTS, supra note 25, at 10 ("Those utilities and their stockhold-
ers accepted a modest, regulated rate of return premised on the existence of a stable customer
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risks of being thrust into competition were not mentioned in regula-
tory hearings,2" in third-party beneficiary arguments that many of the
utilities' investors are retired, individual, small-share investors who
were promised stable income,323 and with a touch of the gloved fist in
claims that the capital market just might dry up if these expectations
are not met.3
4
Whether labeled regulatory reliance, regulatory contract, regula-
tory bargain, or regulatory compact, this argument seeks to let utili-
ties escape any consequences for their past conduct. The claim is
that even if utility plant and contracts have turned out to be very inef-
ficient, the investments were made in reliance upon the regulated
regime, the investments were approved under that regime, and this
reliance interest outweighs the needs of efficiency and consumer wel-
fare. The willingness of many economists to accept this argument
uncritically may owe something to the presumptive rationality with
which economics can color the world. If one assumes that overcapi-
talization and poor risk assessment were rational responses to incen-
tives distorted by regulation, it may follow that electric companies'
inefficiency was an efficient response to a flawed environment. The
fact that power companies received their franchises to provide the
lowest cost power, and that they made very bad mistakes that pre-
vented them from doing so, can get lost quickly.
FERC adopted the regulatory guarantee position in Order No. 888.
A utility reliance interest is the Commission's primary justification for
stranded cost recovery. Order No. 888 brims with references to utili-
ties' "reasonable expectation that [their] customers would renew
their contracts and would pay their share of long-term investments
base .... ."); EEl COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 15 ("Regulators have not in the past compensated
utility investors for the risk of potential future wholesale or retail competition."); id. at 53
("[R]ates of return did not compensate investors for the regulatory risks of an abrupt transi-
tion."); ASUI COMMENTS, supra note 310, at 2 ("[I] nvestors... were willing to forego the possi-
bility of speculative rewards in preference for the more modest and predictable regulated re-
turn on their investment.").
322. See ULJUSAA COMMENTS, supra note 310, at 3 (investors did not have competition in
mind, nor had risks been discussed in rate of return hearings); EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23,
at 16-17 (risk of competition was never really discussed). The EEI polled its members and
found, not surprisingly, that of the 76 utilities responding, only four reported rate hearings in
which the risk of potential future competition had been considered. See id. at 16-17.
323. See UUSAA COMMENTS, supra note 310, at 2 (claiming that among over six million util-
ity company stockholders, the typical stockholder is "retired, likely a married woman, with an
annual income of less than $40,000, owning fewer than 500 shares"); EEI COMMENTS, supra
note 23, at 11 ("The typical investor.., is an individual at or near retirement."); ASUI
COMMENTS, supra note 310, at 2 ("[A]nyone who has life insurance, who is vested in a pension
plan, who is employed in a program funded by a foundation, has a direct stake in the impact of
the electric utility industry's transition.").
324. See EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 30 (discussing drop in electric utility stock prices
and noting importance of attracting capital for industry).
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and other incurred costs.""m FERC noted that electric utilities were
losing money because they entered into contracts under an "entirely
different regulatory regime. 326  The Commission's determination
that utilities should not pay for stranded costs emphasized the inter-
ests of utility shareholders over consumers, competition, and new
competitors.3 7
Order No. 888-A directly blames regulation for the utilities' prob-
lems. Trying to handle the understandable objections to its about-
face from natural gas, the Commission argued that pipelines' com-
petitive risks had been market-driven, but that the threat to electric
utilities is deregulation itself.38 References to the "regulatory bar-
gain" and "reliance" reappear," and the claim of causality is drawn as
starkly as possible. In natural gas, the take-or-pay problem allegedly
was not the fault of regulatory action but rather of general market
conditions.3 In contrast, electricity's problems stem directly from
regulatory action.3 ' "[RIecent significant statutory and regulatory
changes are central to the circumstances that now place at risk the
recovery of past investment decisions of utilities. 3
The stranded cost portion of the CPUC's deregulation Order is
written as if regulation was the sole cause of California's hugely
greater-than-average electricity costs. The CPUC treated the state's
overpriced plants as if utilities had nothing to do with the decision to
build them:
We have found that many of today's high costs result from past regula-
tory promises made by the Commission regarding the timing of the re-
covery of depreciation and taxes, past requirements to diversify sources
325. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,549.
326. Id. at 21,629.
327.
[W]e do not believe that utilities that made large capital expenditures or long-term
contractual commitments to buy power years ago should now be held responsible for
failing to foresee the actions this Commission would take to alter the use of their transmission sys-
tems in response to the fundamental changes that are taking place in the industry. We will not
ignore the effects of recent significant statutory and regulatory changes on the past in-
vestment decisions of utilities. While ... there has always been some risk that a utility
would lose a particular customer, in the past that risk was smaller.... With the new
open access, the risk of losing a customer is radically increased.
Id. (emphasis added).
328. See Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,380.
329. See zd. at 12,272, 12,377.
330. See id. at 12,394.
331. See id. (claiming that problems are the "direct result of Congress' and the Commis-
sion's change in the regulatory regime through FPA Section 211 and Order No. 888"). FERC
identified "the widespread transmission access made available through Commission-mandated
transmission tariffs" as the "widespread force behind the development of wholesale competitive
markets." Id. at 12,377.
332. Id. at 12,375.
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of power by signing long-term contracts that in hindsight have high
costs, and the costs incurred by utilities (most notably those associated with
QFs and nuclear power) that were reviewed and deemed reasonable when in-
curred.333
In this view, electric companies' reliance extended not just to the
kind of plant they bought, but also to the scope of their service. Un-
der regulation, SoCal, PG&E, and SDG&E allegedly received the
benefit of monopoly franchises in return for being required to pro-
vide dependable service to all customers who needed service." Ap-
parently, in fulfilling these responsibilities, the utilities "developed a
portfolio of generation assets by investing in power plants and enter-
ing into purchase agreements on the understanding, the utilities con-
tend, that reasonable costs would be recovered in rates.""5
The prevalence of regulatory reliance arguments is one reason that
it has been so important to decide how far regulation caused
stranded costs and how far market errors were to blame. It is no ac-
cident that Order No. 888 is just as solicitous in rewriting history to
limit the cause of stranded costs to government action, as it is in de-
ferring to utilities' claimed expectation of cost recovery. It certainly
is true that new laws have increased the exposure of pipelines and of
electric companies. For instance, in natural gas, the NGPA deregu-
lated wellhead prices, and FERC began cutting into pipeline protec-
tion with Order No. 380. FERC then tried open access with Order
No. 436 and more recently, unbundling with Order No. 636. s In
333. CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 110 (emphasis added). This finding is
repeated in Finding of Fact No. 38. See id. at 194 (noting that past regulatory promises account
for much of today's high cost of electricity). The determination reads like an adoption of util-
ity arguments, just as when the Commission concludes that utilities' market mistakes "should
not be treated the same way as costs incurred by businesses in unregulated industries." Id. at
113. The commission found that the utilities should get government protection for these er-
rors "because these costs were incurred in a regulated industry and in fulfillment of the respon-
sibilities of a regulated firm." Id.
334. See id. at 118 (utilities "provide reliable service on a nondiscriminatory basis to all cus-
tomers within their territories who requested service").
335. Id.; see also id. at 195 (describing impact of regulatory structure on services provided to
customers by utilities). The Commission wrote that "[I] ongstanding regulatory policies, past
Commission decisions, and ongoing regulatory effects persuade us of the need, during the
transition to full competition, for a process to account for the lingering effects to today's mar-
ket structure." Id. at 119.
336. Furthermore, pipelines had more regulatory protection because their new facilities tra-
ditionally had been "certificated" by FERC, while the Commission did not perform similar
oversight of electric plants. SeeAssociated Gas Distribs. v. F.E.R.C., 824 F.2d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (discussing facility certification and claiming pipelines are "subject to pervasive Commis-
sion regulation"). In addition, the Commission imposed minimum reserve-life requirements
on pipeline gas supplies. See id. at 995 (claiming that pipelines typically bought gas under long-
term contracts because of pressure from the Commission).
One reason that changes in the natural gas market of the Eighties may look more "market
driven" to the Commission than those in electricity today may be the looser regulatory bonds of
traditional intrastate gas production. See id. at 994 (discussing differences between interstate
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electricity, the culprits are PURPA, the EPAct, and Order No. 888.
Yet it stretches the truth to suggest that regulation is the "central"
cause of electric companies' problems. Both pipelines and electric
utilities made gross errors of market judgment, supposedly in the
very area of their special expertise. Utilities were very wrong as to
where cutting-edge technology would be in the Nineties. As the EIA
has shown in its analysis of the electricity industry, and as FERC
showed in the history that begins Order No. 888, the plant, fuel sup-
ply, and generation technology that produce the lowest costs are far
different from those that many utilities have bought in the last few
decades. 7 Some of the difference may be due to contracts and obli-
gations that regulators foisted onto utilities, but the huge disparity in
average costs cannot be explained without emphasizing utility deci-
sions. To have guessed wrong about the cheapest sources of power is
to have made a market error.
When it comes to stranded costs, FERC and California seem de-
termined to ignore the fact that deregulation occurred in electricity
as in natural gas because utilities made inefficient and discriminatory
decisions. Electric companies failed to adapt to major shifts in tech-
nology and production standards. In that sense, it is because their
misjudgments opened a gap between regulated performance and
production possibilities that restructuring had to occur. And it is be-
cause deregulation rests so heavily on economic failures that it does
not violate any regulatory bargain. It was not unforeseeable that
agencies would disallow costs incurred for plants that became wildly
uncompetitive, even if the precise manner in which they might act,
and whether by industrywide deregulation or by company, might
have been hard to predict. And it was not unforeseeable that great
inefficiency and discrimination would cost utilities money.
Deregulation is not a change imposed arbitrarily by agency whim.
It is a deep and fundamental alteration of the market, undertaken in
electricity after FERC and the CPUC came to believe that there were
ineradicable problems with regulated company performance. It is
the fact that too many electric companies made repeated errors that
makes it sensible to think that competition can produce a signifi-
candy better outcome.
Utility citations to a regulatory bargain invariably use cases about
and intrastate gas regulation). There was more room for competition to drive gas prices in in-
trastate markets before the NGPA than there has been in retail electricity markets. The prob-
lems with federal gas pricing became more pronounced because production was shifting to
unregulated intrastate markets. Electricity has not seen the same kind of pressure from the
intrastate sector.
337. See generally supra Part I.
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the prudent-cost standard. The companies argue that American regu-
lation guaranteed that prudent costs would be permitted into the
ratebase, with rates set high enough to recover these costs from a
captive customer base. There are four reasons why such a guarantee
should not protect stranded electricity costs. First, deregulation em-
bodies a judgment that too many electric companies have been too
inefficient in their power decisions-that they allowed too great a di-
vide to open up between their costs and those that would mark a
competitive market. They made investments that competitive firms
would have avoided. Stranded costs are the manifestation of this gap.
Thus deregulation represents a basic judgment that the companies
with stranded costs made many imprudent decisions.3
Second, prudent-cost cases litigate the inclusion of specific costs in
the ratebase within an overall regulated regime. Prudent-cost cases
generally do not consider a change in the regulatory fabric itself, par-
ticularly not one caused by the collective imprudence of regulated
firms. Thus they do not represent the principle that firms are
shielded from the risk of occasional but fundamental changes in the
fabric of regulation or, as in this case, its removal. The history of
American regulation includes repeated uncompensated changes in
regulatory structure to encourage firms to better approximate com-
petitive behavior.
Third, utilities ignore the independent principle long applied to
utility costs that not only must they have been prudent when in-
curred, but that they must remain "used and useful" over their life.
The "used and useful" doctrine demonstrates in another way that
firms always have been at risk that a too-great deviation between their
costs and the market as it unfolds will put them at risk.
Finally, had there ever been a true negotiation over who would pay
if regulated costs got wildly out of line, there is no reason to believe
that the resulting contract would have guaranteed payment for any
and all costs. The contract might have been limited in term; it would
have been negotiated by better consumer agents than regulatory
agencies; and it would have contained protections characteristic of
long-term contracts, like price caps, force majeure clauses, and quan-
tity limitations. Well-represented consumers would not have assumed
the full risks of overpriced power or given their power companies
338. This reading of deregulation does not imply that regulators are not responsible for
some of these mistakes. To the extent that they are, they should bear responsibility and not
dump it on utilities. But if the only cause of excess costs is regulatory, it would make no sense to
adopt the stimulation of new entrants as the remedy. One would fire, or re-educate, the regu-
lators.
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carte blanche.
1. Deregulation presumes the imprudence of most stranded costs
The first problem with the regulatory bargain argument is that it
ignores the reason for deregulating the electricity industry. There is
a curious detachment in FERC's and California's stranded cost rea-
soning, which does not fit the general flow of electricity deregulation.
The impetus behind injecting competition into electricity is the
sluggishness and unresponsiveness of decisions that utilities made in
the Seventies and Eighties. Many electric companies invested in ex-
traordinarily capital-intensive plants harboring the highest-cost tech-
nology, whose expense has prevented these firms from evolving with
the technological innovations of recent years. The inefficiency of
regulated electricity is demonstrated in the gap between the total
costs of the regulated industry and the total average cost of power
from the best new technology, and also in the variability of power
costs among regulated companies. Some of the country's largest utili-
ties are stuck with the wrong assets for today's markets, but many of
their peers charted the market more efficiently and face few losses.
The cost imprudence of many of today's companies is the justifica-
tion for restructuring and forcing them to confront competition.
This presumption is built into Order No. 888, California's deregula-
tion, and any deregulation designed to force utilities to compete with
other companies. The remedy of opening the generation market to
competition makes no sense unless regulators believe that utilities
would have made better investments had they been in competitive
markets during the period when they built large nuclear plants and
signed overpriced power contracts. Deregulation rests on the judg-
ment that utilities with large inventories of stranded costs took risks
that competitive firms would have avoided.
The missing link in FERC's and California's stranded-cost treat-
ment is the failure to work this underlying judgment of imprudence
and anticompetitiveness into the stranded cost mechanism. Order
No. 888 is schizophrenic: FERC forgot its rationale for imposing
open access when the time came to allocate the losses caused by the
change. The CPUC's deregulation shares this flaw.
a. Deregulation's market-efficiency justification assumes imprudence of
incumbent firms
There are a variety of theories why deregulation will bring lower
prices-why electricity must have new blood, and not merely a few
rewritten regulations-but the main theories rely in good part on
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misbehavior and imprudence by regulated firms. The traditional
criticism is that monopolists lose the incentive to experiment and to
take the risks needed to find the most efficient new production."" If
so, regulated firms have every incentive to hide behind their protec-
tive statutes no matter how often warned that they will recover only
for prudent and "used and useful" plants, that their practices will be
judged against a competitive template, and that marked failure to
achieve efficient outcomes will expose them to competition.
The dulling effect of monopoly is part of the theory of competition
and, in addition, a conclusion from one of the economic theories
about regulation. It is part of the theory of competition because
firms facing no effective risk of losing profits have little incentive to
worry about making the best investments.l It is part of the theory of
339. This view, which has become the core of the deregulation movement, has been perco-
lating its way into the mainstream of economics for much of this century. Its precursors include
Ronald Coase's insistence that firms do not need regulators to define the best market structure
because they will provide goods and services by an integrated structure when it is more efficient
to do so, see generally COASE, supra note 200; the incessant press of Milton Friedman's popular-
ized writings against government planning, see, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM (1962), as well as a series of works that have begun to apply such general views to par-
ticular government activities like regulated industries. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 66; George
Stigler & Clair Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5J.L. & ECON. 1
(1962); cf. George Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 19 Bus. LAW. 721, 721 (1964).
The intellectual trajectory of this movement is tracked in Edmund Kitch, The Fire of Truth: A
Remembrance of Law and Economics at Chicago 1932-1970, 26J.L. & ECON. 163 (1983).
There are several kinds of criticisms of the traditional regulatory model. Clifford Winston,
for instance, contrasts the "public interest" theory, which assumes that agencies function as in-
tended to correct market failure and that regulation comes into existence only for this stated
purpose, with the Averch/Johnson theory of overinvestment, with capture theory as adopted by
the Chicago School, and with contestable market theory with its attack on the idea of long-term
monopoly power. See Winston, supra note 3, at 1266-69. The fundamental questions are, do
markets work better than expected, and do agencies function worse? In this regard, Winston
argues that "[tiheories of regulation tend to suggest two ways that deregulation will improve
things: it will end the "insulat[ion] from actual and potential competition," and it will stop the
rent-seeking that characterizes agencies prone to capture. See id. at 1268. In addition, there is
the dynamic aspect to competition, which has led many to believe that we have underestimated
markets' ability to spur innovation in the long run. See id. Markets should produce gains by
forcing consumers to face the real cost of the goods and services they buy, as well as by forcing
firms into innovation and cost-efficient practices. See CRANDALL & ELLIG, supra note 3, at 3, 6.
By the Sixties, critics were beginning to examine the results of energy regulation, among
other regulated sectors, much more specifically. George Stigler and Clair Friedland published
their famous study claiming that regulation had not lowered electricity rates. See Stigler &
Friedland, supra. This period saw general critiques of economic regulation such as Murray
Weidenbaum's & Robert Defina's The Cost Of Federal Regulation Of Economic Activity (1978),
Robert Litan & William Nordhaus' Reforming Federal Regulation (1983), Eugene Bardach & Rob-
ert Kagan's Going By The Book: The Problem Of Regulatory Unreasonableness (1982), and more in-
dustry-specific works like Stephen Breyer & Paul Macavoy's Energy Regulation By The Federal
Power Commission (1974) and Robert Helms' Natural Gas Regulation: An Evaluation Of FPC Price
Controls (1974). The early Eighties witnessed the first appearance of Richard Pierce's continu-
ing work urging gas and electric deregulation, his Harvard Law Review article on Reconsidering
the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARv. L. REV. 345 (1983).
340. This theory is really quite simple. The EEI's economists gave a standard description of
the idea:
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regulation because economists have speculated for years that the rate
structure under which returns are earned only on capital investment,
and that base dwindles as it depreciates, encourages overexpenditure
as a way of maximizing profits.'"
Ignoring risk and strategically overinvesting may be "rational" re-
sponses for profit-maximizing firms in a controlled industry, but cost-
of-service regulations are not designed to protect this behavior.
Regulation was not intended to shield careless investment or overin-
vestment. Such conduct prevents least-cost service and deprives con-
sumers of just and reasonable rates. To the extent that today's varia-
tion in average electricity costs, a factor that can make power from
some plants two, three, or more times as expensive as competing
power, reflects careless investment or overinvestment, nothing in the
structure of regulation requires passing along these costs.
Nor was regulation ever designed to protect firms against innova-
tion and better competitors. It is true that one of the benefits of
competition supposedly is a long-term, dynamic gain from innova-
tion. By implication, a regulatory structure built upon monopoly
[A] competitive industry, which places squarely on investors rather than ratepayers
the burden of risks that their investment decisions may prove to have been mistakes-
while offering them the corresponding opportunity for large profits on their success-
ful ventures--will be more efficient in deploying resources to meet future generation
needs than the institutional structures and administrative processes that brought us
the major disappointments of the past fifteen years.
EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 21-22; see alsoJOsKOw & SCHMALENSEE, supra note
175, at 9 (listing primary economic questions as whether electricity is at least cost, and whether
consumers face marginal cost of power), 79 (stating "two principal dimensions of economic
efficiency... are the costs of supplying electricity and the prices that electricity consumers are
charged"); Kahn, supra note 175, at 8 ("Wherever it is feasible, competition is superior to regu-
lated monopoly as an institutional mechanism for producing close attention by management to
efficiency and promoting progress both in methods of production and in offering consumers
an ever-expanding variety of choices, at efficient prices."). See generally F.M. SCHERER & DAVID
Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 19-33 (3d ed. 1990)
(discussing economic "case for competition" and theoretical inefficiencies of monopoly pric-
ing).
341. The pressure to install too much capital is known in the economics literature as the "A-
J-W" effect after Harvey Averch, Leland Johnson, and Stanislaw Wellisz. It is discussed in II
ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 49-59 (1988); Pierce, supra note 56, at 506-07.
One of the seminal articles by Wellisz was on natural gas--Stanislaw Wellisz, Regulation of Natu-
ral Gas Pipeline Companies: An Economic Analysis, LXXIJ. POL. ECON. 30 (1963).
Alfred Kahn has argued that the bitter experience of nuclear plant disallowances in the Sev-
enties and early Eighties made utilities so risk-averse that they switched to "in effect, a reverse
Averch-Johnson incentive-a fear of expanding rate base and particularly of risky long-lead-
time investments." Kahn, supra note 175, at 6. Unfortunately, Kahn has not developed this ar-
gument, nor shown that utilities were prudent in the investments (limited or not) that they did
undertake. Both he and the EIA certainly are right, however, that fear of overextension made
utilities less hostile to new third-party generation than they otherwise would have been. It
probably is more correct that utilities became more careful in where they would overinvest,
than that they shifted from over to under-investment. Consider, for instance, Richard Pierce
and Bernard Black's description of how demand side management became a new source of
easy returns. See infra notes 569-71 and accompanying text.
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franchises should expect to dull competition's incentives. Even if
monopolists appropriate existing technologies just as well as competi-
tive firms, they still might not risk as much capital on R & D.42 They
might miss the small improvements that, compounded over years,
can bring the greatest welfare gains. 34 Competitive firms are under
constant pressure to innovate because they can only reap windfall
gains (above-market returns) if they stay ahead of the market, and
they have to assume other firms are trying to do the same. Thus
competition brings a premium on experimentation and speed. Firms
have to race for "excess" profits. Companies secure in their markets
lack this pressure.
Congress's belief in holding electric companies to high standards
of performance (and in competition's technology-forcing potential)
can be deduced from its effort to bring new firms into the generating
market, first with PURPA's incentives for cogeneration and other
qualifying facilities, and then with the loosening of limits on genera-
tion ownership under the EPAct. As economists William Baumol,
Paul Joskow, and Alfred Kahn point out, these new laws helped
stimulate the technological advances of recent years.
342. The jury seemingly remains out on whether competition, monopoly, or some hybrid
market form is most conducive to innovation. See, e.g., ThomasJorde & David Teece, Introduc-
tion, in THOMAS JORDE & DAVID TEECE, ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 6
(1992) (no evidence that either competition or monopoly is "ideal for promoting innovation");
see also Robert Merges & Richard Nelson, Market Structure and Technzcal Advance: The Role of Pat-
ent Scope Decisions, inJORDE & TEECE, supra, at 185 (no evidence that monopoly "is a necessary
or optimal setting for technical advance").
343. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: ShouldJudges and Juries Make
it?, inJORDE & TEECE, supra note 342, at 31 ("At least since Schumpeter wrote nearly fifty years
ago, innovation has been thought to contribute far more to our well-being than keeping prices
closer to costs through competition."); Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, inJORDE & TEECE,
supra note 342, at 122 ("An antitrust policy that reduced prices by 5 percent today at the ex-
pense of reducing by I percent the annual rate at which innovation lowers the costs of produc-
tion would be a calamity."); Jorde & Teece, Introduction, supra note 342, at 4 ("We take it as
axiomatic that innovation and its rapid and profitable commercialization are the key factors
driving productivity improvement and economic welfare."). Joskow and Schmalensee's study
of the electricity industry concluded that "[m]ost long-run evaluations of the electric power
industry ignore technological change, despite its importance." JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra
note 175, at 86. See generally COSTELLO & GRANIERE, supra note 2, at 65-66 (arguing that regula-
tory benefits tend to be underestimated because long-term gains from innovation are greater
than expected); cf. ROSE, supra note 3, at 37-38, 88 (arguing that "main economic argument for
permitting more competition for electric generation" is dynamic efficiency, and that regulators
should focus on efficiency). Joskow and Schmalensee do lend a note of sobriety to the discus-
sion when they remind us that most innovation has been in "laboratories and factories of the
electrical equipment and boiler manufacturers,"JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 175, at 87,
not from utilities. This may be a measure of how severely regulation has impeded experimen-
tation, or a sign of the limits of physical improvements in the regulated aspects of the industry.
Evincing even more humility, they note that Thomas Edison had opposed high-voltage trans-
mission. See id. at 86. Failure to read the market well has deep roots in the industry, even
among its greatest minds.
344. "On the positive side, QF developers provided a major stimulus to advances in com-
bined cycle gas turbines (CCGT), as well as waste-utilization and coal technologies, and have
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Because competition is expected to bring technological advances,
regulators might have expected somewhat less innovation from the
traditional geographic monopolies. But they did not endow regu-
lated firms with investment-life protection if they failed to appropri-
ate new technologies. That energy companies got market protection
was not meant to disable them from taking risks; regulation was not
created to reward failures of nerve or skill. The benefit of structuring
regulation to let private firms continue operating in the public inter-
est lay precisely in retaining the benefit of private companies' entre-
preneurial drive.
Federal deregulation relies heavily on the belief that too many
firms acted inefficiently when they made their investments. Deregu-
lation implies a judgment of imprudence. Thus when FERC found
that it "became increasingly clear that the potential consumer bene-
fits that could be derived from [] technological advances could be
realized only if more efficient generating plants could obtain access
to the regional transmission grids,3 45 what it meant was that even go-
ing forward, utilities would not invest with desired efficiency unless
they had competitors.4 6 Moreover, when FERC found that electric
companies, hoping to protect outmoded plants, had "the incentive to
engage, and have engaged, in unduly discriminatory practices in the
provision of transmission services, ' s  that was another reason why
regulated companies needed to face more competition.
The CPUC similarly found that "[w] e cannot have a fully competi-
tive market for generation unless and until we eliminate any signifi-
cant lingering ability of the former monopoly utility to distort prices
or restrict competition in the new competitive market.""3 ' This find-
been successful in employing those technologies efficiently. Many have excellent performance
records." EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 11-12. ComEd's competing economists
from the Law and Economics Consulting Group noted the possibility that the gains from add-
ing a new firm to the market might outweigh other costs. Cf COMED COMMENTS, supra note 25,
LaW AND ECONOMICS REPORT, at 50 n.45 (even "inefficient bypass may have a positive welfare
implication, in that it may create a set of suppliers that would not exist otherwise"); Kahn,supra
note 175, at 11, 16 (discussing case for"infant company" protection, but concluding that regu-
lations for such purposes "impos[e] certain, current costs on society in exchange for uncertain
future benefits and ought not be undertaken except on the basis of an explicit and careful
judgment.").
Perhaps showing that some groups can never give credit where credit is due if the govern-
ment is involved, the Heritage Foundation claims that the positive, innovative impact of PURPA
was an unintended consequence of reform. SeeTHIERER, supra note 38, at 20.
345. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,546.
346. FERC cannot mean simply that utilities would not invest in new technologies today
because they already have excess capacity. The combination of full-recovery and exit-fee billing
insures that most of this old capacity will be used, so it cannot be current utilities' failure to ex-
ploit existing plants, but their expected inefficiency over time, that worries the Commission.
347. Order No. 888,61 Fed. Reg. at 21,566 (emphasis added).
348. CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 34.
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ing would make little sense unless the Commission meant that Cali-
fornia's electric companies had used their monopoly power to distort
prices and restrict competition.
That California's deregulation, like other deregulations, draws its
legitimacy from the perception of utility underperformance comes
through in the 1993 Yellow Report prepared by the CPUC's Division
of Strategic Planning. Though the report admitted the unwarranted
costs of the CPUC's own processes, it is also replete with statements
about the blunted incentives and inefficient investments that firms
displayed during regulation.m9  Traditional regulation rewarded
companies that overestimated costs or underestimated sales.5W These
distortions may be the "rational" responses of a profit-maximizing
firm to regulation, but they are not proper behavior. The utility can
gain only if "this behavior goes undetected by the Commission.35 '
Such uneconomic deviations are a "sort of manipulation" that cause
consumers to pay excessive rates.5
Both electric companies' failure to avoid avoidable costs and their
assumption of inappropriate risks are embedded in the mounting
stranded costs. Though they are the foundation for the decision to
deregulate, these considerations disappeared from FERC's and the
CPUC's stranded cost thinking. Both agencies failed to estimate how
much of the stranded cost burden is attributable to utility careless-
ness, and how much to anticompetitive decisions, even though their
deregulations make little sense without the judgment that electric
companies made a lot of very inefficient investments in the last few
decades. Assume, for instance, that utilities building nuclear plants
and very large coal-fired plants really made the same decisions that
competitive firms would have made, that their monopoly positions
did not cloud their risk-taking. Assume too that the clear after-the-
fact inefficiency of much of the country's generating capacity is just
349. SeeYELLOW REPORT, supra note 14, at 3,96-98, 141-46.
350. See id. at 141.
351. Id.
352. See id. The belief that regulated firms will try to game the system is so strong that de-
scription often fades into justification. Thus, when the Yellow Report describes the regulatory
environment as one in which "the utility develops and puts to use skills that differ considerably
from those on which firms operating in an intensely competitive market must rely," id. at 150, it
is hard to tell whether this is a lamentation or an excuse.
In describing the end of the "glory days," the staff made clear that companies did not re-
spond well to the higher-cost, tighter energy market. As it described the general industry re-
sponse to these problems:
Some utilities continue planning as if nothing has happened.... Other utilities are
more cautious but no more realistic; they continue to pursue large generation, in the
pursuit of economies of scale and in the face of the environmental movement. The
result will be financial difficulties for many of them, including California's utilities.
Id. at 34.
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the march of technology, and that technology would have bypassed
competitive firms as thoroughly. Then there would be no need to
change the firms or market structure of the industry.
Similarly, if the only cause of stranded costs was agency ineffi-
ciency, the "logical solution would be to try to make the existing
regulatory process work better."353 This particularly would be true
because monopoly utilities have some comparative advantages, what-
ever they may lose in vigor and zest. Generation continues to have
some economies of scale,M which firms in protected markets are best
situated to reap to the fullest, and service-area monopolies can ex-
ploit gains from vertical integration. Unless these companies have
extinguished those advantages by mistakes in planning and investing,
a rational society probably would leave the current market structure
intact.355
Consumer advocates might argue that even if technological change
has opened the cost-gap between current large plants and the best
new facilities, it is best to give consumers the benefit of the cheapest
prices. Competition would be served by making utilities pay stranded
costs. But punishing utilities without regard to fault solely because
technologies changed would be a motive prohibited by the Supreme
Court. The Commission would be "arbitrarily switch [ing] back and
forth between methodologies in a way which required investors to
bear the risk of bad investments at some times while denying them
353. JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 175, at 6.
354. Cf EEl ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 7 (conceding that there are "some"
economies of scale in generation, but arguing that electricity generation never has been a
natural monopoly and that recent gas-fired technologies have "further undermined the case
for local or regional monopolies").
Perhaps the more interesting question will be just how much utilities benefited from
economies of integration. As the EEI's economists rightly point out, if the competitive market
does not correctly price formerly integrated services (and cannot perform those senices with as
little transactions cost), the benefits of deregulation "could be entirely dissipated or indeed
more than entirely offset by the deteriorated coordination between that sector and transmis-
sion." Id. at 29. See generally supra note 200 and accompanying text.
355. Some utilities still would claim that society should just leave the industry alone.
Though it has been clear that FERC and most states are going to order some form of open ac-
cess (so there has been little to gain from arguing over the virtues of pure monopoly), consider
the undocumented assertion by EEI's economists that the chance for short-term efficiency
gains are "very limited" and that "most existing utility plants.., are superior to any proposed
new ones." EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 20-21. Though the economists do pre-
dict long-term gains from injecting competition, it is a little hard to square that with this part of
their report. If there are not some current gains to be had by switching to other plants, i.e., if
the historical decisions of utilities have been just fine, why expect marked gains in the future
from a new structure? Why would a competitive market be that much better at dynamic gains,
if utilities have not fallen short as innovators over the last few decades? All this highlights, of
course, the odd failure of these economists (and FERC and the CPUC) to address, much less try
to quantify, the inefficiencies caused by the utilities themselves even though they acted as the
unquestioned primary economic decisionmakers under the old structure.
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the benefit of good investments at others. ""s This is not a legitimate
reason to restructure the electricity business; one legitimate reason to
restructure the industry is underperformance of regulated utilities.
b. Deregulation's agency-inefficiency justification implies firm errors
The conclusion that utilities bear a lot of responsibility for deregu-
lation, a responsibility inconsistent with full stranded-cost recovery,
draws support from a second main economic reason for deregula-
tion, one of the agency-inefficiency arguments. Deregulation prom-
ises to cure various inefficiencies in agency performance, not just in-
efficiencies by regulated firms. Some of these inefficiencies are
"innocent,"' but others occur because firms exploit or, in economic
356. Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 315.
It may well be that competitive markets generate more losses for firms than regulated mar-
kets because most firms guess wrong. It is quite possible that competition functions so well to
spur investment only because so many entrepreneurs overestimate their individual likelihood
of return, and so risk more money than is rational. Cf Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 63
(arguing that companies generally underestimate risks by focusing on the likeliest outcome,
rather than the weighted probabilities of the many ways in which an investment might go
wrong). Were that the case, regulated firms would be rational in avoiding the excesses of com-
petitive firms. Regulated firms would not make foolish or dubious investments on the remote
possibility that one of them might pay off when they would not profit anyway.
From this perspective, the question about recovery then would become whether regulated
firms, though perhaps expected to be more cautious about risk than headstrong competitors,
retained any risk that a too-great deviation from competition would re-expose them to a com-
petitive market. Even if they were not at risk of day-to-day, asset-by-asset competition against
rival firms, if for any reason, including the high costs of the Energy Crisis in the Seventies, it
began to appear that competition could offer much lower prices, or that a new structure could
produce a better outcome, were they really not at risk? The answer of the cases discussed in
this part is a resounding yes, they were. This risk is not one that often materialized, so its dis-
counted present value may never have amounted to much and it mhay have moved off most in-
vestors' horizons, but it always was there.
For a contrary view of risk expectations, see JOSEPH KALT ET AL., RE-ESTABLISHING THE
REGULATORY BARGAIN IN THE ELEcric UTILITY INDUSTRY (1987). Not surprisingly, given their
narrow reading of the "used and useful" test, Kalt and his co-authors argue that denial of full
recovery for nuclear plants was a reversal of a standard bargain that guaranteed recovery of all
prudent costs. See id. at 39. They claim that "all parties" in the industry, including regulators,
believed that nuclear plants were prudent investments, and that the uncompetitiveness of these
plants was unexpected. See id. at 17-18 (noting a "perception on the part of all parties was that
these investments would result in substantial cost savings... [n]o one foresaw three- to five-fold
increases in construction costs" or drop in demand growth); id. at 26 (acknowledging a
.general recognition" that nuclear plants "were reasonable given the information available at
the time"); id. at 43 ("general agreement" between regulators and utilities over building nu-
clear plants). According to this reading, investors had not understood their risk. &ee id. at 32-
33. The authors warn that investors' perception of a change in their expectation of recovery
will jeopardize capital for future electricity plant regardless of who really is at fault for nuclear
costs. See id. at 3-4 ("Nothing can distinguish the fact that financial markets now distinguish
sharply between companies with construction programs [i.e., at risk of cost disallowance] and
those without."). Apparently for this reason, they warn that"blame" is an "unfortunate" issue
that should not be relevant in an efficient regulatory structure. See id. at 3-4, 9-10, 66. They
ultimately recommend regulatory preapproval for large capital projects as the best solution to
this problem.
357. As an example of an "innocent" regulatory distortion (a problem that even an econ-
omy filled with good-faith participants might experience), regulation will not work well if effi-
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cient decisionmaking requires diffuse decisions at a variety of market levels. It may be impossi-
ble to make central planning as efficient as traditional regulatory structures require.
This probably is a fair summary of F.A. Hayek's point about the marvel that a market system
not only works, but works well. In ajustly famous passage, FA Hayek expressed this strength of
the market as follows:
Fundamentally, in a system where knowledge of the relevant facts is dispersed among
many people, prices can act to coordinate the separate actions of different people in
the same way as subjective values help the individual to coordinate the parts of his
plan.... There is no need for the great majority of them even to know where the more urgent
need has arisen .... The whole acts as one market, not because any of its members survey the
whole field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that
through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all.
F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519, 526 (1945) (emphasis
added). The more complex and difficult it is for an economic activity to be mastered by a sin-
gle mind, or even a group of computer-aided minds-that is, the less predictable a market or
the more it is going through a period of rapid change-the greater this strength of the market.
Hayek continued:
The most significant fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which it
operates, or how little the individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the
right action. In abbreviated form, by a kind of symbol only the most essential informa-
tion is passed on ....
But I fear that our theoretical habits of approaching the problem with the assumption
of more or less perfect knowledge on the part of almost everyone has made us some-
what blind to the true function of the price mechanism and led us to apply rather mis-
leading standards in judging its efficiency. The marvel is that in a case like that of a
scarcity of one raw material, without an order being issued, without more than per-
haps a handful of people knowing the cause, tens of thousands of people whose iden-
tity could not be ascertained by months of investigation, are made to use the material
or its products more sparingly, i.e., they move in the right direction. This is enough
of a marvel even if, in a constantly changing world, not all will hit it off so perfectly
that their profit rates will always be maintained at the same constant or "normal" level.
I have deliberately used the word "marvel" to shock the reader out of the compla-
cency with which we often take the working of this mechanism for granted. I am con-
vinced that if it were the result of deliberate human design, and if the people guided
by the price changes understood that their decisions have significance far beyond
their immediate aim, this mechanism would have been acclaimed as one of the great-
est triumphs of the human mind. Its misfortune is the double one that it is not the
product of human design and that the people guided by it usually do not know why
they are made to do what they do.
Id. at 526-27 (emphasis added).
Another regulatory-cost problem for which regulated firms cannot be blamed is that regula-
tors often impose social policies that add greatly to costs. Regulation brings into being a hier-
archical, industry-wide command structure that makes it possible to spread rules cheaply across
all firms. Once the command structure is in place, many groups cannot resist the temptation
to subsidize their pet goals. Agencies may push nuclear power or alternative fuels from a desire
to better the security of fossil fuel supplies; may require environmental measures whose costs
exceed their benefits; or may graft objectives like demand management and subsidies to the
poor onto the rate structure. For a pessimistic interpretation of recent electric generation in
this regard, see Black & Pierce, supra note 175, at 1343 (opining that the reasons for misuse of
rate regulation and other regulatory measures in electricity "are deeply embedded in a combi-
nation of strong political forces, the powerful symbolism of energy conservation and environ-
mental protection, the incentives of utility regulators and rate regulated industries, and the
limited competence of utility regulators in addressing highly complex issues").
To the extent that regulation imposes uneconomic or misguided goals onto utilities (and
the utilities say that social policies caused a lot of their problems), see, e.g., supra note 208;infra
note 561, a society smart enough to know the true value of its policies would not deregulate.
Instead, it would identify and remove unwarranted rules. If it has overvalued diversification of
energy supply, it will relax those requirements. If it has pushed demand management beyond
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jargon, "capture" the regulatory framework.38 Firms try to game the
system, and customers should not pay when that happens. A full
analysis of regulatory failure would have to address the extent to
which firms distorted agency decisionmaking. The effort to blame all
stranded costs on regulators, as if utilities had not retained primary
investment responsibility and instead had invited commissioners to
pull up a chair to the planning table, is a woefully inaccurate descrip-
tion of the agency process. It endows underfunded commissions with
superhuman powers, while treating well-funded power companies as
victims.
Many rate processes operated in reverse. Utilities had much
greater resources than the commissions that watched them. As one
long-time industry observer has stated, "[c]ommissions do not have
personnel adequate either in numbers or in expertise to make inde-
pendent forecasts of demand, construction costs, cost of alternative
methods of generating electricity, and the many other factors rele-
vant to decisions to construct new plant."359
all reason, it will drop those requirements. These inefficiencies exist independent of market
structure. But, conversely, to the extent that these"social" policies make sense, they will be im-
posed on all companies, including new entrants, even in a competitive market. Most econo-
mists prefer to remove all sectoral subsidies, and provide direct funding to further such social
aims as income redistribution. This is true because, unless consumers' income elasticity for a
product is one, giving them money rather than a product subsidy lets them spend some of the
money on other products and raise their total utility. See HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 172-
76 (3d ed. 1992) (comparing in-kind transfers and income transfers). See generally BRIAN
BINGER & ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS TrH CALCULUS 152-58 (1988) (discussing
mathematical derivation of income and substitution effects). This belief in vouchers and in-
come subsidies, rather than product subsidies, make one expect to find economists urging that
power regulators stick with the economic goals of the least-cost power and marginal cost pric-
ing. Cf.JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 175, at 8 (cautioning against using electricity regu-
lation to further "all possible basic social goals"); THIERER, supra note 3, at 32-33 (urging avoid-
ance of "service mandates" and use of vouchers "if[-if?-] there is a justifiable need to ensure
the poorest Americans do not go without electricity").
California's electricity deregulation includes an intricate process committing hundreds of
millions of dollars to maintain direct funding for certain social programs. The Legislature
mandated a separate rate component to fund energy efficiency, conservation activities, and
other public interest programs. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 381(b) (West Supp. 1997). Effi-
ciency and conservation program funding was to be maintained at "not less" than $172 million
a year from January 1, 1998, through 2001; research and development funding at not less than
$62,500,000; and renewable resources at not less than $109,500,000 for the first three years,
and $136,500,000 for 2001. See id. § 381(c). Income-support programs "shall be funded at not
less than 1996 authorized levels based on an assessment of customer need." Id. § 382. The
CPUC has taken the first steps in restructuring both energy efficiency and low-income services
to see how far it can inject competition into their provision. See Dec. 97-02-014, Dockets R94-
04-031, 1.94-04-032 (Feb. 5, 1997).
358. See infra Part VI.C.
359. Pierce, supra note 7, at 533; see alsoKALT ET AL., supra note 356. Kalt and his co-authors
admit the imbalance of resources between the agency and the firm. Oversight proceedings are
dangerous because of the risk that the agency auditor "will not have the support staff or the
expertise to do the job." Id. at 48. They spell out the problem:
In fact, most PUCs are not institutionally equipped to do the type of analysis needed
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Electric companies did not just sit back and entertain capital pro-
posals from their commissions. They designed, proposed, and
championed, sometimes without any requirement of regulatory ap-
proval, very capital-intensive facilities. They often urged, rather
than resisted, the new nuclear plants and QF contracts about which
they complain today. Prudency tests have not been that effective at
ferreting out those ill-advised investments.s1 In order to maximize
returns, some utilities unquestionably tried to maximize capital ex-
penditures. Electric companies, not commissions, controlled the in-
vestment process, with one result being that the prudent-cost test that
utilities now claim immunizes their stranded costs did not weed out
bad investments (which is why utilities find it so useful in retro-
spect) .2
to support decisions based solely on a determination of whether strict criteria or
guidelines have been met .... They are rarely provided with sufficient staff, and the
staff they do have turns over at a rate that makes it difficult to create enough institu-
tional memory to handle the complicated issues brought before it.
Id. at 54.
It is important to note that customers, or their representative, the commission, were usually
not a party to utility decisions. Since commissions do not have the same level of information
and resources as the utility, they often act as reviewers of plans and hear the arguments of in-
terested parties. In these cases, it would be difficult to see why ratepayers should now shoulder
the entire burden of a utility's loss from being uncompetitive. See ROSE, supra note 3, at 70; see
also Southwestern TeL Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923) ("It must never be
forgotten that while the State may regulate with a view to enforcing reasonable rates and
charges, it is not the owner of the property of pubic utility companies and is not clothed with
the general power of management incident to ownership."). Though in Southwestern Telephone
this principle operated to protect the phone company's judgment, responsibility should come
with a price. If utilities are the primary decisionmakers, they must be accountable for their mis-
takes.
Even some agencies sense the problem. Cf. YELLOW REPORT, supra note 14, at 3
(acknowledging that the complexity of proceedings threatens quality of CPUC decisions), 75
(Commission accused of micromanaging but also of "failing to adequately scrutinize" compa-
nies).
360. Richard Pierce's history of the varying state positions on nuclear plant approval, opera-
tion, and cancellation is a good example of how much more complex the industry decision-
making process really is, as well as how it can vary by state. See Pierce, supra note 60, at 507-20.
361. Seeid.at512.
362. Though this test may sound fairly stringent, Richard Pierce thinks that it"almost always
results in the inclusion of plant investments." Id. at 511. Pierce has two explanations for the
weakness of the test. First, investments were "rarely blatantly imprudent when viewed in light of
the knowledge and alternatives reasonably available... and the overall complexity of the con-
siderations involved." Id. at 512. In addition, the burden of applying a test stringently is too
high given the "extraordinarily large expenditures for the services of lawyers, economists, and
engineers." Id. As an example, Pierce argues that for plant approvals, "[a]s a result of the rela-
tionship between a Commission's prior certification of plants and subsequent rate treatment of
plants, utilities are seemingly the principal beneficiaries of a grant of certification power to a
state regulatory commission." Id. at 535. This goes not just for plant certification in states in
which commissions do certify plants, but also for the broader decision to include costs in the
rate base. Electric companies come to those proceedings with far greater resources than a
commission can bring to bear. Yet, as the next section shows, the companies now want to con-
vert that review process into a guarantee of recovery. In fact, all the rate process does is deter-
mine which costs companies can try to recover and at what rate; it has never been the purpose
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Companies that underestimated or concealed costs and risks-and
those that overindulged in capital spending to hike returns-were
not following their regulatory duty. Reasoned rulemaking would es-
timate the plants, contracts, and other obligations that utilities accu-
mulated by mistake or by overinvestment, 3 It would ask how seri-
ously they approached their duty to supply "least-cost" power. Rather
than take at face value claims that so many stranded investments were
thrust upon them by agencies, it would examine utility filings and
behavior. It would question whether utilities opposed, or, instead,
supported (or even sought) the assets that today are so uneconomic.
It would ask how well the firms disclosed the risks of large-scale,
multi-year capital investments.64 In addition, the inquiry would have
to estimate the costs utilities imposed by discriminating against new
and cheaper power.)6 And these costs would stay with the utilities.
Both natural gas and electricity deregulation would have had a very
different history (and outcome) had utility inefficiency and discrimi-
nation not formed such a large part of their justification. Nor would
of regulation to include a guarantee against competition from other providers, no matter how
inefficient or careless the incumbent firm.
363. A prudent Commission might have done this generically, trying to estimate an overall
range for these costs, rather than proceeding by company, but it would have made some find-
ings in these areas.
364. Another unfortunate consequence of full recovery is that it has let FERC and Califor-
nia avoid the issue of just how imprudent the company decisions leading to stranded costs
really were. Indeed, these two Commissions did not even make a finding of the likely scope of
stranded costs. Society has been deprived of the facts needed to create a fair and effective solu-
tion to the problem. These two recovery mechanisms stand as billion-dollar solutions for
.problems" whose extent will remain undecided until after the remedies become final.
Natural gas again is a telling contrast; when the Commission issued Order No. 500, it already
had collected detailed data from pipelines on their take-or-pay exposure.
365. Utilities could argue that this would be a very expensive process and that (given the
greater involvement of commissions in electricity than in natural gas investments) making de-
tailed stranded-cost findings would only squander resources when the outcome should be that
virtually all costs will be recoverable anyway. After all, one reason FERC approved equitable
sharing in natural gas was to avoid litigation costs, see infra note 525 and accompanying text. In
electricity, the CPUC was quite clear about its belief that resources spent on litigation over elec-
tricity deregulation would be wasted resources. See infra note 526 and accompanying text.
The argument that fighting over an exact assignment of responsibility will waste resources,
though, is not ajustification for making customers bear all stranded costs. In natural gas, FERC
decided it would be hard to make any exact allocation of blame, so it imposed an "equitable"
burden on pipelines and their customers. The natural gas experience suggests one problem
with electricity's litigation-avoidance rationale: if we are avoiding litigation, why should only
one of the sides that might sue get all the benefit? A solution that makes utilities bear some
costs, but less than they might lose under a pure economic test, while giving customers more
than they get undcr Order No. 888, would be likelier to avoid litigation.
Moreover, if FERC and the CPUC believe that the real justification for 100% recovery is
avoidance of litigation cost, their obligation as agencies is to prepare a record that justifies that
conclusion. Finally, the solutions adopted seem likelier to encourage than discourage litiga-
tion. For instance, FERC has opened up a range of disputes over issues ranging from its retail
jurisdiction to the fact-intensive, contract-by-contract decisions it will have to make over
.reasonable expectations."
ELECTRICITY'S STRANDED COSTS
the process have been so avidly championed by the agencies them-
selves, had it rested on the belief that regulators, and they alone,
were to blame for the problems that hobble the industry today.
2. Prudent-cost protection never prevented changes that foster competition
Another mistake of regulatory-bargain advocates, and of FERC and
the CPUC in endorsing their arguments, is to assume that protection
for prudent costs should extend to losses caused by changes in the
regulatory fabric itself, as opposed to the risks of individually impru-
dent investment decisions within a fixed regulatory structure. Allow-
ing a cost in the ratebase historically has not protected a firm from
the possibility that competitive forces gathering strength outside the
protected market might undercut cost recovery, or that regulators
might change the regulatory structure in a way that enhances the risk
of competition.
In the Order No. 380 appeal, for instance, the Court of Appeals
agreed with FERC that certification of service "does not guarantee
that the initial terms of that service will never change. 3'" FERC's
power to order competitive remedies came up again in Order No.
436 and the battle over open access. Pipelines had argued that open
access would prevent them from passing along gas costs. They
pointed out that FERC had required them to buy a long-term gas
supply, and said it would be unfair for the Commission to remove the
context in which they had expected to recover these investments:
[T]he pipelines have been caught in an unusual transition. They
entered into the now unnecessary contracts in an era when gov-
ernment officials berated pipeline management for failures of sup-
ply and constantly predicted continuing energy price escalations.
Moreover, as sales and transportation were then wholly bundled,
and unregulated pipeline gas trading affiliates were unknown,
there was no way that a pipeline could generate direct profits on
the gas-trading component of its business. Thus, their being
abruptly and retroactively subjected to the downside risk is at least
jarring.
366. Wisconsin Gas, 770 F.2d at 1153 n.7. The natural gas orders show just how free FERC
remains to make uncompensated changes to foster competition. In Order No. 380, FERC
found (in the reviewing court's words) that the "benefit of eliminating variable cost recovery
through minimum bills outweighs the negative impact such action will have upon pipelines
and upon full requirements customers." Id. at 1157. The Commission had decided that any
harm would be isolated and brief, and was outweighed by the long-term benefits of Order No.
380. The court of appeals called this one of the "hard choices the Commission is required to
make." Id. at 1161.
367. See Associated Gas Distribs. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981,995 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
368. Id. at 1027.
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Electric utilities have lined up to make the same reliance argument
for nuclear plants and other outmoded generating capacity and
power supply contracts.369
In spite of these pleas, the courts upheld Order No. 436.
"Pipelines had no right to avoid losses from market conditions";1
71
regulation did not guarantee that a pipeline would operate success-
fully.3 7 ' The evidence supported the Commission's determination
that competition's gains offset pipelines' losses.sn FERC could hold
pipelines to the standards of competitive firms, even if they had made
their investments in reliance on a quite different regulatory envi-
ronment:
The Commission also invoked the closely related policy of holding
pipelines accountable for their decisions in order to induce them
to act more in the manner of firms in a competitive industry.
In essence, FERC argues that the pipelines' subjection to regulation is
hardly, in itself, a reason why they should be able to escape contract liability
more readily than unregulated firms.
FERC's policy arguments in favor of subjecting pipelines to the
pressures of a competitive market seem powerful and well
grounded in the statutes it is authorized to enforce.373
This approach treats costs stranded by industrywide deregulation
as outside ordinary prudence review. Investors and shareholders will
not be guaranteed recovery when the reason costs are at risk is an
exposure to competition. Regulation was not intended to insulate
firms from long-run technological and market trends.
The pipelines tried to argue that by making it much harder for
them to pass through gas costs, Order No. 436 undercut one point of
the Natural Gas Policy Act, namely, preventing the Commission from
369. See supra notes 309-24 and accompanying text.
370. AGD 1, 824 F.2d at 1001.
371. See id. (" [P] etitioners have called our attention to nothing that bars the Commission
from devising rules that remedy a lack of competition by exposing pipelines to competition
and its normal consequences.").
372. Seeid. at 1002.
A duty not to discriminate, imposed by the Commission on the basis of findings that
the duty is necessary to assure consumers access to competitively priced gas, is utterly
different [from common carrier classification]. The imposition of the duty here facili-
tates the accomplishment of Congress's purposes. At least it will do so if the gains in
enhanced access offset whatever losses may result from the disincentive effect on pipe-
lines. The judgment balancing those consequences is for the Commission to
make ....
Id.
373. Id. at 1026-27 (emphasis added).
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interfering with privately negotiated gas prices. 4 The Court of Ap-
peals responded that regulatory steps designed to make a market
more competitive are a proper intervention:
Despite [the] constraints on the Commission's power to limit pass-
through by decree, it has considerable ability to protect consumers by
bringing about market conditions that prevent a pipeline from pass-
ing costs forward. The NGPA's legal limits on restricting pass-
through clearly do not bar rules tending to generate such market
conditions.... Indeed, that is the principle underlying Order No.
436.
375
Moreover, in natural gas, FERC held pipelines to a duty of main-
taining their performance near competitive levels even if their errors
only became evident in hindsight. In the first review of Order No.
436, pipelines argued that "the Commission's not having imposed
any requirements like those of Order No. 436 in the period from en-
actment in 1938 until the present demonstrates the lack of any power
to do so.0 76 But the courts agreed with FERC that it could create new
remedies to keep up with market changes: "the Commission here
deals with conditions that are altogether new. '' "
The prudence of costs can be a guarantee that they will make it
into a ratebase and be reflected in the rate that a company then can
charge for its services. Of course, prudence cannot guarantee that
customers will want to buy the services. Nor, as the natural gas ex-
ample shows, does it prevent a commission from taking steps to make
the market in which that rate is to be recovered more competitive.
In electricity as well, the main issue is not whether an agency can
limit pass-through by decree, but whether it can facilitate market
conditions even if these block recovery for certain old plants and
contracts. The "opportunity" to recover is not a guarantee.378
374. See id. at 1025-26.
375. Id. at 1025-26.
376. Id. at 1001 (citation omitted).
377. Id.
378. See RoSE, supra note 3, at 43-44 ("opportunity" to recover does not give "legal right to
recover all incurred costs" and does not include reciprocal obligation on customers to buy
power); id. at 58 ("key thread" is that return is only an opportunity; "[s]ince competition and
its introduction do not cause 'stranded costs,' and the utility is not likely to be prevented from
an opportunity to sell its power, the introduction of competition does not result in an unconsti-
tutional taking[]").
This is how Rose summarizes the bargain embedded in the prudency cases in his NRRI Re-
port:
A description of the regulatory compact as historically interpreted, may be as follows:
the careful balance between compensatory rates and confiscation of utility property
that allows a utility an opportunity to earn a reasonable return on their investment in
exchange for providing safe and reliable power at reasonable cost to all customers
who request service. This opportunity is held in check by the "used and useful" and
19981
872 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAw REvIEW [Vol. 47:775
The relevance of the market as it changes is clear in some parts of
Order No. 888, too, though this point mysteriously vanishes in the
stranded-cost discussion. For instance, the prologue describes utili-
ties as if their large-scale plants have been superseded by later
changes in demand, interest and costs, and technology37 Hence, the
importance of the finding that the benefits of the new technologies
"could be realized only if more efficient generating plants could ob-
tain access to the regional transmission grids," i.e., by open access.3"
FERC's power to apply changing standards comes through even
more clearly in its rejection of utility claims that it could not con-
demn already-approved electricity tariffs as discriminatory. Order
No. 888 made very clear that FERC can reexamine and change what
companies may think are settled expectations:
However, it is entirely appropriate, and indeed necessary, that our
application of the Federal Power Act's undue discrimination stan-
dard evolve over time and adapt to changing circumstances in the
industry. Our prior willingness to tolerate the use of monopoly
prudent-investment tests, as well as from competition from government ownership,
fuel substitutes, and self-generation. Another important feature of the compact is the
continuous rebalancing that takes place to accommodate changing conditions in the
industry.
Id. at 69.
Rose found a "wide variation" in whether the costs of an obsolete plant or abandoned plant
could be recovered. See id. at 64-68. He concluded that "[t]he examination of the origins and
content of the regulatory compact finds little basis for the claim that utilities are always entitled
to cost recovery" and that a "strong case" is that such treatment would be inconsistent with this
history. See id. at 69.
Though utilities portray the regulatory bargain as if it were as old as the hills, it is more cor-
rect to say that businesses' hope for government protection is as old as the hills. Actual protec-
tion is harder to find. A mid-Eighties NRRI report that tried to find the roots for the social
contract" concept, at a time when the basis for telephone regulation was being debated, found
that only one of eight leading textbooks from the prior four decades had used the term "social
contract." DOUGLAS JONES, A PERSPECTIVE ON SOCIAL CONTRACT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION 9 (National Regulatory Research Inst. 87-5, 1987).
379. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,543-45. The Commission does not say whether these
changes were foreseeable, but it conspicuously fails to blame utilities for building plants whose
scale appears very inefficient today. See id. Further muddying the question of responsibility is
the implication of FERC's quick insertion that the "construction of nuclear and other capital-
intensive baseload facilities (was] actively encouraged by federal and some state governments."
Id. at 21,543. The fact that governments may also have read the market wrong does not (or at
least should not) absolve utilities entirely for their decisions, though the fact that regulators
also guessed wrong may be evidence that the changes were not foreseeable. On the other
hand, the wide variation in average costs and the type of generation shows that most companies
guessed correctly, and that the problems are concentrated in a minority of large and influential
utilities. The variability supports the idea that contemporary problems were foreseeable. Sort-
ing out these issues would be difficult and inexact, but it is much better than the alternative
FERC-and-CPUC approach, which ignores the issue of responsibility altogether. As this Article
discusses in the next section, foreseeability is not the market's test for who should accept the
costs of economic mistakes, but it too often is the regulatory test under the prudent investment
standard. See infra Part V.A.3.
380. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,546.
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power over transmission to maintain and aggregate the utility's
market power over generation occurred in the context of an indus-
try structured largely as vertically integrated regulated monopolies
that sullied all facets of utility service ... as a single monopoly
service.
Fifty years of protected markets and largely secure rates may have
dulled utility recollections, but the principle that the fact of regula-
tion is not insurance against all changes in regulation is an old prin-
ciple. In one of the first major natural gas decisions, Federal Power
Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 2 the Supreme Court affirmed a
Federal Power Commission decision to switch from one ratebase
methodology to another." Hope substituted prudent-cost ratemaking
for the prior fair value standard.34 The Supreme Court agreed that
the Commission did not have to use any particular rate formula, free-
ing FERC to switch to other approaches that better serve consumer
welfare. ; It was the overall result, not the route taken, "not the the-
ory but the impact of the rate order," that matters.- The Court took
pains to remind Hope that 'Just and reasonable" is a deliberately
broad mandate, and that Congress had rejected a formula-like
"legitimate cost" standardY. As the Court later said when upholding
the Commission's shift from individual to area rates in natural gas,
what matters in changing rate structures is that the result falls into a
"zone of reasonableness.""
In Hope, pipelines argued that depreciated cost would not give
them a fair return 9 The Court left this judgment to the Commis-
sion, whose decision "is the product of expertjudgment which carries
381. d. at 21,568.
382. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
383. See id. at 618-19.
384. The Commission rejected both the prior replacement cost measure and what the
Court in Hope had called trended original cost, or original cost with additions for later expendi-
tures. See id. at 596-98. Hope Natural Gas Company was fighting to recover either a reproduc-
tion cost it put at $97,000,000, or a trended original cost of $105,000,000. See id. at 596. The
Commission's depreciated original cost came to $33,712,526. See id.
385. See id. at 612.
386. See id. at 602.
387. See id. at 600. For the flexibility of this standard, see Colorado Interstate Co. v. Federal
Power Commission, 324 U.S. 581, 601 (1945) ("We do not say that the Commission lacks the
authority to depart from the rate-base method. We only hold that the Commission is not pre-
cluded from using it.").
388. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767, 822 (1968) (citation omitted);see
also Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942) ("The Constitution
does not bind rate-making bodies to the service of any single formula or combination of formu-
las. Agencies to whom this legislative power has been delegated are free, within the ambit of
their statutory authority, to make the pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by par-
ticular circumstances.").
389. See Hope, 320 U.S. at 607-09.
1998]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:775
a presumption of validity."3 ° The Court also cited its holding in the
Natural Gas Pipeline case that "'regulation does not insure that the
business shall produce net revenues. ' ''3"
Thus, it is an old principle of American regulation that the regu-
lated company does not have a vested, enforceable right in a specific
regulatory framework. Companies always have been on notice that
regulation will not shield them from competition if their perform-
ance is markedly sub-par. The penetration of competition did not
occur often, in part because with regulation a national phenomenon
it was hard to find competitive benchmarks,H but the risk that very
uneconomic costs would jeopardize rate recovery always was there,
even if investors and utilities preferred to ignore it.
390. Id. at 602.
391. Id. at 603 (quoting Natural Gas Pipelin 315 U.S. at 590).
392. One of the reasons that Franklin Roosevelt supported public power as vigorously as he
did was to make sure that private firms could be held to the standards of well-run public power.
SeeARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 390 (1957) (public authority projects
were to serve as "a yardstick with which to measure the cost of producing and transmitting elec-
tricity"); see also EIA UPDATE, supra note 10, at 6 (discussing New Deal boost for public power).
In the headlong rush to get government out of economic relations, the most doctrinaire
pressure groups want to abolish all government-supported power entities. See THIERER, supra
note 3, at 7, 17 (attacking federal power as "nothing more than old-fashioned redistributionist
programs"); cf Black & Pierce, supra note 175, at 1385 (claiming that bureaucratic inefficiency
of federal power "squander[s]" much of the cost advantage that comes from tax-exempt status).
Joskow and Schmalensee's early 1980s' study of the industry mentioned "yardstick competi-
tion" as one source of market pressure that is "frequently discussed," but argued that at least
.until recently," agencies "do not appear to have made much use of comparative information."
JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 175, at 21. They cited the "enormous difficulty" in com-
paring utilities, and found the benefits of this kind of competition "uncertain." See id. at 22.
They urged a "reevaluat[ion]" of the subsidies given to publicly owned utilities and a"clear pol-
icy regarding the role that such entities should play in wholesale power markets." Id. at 219; see
also id. 202-03 (observing that subsidies may be undesirable, but power agencies that behave "as
if they were operating in a competitive market" may provide "important competitive con-
straint").
After decades of mixed regulation of private firms, the benchmark that seems to have
spurred deregulation was the variability among the costs of private firms, not the gap between
them and public power. At least for states like California, the apparent inefficiency of their
private but regulated utilities became insupportable. See EIA UPDATE, supra note 10, at 35
("[L]arge differences in the retail prices of electricity have continued to motivate some to ad-
vocate expanded restructuring," with the "main thrust" for deregulation so far having come
from "large industrial users of electricity who, in some areas of the United States, have been
burdened by high electricity prices while their competitors in other areas pay far less for a
kilowatt hour of electricity"). With a bit of understatement, the EIA adds that it"is probably
not coincidental that many of the States that are leaders in the restructuring of retail electricity
markets are among the States with high average revenues." Id. at 36.
Of course, utilities in these states argue that their higher prices reflect their states' special,
additional regulatory constraints and other factors in the physical problems of providing power
in states beset with geographic challenges. One of the initial ways to determine whether the
deregulated market is competitive, in addition to the real price level, will be whether the vari-
ability of costs (and rates) narrows between markets. (To the extent that there are real cost
differences in providing power between markets, though, homogenous prices across the coun-
try after open access could reflect continuing power of some electricity suppliers.) The con-
vergence of natural gas prices seems to be one of the early signs of success in that industry's
deregulation. See CRANDALL & Eu.IG, supra note 3, at 12.
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The history of energy regulation includes other changes that
pushed industries back toward a more competitive position. In elec-
tricity, the starkest example is Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States!"s In
Otter Tail, the Supreme Court held that a regional power company
serving a 465-town area in Minnesota and the Dakotas had to allow its
customers to establish municipal power companies and then use Ot-
ter Tail's lines to wheel power from other, cheaper sources. 9 4  Mu-
nicipalization did not sweep the industry, but it was one way in which
electric utilities were exposed to competitive risks.3 5 This risk pre-
dictably would increase as the spread in electricity prices increased.
39
Without open access, price pressures would force municipalities to
seek other routes to escape overpriced power. Another illustration
393. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
394. See id. at 381-82; see also COMMENTS OF VT. DEP'T OF PUB. SERV. 6 (Dec. 9, 1994)
(unleashing competition "dates back more than twenty years to the Supreme Court's decision
in Otter Tail Power Co."); id. at 10 (citing Otter Tail for Federal Power Act's "overriding policy of
maintaining competition"); REQUEST FOR REHEARING OF VT. DEP'T OF PUB. SERV., supra note
188, at 38 (stating that the "reasonable expectation" test never could be met given the Otter Tail
decision). The Otter Tail opinion also included one of those cautious hedges that American
judicial opinions so commonly produce. The Court added that it was not suggesting that the
trial courts "should be impervious to Otter Tail's assertion that compulsory interconnection of
wheeling will erode its integrated system and threaten its capacity to serve adequately the pub-
lic." Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 381. So utilities may argue that Otter Tail represents the principle
that uncompensated, minor customer defections are allowed, but not significant ones. As open
access shows, however, this is a dangerous and incorrect reading of the more general power
agencies have to renovate the regulatory edifice. See generally ROSE, supra note 3, at 44-45
(discussing constant risk that customers would depart or turn to municipalization); id. at 62-64
(discussing traditional risk from municipalization, alternative fuels, and major technological
change).
395. The electricity industry has grown from one that had room for small private producers
and municipal producers to one in which large private companies dominate. See EIA REPORT,
supra note 15, at 3. In 1995, the 2,014 state and municipal utilities produced only 11% of gen-
eration, while the 10 federal power systems, which rely mainly on hydroelectric power, gener-
ated another 9%. See id. at 12. Public utilities have not avoided the current cost problem, and
municipal utilities have their own substantial stranded cost exposure, $33 billion by one report.
See RDI REPORT, supra note 24, at 1.
396. In Order No. 888-A, one of FERC's justifications for its great solicitude for pass-
through was that it was not proposing similar treatment for self-generation, as well as other tra-
ditional forms of bypass like cogeneration and bypasses that did not require open access trans-
portation. SeeOrder No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,381-82. It claimed that natural gas had been
different because there, "most of the former bundled customers" had left and a competitive gas
commodity market had developed. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,636. In addition,
FERC cited the falling market price for gas as a "market failure" that did not exist in electricity.
See, e.g., Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,393-94. Given the expected gap between the costs
of utilities with stranded power and market prices, it is hard to see why the Commission does
not think that electricity has a similar problem with sharply dropping market prices.
This argument is too static as well. On the one hand, the evolving gas market followed two
governmental actions, the NGPA and Order No. 380, so it is unfair to assume that the market
changes occurring just before Order No. 436 were only "market" driven. On the other hand,
the cost differential between certain large utilities' power and the feasible alternatives is so
great that, had Congress and FERC not moved toward open access, it is reasonable to expect
that pure market forces would have created a qualitatively greater degree of "traditional" by-
passing like municipalization.
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that electric utilities remain at risk for uncompetitive decisions is the
disallowance of billions of dollars in overbuilt, canceled, and aban-
doned nuclear plant costs in the Eighties.
9 7
Electric companies and their shareholders should have learned the
same lesson by looking across the industry border at their natural gas
counterparts. There was the switch of ratebase methodology in Hope
and many other sea changes; witness the jump from unregulated
wellhead prices to regulated individual wellhead prices in 1954, to
regulated area rates supplemented by vintaging in the Sixties, to na-
tional rates in the Seventies, and finally to statutorily vintaged rates in
the NGPA, which phased-in deregulation at the same time that it im-
posed a statutory rate schedule.3" The Commission repeatedly
stranded gas costs without compensation as it shifted among these
rate structures.!" The FPC and FERC have buffeted the gas and elec-
tricity markets with periodic major structural changes. If regulated
firms run their affairs in a way that becomes markedly inefficient as
the market develops, large-scale changes in industry structure should
be no surprise.
These losses were not peculiar to energy industries. By the late
Seventies, electric companies and their investors could observe un-
compensated losses spreading from trucking to airlines, from tele-
phone service to banking. For instance, Alfred Kahn, who has urged
full pass-through of electricity stranded costs while representing EEI
in its Order No. 888 filings, did not subsidize stranded costs when, as
Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, he aggressively removed
airline market barriers.4°  Some deregulations, like the judicially-
397. For a general discussion of the issues surrounding nuclear cost disallowance, see
Pierce, supra note 60. FERC counted $22.4 billion in disallowed costs between 1985 and 1992.
See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,544 & n.19. The EEI put the number for the Eighties at
$16 billion. SeeEEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 12-13.
398. For a discussion of regulated gas pricing and its problems, see Richard Pierce, Reconsti-
tuting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9 ENERGY LJ. 1, 8-16 (1988), Richard
Vietor, Contrived Competition ch. 3 (1994), and Stephen Breyer, Regulation and its Reform 244-53
(1982). For present purposes, what is important about this history is not how well or ill-advised
was the experiment in government control, but the notice that the changes in regulatory struc-
ture gave investors in regulated industries that their companies might be subject to occasional,
but large-scale, changes in market structure.
399. Some expectancies were protected in the gas rate changes, but often only because of
special contract provisions. For instance, producers secured performance of their expectancy
in regulated rates after deregulation if their contracts maintained those rates upon deregula-
tion. For a brief discussion of these price-floor clauses, see McArthur, supra note 305, at 362
n.30.
400. For a short summary of Kahn's extraordinarily influential role in the deregulation
movement, see DERTHICK & QUIRK, supra note 64, at 69-73, 88-90.
In the EEI's economic report, whose authors include Kahn, airlines are distinguished as an
industry in which "there is clear evidence that the cartelization of those industries under regu-
lation sheltered inefficient work practices and inefficient route configurations and employ-
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spawned divestiture of AT&T, were more formally linked to past dis-
crimination than electricity deregulation (and one does not expect
compensation for companies committing antitrust violations).
Nonetheless, even if participants in electricity did not expect that the
same risk would fall on them (i.e., did not view uncompensated de-
regulation as the likeliest outcome), it was not unforeseeable. 02
Hope and other cases establish that utilities have a constitutional
right to an opportunity to recover legitimate costs. But this interest is
not absolute. It does not freeze regulatory structures; it does not
mean that outside market changes cannot undermine regulated
firms-it is an opportunity that must be balanced against consumer
needs for 'just and reasonable" rates, the NGA's and FPA's guiding
duty. The limits of firms' opportunities were perhaps best put in
Hope
The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of 'just and
reasonable" rates, involves a balancing of the investor and the con-
sumer interests.... [T]he investor interest has a legitimate con-
cern with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are be-
ing regulated. From the investor or company point of view it is
important that there be enough revenue not only for operating
expenses but also for the capital costs of the business.... IT]he
return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns
on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.
That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in
the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit
• ,403
and to attract capital.
In upholding a measure of ratebase that was below what Hope
sought, the Court explained, "[r]ates which enable the company to
operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract capi-
ment of equipment." EEl ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 21. It may be that electric
companies did not have similarly inefficient route configurations (although we will see what
changes competition brings to power routes and pools), but it is striking that the three econo-
mists do not consider whether electric companies were inefficient in their work practices or in
their "employment of equipment," the very place where one would expect an economic analy-
sis to begin.
401. For a discussion of the differences between telephone deregulation and electricity de-
regulation, see CPI REPORT, supra note 5, at 39-40 & app. B.
402. Not only is the claim to protection against any market contingency a claim of entitle-
ment that generally conservative utility managers would reject quickly if they heard it from, say,
the poor or unemployed, but it is also a quest for an entitlement that very few firms or indus-
tries have received. As the Wall Street Journal editorialized, in language cited with approval by
the Heritage Foundation, "'Why should utility investors be uniquely indemnified against
change? That favor was not forthcoming to the owners of airlines, railroads, and natural gas
and trucking companies.'" THIERER, supra note 3, at 25 (quoting Holman W.Jenkins, Electricity
Producers Run Screaming from Reality, WALL ST.J., May 14, 1996, at A21).
403. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope National Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944), (citing
Missouri v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 291 (1923) (Brandeis,J., concurring)).
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tal, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed certainly
cannot be condemned as invalid, even though they might produce only a
meager return on the so-called fair value' rate base. 40
In Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,4 5 a Supreme Court case arising
from disallowed nuclear plant costs, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
returned to the question of how much regulation really guarantees
cost recovery.4° A Pennsylvania utility had asked to recover $35 mil-
lion in planning expenses for seven abandoned plants. 4 7 The Penn-
sylvania commission had approved recovery, but its decision was re-
versed by statute.48 The utility attacked the denial of recovery as a
taking of its property.
4°9
In affirming the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and upholding the
statute, the United States Supreme Court spoke generally to reliance
on a rate scheme. The Court noted that a relevant factor in setting a
rate is the risk investors expect for a given type of investment.4 0 For
utilities, the Court stated that this risk includes regulatory change:
"The risks a utility faces are in large part defined by the rate method-
ology because utilities are virtually always public monopolies dealing
in an essential service, and so relatively immune to the usual market
risks."4 ' This language carries varying connotations. On the one
hand, if utility rates incorporate immunity to certain risks, presuma-
bly their return can be lower than otherwise (because of the greater
safety), but regulators should honor the reliance interest where they
have promised a return. The overall risk may be lower than that of
competitive firms even if it does not include absolution for long-term
failures.
On the other hand, the fact that utilities should know they are sub-
ject to regulatory risk, which includes changes in regulatory format
and even deregulation, should mean that they will not be entitled to
recover for such changes, or, at least, not for structural changes in
regulation itself. Operating in a regulated industry creates a buffer
against most short-term market risks, including against easy entry by
competitors and fluctuations in rates. At the same time, it creates a
risk of occasional but large and unpredictable changes in basic struc-
ture. The more controlled structure of a regulated market, with the
404. Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
405. 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
406. See id. at 301-02.
407. See id. at 302.
408. See id. at 303-04.
409. See id. at 305.
410. See id. at 314-15.
411. Id. at 315.
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hierarchical nature of its firm/agency tie, should warn firms that ma-
jor structural change will be easier to implement when an agency
wants to effectuate it.
The Supreme Court did describe the extreme point where regu-
lated companies can rely on the regulatory framework, at least in dic-
tum. "[A] State's decision to arbitrarily switch back and forth between
methodologies in a way which required investors to bear the risk of bad
investments at some times while denying them the benefit of good
investments at others would raise serious constitutional questions.
4
'
2
This language does not suggest that electric utilities should be
guaranteed full recovery of stranded costs. One reason is that de-
regulation, with its determination that the failures of regulated firms
require a return to the market, is not just another change among
regulated methodologies. It is a return to competition grounded on
dissatisfaction with regulated firm performance. Another is that
FERC is not just shifting back and forth among methodologies to
dump the largest possible loss on investors. Regulated companies do
not have the same interest against a decision to expose them to com-
petition that they may have in cost recovery while their industry re-
mains regulated.
3. Investments have to be used and useful
A third problem with claiming a regulatory cost guarantee is that
prudence is not the only threshold for cost recovery. In natural gas,
for instance, the Commission assumed the power to order a pro-
competition remedy even if the utilities' decisions were sensible
412. Id. (emphasis added). The other limit on rate changes is ajudicial creation, the filed-
rate doctrine, which prohibits retroactive changes in rates. This doctrine arose to protect con-
sumers: it "bars a regulated seller of natural gas from collecting a rate other than the one filed
with the Commission and prevents the Commission itself from imposing a rate increase for gas
already sold." Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 578 (1981); see also Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 831 F.2d 1135, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Electrical Dist. No. 1 v.
FERO, 774 F.2d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing need for predictability that drives the
doctrine).
The lead filed-rate case is Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), a
railroad case. The filed-rate doctrine establishes one way in which the regulated firm (as well
as its customers) can rely on the administrative framework. Rates already collected generally
cannot be challenged. See id. at 163. Thus, rates already paid for old utility plants should simi-
larly be protected by the doctrine. In Order No. 500, the initial "deficiency allocation" formula
for passing through costs was based on prior purchases. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia struck this mechanism as a violation of the filed-rate doctrine. See Associated Gas
Distribs. v. FERC, 893 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Though the filed-rate doctrine protects rates already collected (and not rates approved but
not yet collected), it is a mixed blessing. By establishing a line beyond which the Commission
cannot go, it implicitly confirms that an agency can destroy settled expectations of utilities go-
ing forward if necessary to foster competition, at least up to the point of due process and tak-
ings concerns.
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when made, but were overcome by events. In ordinary prudence re-
view, a commission examines whether the utility acted prudently
when it invested even if the market has proven the decision wrong.4" This
is in contrast to the "fair value" test, in which companies lose money
if their investments turn out to have little or no value over their
lives.14
That prudence is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for cost
413. See Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 316 (test for prudence compensates for investments
at "actual cost when made (their 'historical' cost), irrespective of whether individual invest-
ments are deemed necessary or beneficial in hindsight"); Pierce, supra note 60, at 511-12
(listing as one reason that prudent investment test "almost always" results in approving costs
that "utility decisions are rarely blatantly imprudent when viewed in light of the knowledge and
alternatives reasonably available to the utility's management at the time of the decision and the
overall complexity of the considerations involved"). For the imbalance of resources between
company and regulator, see supra note 359 and accompanying text.
414. See Duqueme, 488 U.S. at 308-09. In practice, even the prudency rule does not work
quite as announced. See Pierce, supra note 60, at 512. Though Richard Pierce may be right
that in application the test has been very utility-friendly, the further the market strays from a
decision, the easier it is for regulators to find imprudence lurking behind decisions that turned
out badly. The passage of time has a wonderful way of exposing the missing components of a
company's analysis. It perhaps is only the tendency to insert full investment costs into a rate-
base early in an investment's life that prevents hindsight reasoning from being a more potent
threat to utility underperformance. The treatment of nuclear plant costs shows how the temp-
tation to disallow spectacularly uneconomic investments is hard to resist.
Prudency timing arguments lead to funny debates. Even if the issue is narrowed to prudency
at the moment of investment, the battle over an early mistake only arises if the later unfolding
of the market outstrips the early decision. Companies do not have to pay up if their invest-
ments do better than expected, though profits above the intended level can hurt them in their
next rate hearing. In an adverse market, in contrast, prudency should become a judgment
about the effectiveness with which the utility's historical decision handled the risk that has oc-
curred. It may be only regulators' messy involvement in the investment decision that has made
this test so relatively passive.
The argument that how a power plant actually fares, relative to the market, should be irrelevant
to its prudence may be akin to arguments in fraud cases that the actual outcome of an invest-
ment is irrelevant to whether it was correctly portrayed as safe to investors at the outset. For
instance, in a major oil and gas fraud case, the defending operating company, Davis Oil Com-
pany, moved to exclude all evidence "of the ultimate financial or drilling results of AEI's in-
vestments with Davis Oil" for this reason: "The simple fact is that the value of a prospect
changes dramatically, either upwards or downwards, as a result of the drilling of a well. The
actual outcome of the well is irrelevant to the speculative value that a purchaser would pay for
the opportunity to drill the well...." Davis Oil's Memorandum in Support of Motion in Lim-
ine To Exclude Evidence of the Ultimate Financial or Drilling Results of AEI's Investments with
Davis Oil at 4-5, A.E. Investments, Inc. v. Davis Oil (D. Colo. 1990) [hereinafter Davis Oil's
Memorandum] (emphasis added). Evidence of the property value after the end of 1982
(barely a year after the drilling of the investor's first well) "is simply too remote and unfairly
prejudicial to be allowed." Id. at 9. "[W]here the results of drilling have been disappointing,
the jury will find it difficult, if not impossible, to consider the initial opportunity for profit that
determines the true value of an undrilled prospect." Id. at 5.
A second reason that prudence alone does not determine recovery is that it is only one of a
regulated firm's hurdles. Many regulators deny recovery for portions of an investment that
turn out to be neither "used or useful." See Pierce, supra note 60, at 512 (defining "used and
useful" test). This standard lets regulators freely judge the usefulness of a plant ir. the market
as it has developed, rather than its wisdom at the moment of investment. See infra note 416 and
accompanying text.
The ability of regulators to make utilities pay the price of their mistakes under either test
would seem confirmed by the heavy penalties many utilities bore for idled nuclear plants.
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recovery-that being put in a ratebase is not insurance-is the un-
ambiguous lesson of Order No. 528-A. In that Order the Commis-
sion reiterated the long-standing rule that costs must be for "used
and useful" investments as a second, independent requirement of
ratemaking.1 5 Pipelines had claimed an entitlement to payment for
all prudent costs, but FERC pointed out that this claim ignored two
key regulatory principles. One, the Commission does not guarantee
costs "which market conditions would not otherwise permit
[pipelines] to recover. ,4 6  Two, ratepayers need only pay the
"legitimate costs of providing service, 41 7  "Legitimate" means not
wildly out of line with market standards, not the historic prudency of
the ratemaking world.418
In general, regulated firms are to bill for "used and useful" facili-
ties. The focus of the "used and useful" test is "whether the plant is
actually used and useful to the utility in providing regulated serv-
ices. 44 For instance, this test ordinarily excludes a plant that was not
physically operable, incomplete plants, or those that had become ob-
415. See Order No. 528-A, 54 F.E.R.C. at 61,304.
416. Id. at 61,303.
James Hoecker published a detailed article on the background to "used and useful" as a
ratemaking principle while he was FERC's general counsel. SeeJames J. Hoecker, "Used and
Useful". Autopsy of a Ratemaking Policy, 8 ENERGY L.J. 303 (1987). Starting with the comment
that used and useful "has a certain immutable friendliness and clarity," id. at 303, he argued
that ever since EP.C. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) made the overall result (not
the theory) the test for FERC procedures, "used and useful" had become "'simply one of sev-
eral permissible tools of ratemaking, one that need not be, and is not, employed in every in-
stance."' Id. at 309 (quotingjersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1175
(D.C. Cir. 1987)). Hoecker's article is a good tonic against the common error, particularly by
those seeking cost recovery, of trying to make any single test the only test for rate recovery. See
id. (arguing that prudent investment test is "not the last resort if agencies suspect excessive re-
turns"). Contrary to this common error, "used and useful" is an independent requirement,
and it is one reason that prudent costs have not become "'the prevailing rule.'" See id. at 310
(quoting Democratic Cent. Comm. of D.C. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 485
F.2d 786, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). (It is perhaps more accurate to write, not"the only rule.").
Hoecker believes that the doctrine should be used even "to exclude substantial prudent in-
vestments from rate base or cost of service... if a reviewing court has a basis for believing that
such a countervailing public interest is being served." Id. at 331.
For a much more limited reading of the "used and useful" test, seeJOSEPH KALT ET AL., supra
note 300, a paper commissioned by Boston Edison. In the authors' view, facilities generally
have satisfied the "used" prong of the test if they are "available to be utilized," id. at 29, a test
that virtually all stranded electricity costs would satisfy. They believe the "useful" prong has
"[h]istorically ... prevented utilities from putting assets unrelated to providing service, such as
abandoned plants or investments not germane to the electricity business, into the ratebase."
Id. This is a narrower reading of energy history than Hoecker's. The authors' potential overes-
timation of the protection that the old regulatory system allowed may be explained in part by
the sponsorship of their project; it would have been hard for these authors to come out with a
report, on a job commissioned by a major utility, stating that utilities should have to absorb
most or all of their stranded costs.
417. Order No. 528-A, 54 F.E.R.C. at 61,303.
418. See supra note 413.
419. Pierce, supra note 60, at 512.
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solete.420 The "used and useful" test thus looks at assets in the evolv-
ing market and does not require the "finding of fault" that marks the
prudent capital test.
421
"Used and useful" and prudent-cost formulas are not substitutes.i2
That each can exclude costs from the ratebase independently can be
seen from the fact that a plant may be useful, but its costs have not
been incurred imprudently4 s Alternatively, a plant may have been
prudent if prudence is judged at the moment of inception, even if it
is no longer useful.424 The "used and useful" rule has excluded a wide
range of assets, including experimental and abandoned facilities, real
estate held for later use, interest and taxes accruing during sus-
pended construction, and material intended for but not used in plant
construction.4 2 In natural gas, FERC has used the doctrine to deny
recovery of projects that failed before certification; synthetic gas pro-
jects that did not require certification; excess capacity from
"improvident venture [s] "; retired plant; some research and develop-
ment expenditures; and expenses "entrepreneurial in nature." 26
"The costs of the failed gas supply projects embarked upon during
the gas shortages of the 1970s were generally allocated to inves-
tors., 427 On the other hand, though "highly speculative or exotic gas
supply projects" tended to be "left on the doorstep of investors," the
Commission has allowed recovery of more ordinary operating risks
like those in gas storage projects and drilling of dry holes.28
One reading of the "used and useful" test is that it generally func-
tioned to deny recovery of investments that did not work at all, or
that did not function when built.42 But as the listing above shows,
the full list of excluded uses is broader. In addition, even though the
test has been applied in the quasi-political atmosphere that sur-
420. See id.
421. See id. at 513.
422. See id. at 513-14.
423. See id. at 513.
424. See id.
425. See Hoecker, supra note 416, at 313 (discussing examples). One problem was reconcil-
ing the "used and useful" test with legitimate expenses that primarily would benefit later con-
sumers. Commissions did not want to penalize prudent inter-generational planning. The con-
struction-funding problems in this area were channeled into the standards set forth in Order
No. 555, 56 F.P.C. 2939 (1976), afrd sub non. Oglethorpe Elec. Membership Corp. v. FERC, 574
F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cited in Hoecker, supra note 416, at 313-14.
426. See Hoecker, supra note 416, at 315-16.
427. Id. at 321.
428. See id. at 321-22. Hoecker notes that "recovery of such failed plant costs receives more
generous treatment when an electric generating plant is involved," with one reason being
FERC's power to certificate natural gas plants but not electric plants. See id. at 322; see also id. at
314 n.53 (explaining FERC'sjurisdictiona distinction between electric and gas utility projects).
429. SeegenerallyKALTETAL., supra note 356.
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rounds agency action, and so may not always have been pushed to its
full potential, the existence of the doctrine and its potential applica-
tion always have represented the risk that major investments might
not receive ordinary ratebase treatment if time showed that they were
not needed.
4. A regulatory "contract" would be subject to contract defenses
Regulatory bargain claims rest on the assertion that there is an en-
forceable bargain between agencies and electric companies.3 0 A fa-
vorite way to jazz up the claim into a full guarantee for stranded costs
is to push the metaphor of regulation as contract.43' Thus, some de-
scribe the regulatory tie as an implicit contract whose termination
requires compensation.3 2 They redefine deregulation as a breach of
contract, with payment of stranded costs treated as the expectations
damages due under contract law.'
One way to assess this claim is to take the contract metaphor seri-
ously. Within the realm of contract, there are serious problems of
capacity, agency, vagueness, and missing terms for anyone trying to
justify a guarantee of full recovery. For instance, the history of the
regulatory bargain shows that Congress did not give FERC carte
blanche to tie the fate of customers around the country to the full life
430. See COMED COMMENTS, supra note 25, at 8 (analogizing public utilities' agreements
with regulators to private contracts).
431. See zd. (using contract theory of expectation damages to justify claim for stranded
costs).
432. See id. at I (discussing the "quid pro quo" in compact, as if it was an ordinary contract
with consideration on both sides). ComEd refers consistently to the"compact" as a "regulatory
contract." Id. at 1, 6 (emphasis added). This semantic distinction lets ComEd's economists ar-
gue that, "like a private contract, [the compact] is a negotiated economic agreement between
utilities and regulatory commissions," id. at 17, and like private contracts, it has "implied fea-
tures." Id. at 20. Predictably, one feature is a guarantee of stranded cost recovery. From here
stems the "general understanding between the regulated firm and the regulatory authority...
that the main components of the regulatory apparatus remain in place even though economic
changes occur." Id. at 26.
Though the EEI's prose is not quite as sweeping on this point, the trade group means the
same thing when it calls the regulatory compact a "reciprocal arrangement." EEI COMMENTS,
supra note 23, at 2.
433. As one would expect, CoinEd, which most expressly used the contract metaphor, also
advanced most strongly the "reasonable expectations" argument. Its economists argued (as
properly trained economists who believe in the "efficiency theory of breach" so often do) that
even unilateral breach is acceptable "if ratepayers can be made better off without denying just
compensation to the utility's investors." COMED COMMENTS, supra note 25, LAw AND ECO-
NOMICS REPORT, at 43. This assertion is just Pareto optimality rephrased. See THUROW, supra
note 69, at 218-19 n.1 ("Economic theory avoids equity decisions by retreating into what is
called Pareto efficiency-a fancy term for 'more is better than less.' ... But since there is always
someone who is worse off after any change, nothing is Pareto-efficient in the real world."). The
catch, of course, is that if stranded costs are treated as if the guarantee really was written into a
contract (or fairly implied in what was written), deregulation, which has become "a unilateral
breach of the regulatory contract by regulators," requires "payment to utilities for their expec-
tations damages." Id. The damages turn out to be (what else?) stranded costs.
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of whatever assets utilities decided to buy. There is a problem of con-
tract capacity.4 3 4 It is unclear whether the real "bargain" is between
the agency and the firm, or the firm and its much larger, unorgan-
ized customer base.
This vagueness of parties spills over into agency problems. In spite
of the consumer groups that exist in many states, neither consumer
groups nor agencies have the resources to compete with utilities in
their planning function. Only utilities can afford to maintain large
technical and managerial staffs and to buy substantial expert reports
in the ordinary course of business; as agencies currently are staffed,
none could replicate or even fully test the hundreds of investment
plans utilities have carried out in the last few decades. 5 Though
agencies often reviewed and, at times, approved or modified these
plans, they were not the real architects of the current power infra-
structure.
Moreover, if power company investments are to be examined as a
product of multi-party decisionmaking, the expectations of the com-
panies have to be reconciled, in one way or another, with those of the
other parties. Utilities and their shareholders indeed may have
hoped, and even "expected" (if that means what they thought was the
most likely outcome) that they would recover all of their invest-
ments.4 36 At the same time, as they built nuclear plants and the larg-
est of generating units, these companies did not publicize the risk of
the kind of overruns that have in fact occurred.3 7 If they had, so that
434. SeeJONES, supra note 378, at 13 (discussing whether telephone bargain was with agency
or customers).
435. Cf. supra note 359 and accompanying text (discussing imbalance between utility re-
sources and those of customers and regulatory commissions).
436. When dealing with expected risks it is a fallacy to equate the deregulation that has oc-
curred with the risk that such restructuring would happen-today its probability is 100% be-
cause it is history, but that was not the world as investors faced it. See infra note 470 and accom-
panying text (describing court decisions and regulatory changes that should have alerted
investors to risk).
437. Although they warn readers against judging blame and generally favor stranded cost
recovery, Kalt et al. admit that the regulatory approvals that utilities received for large plants
never were seen as protection for the kind of overruns that have plagued so many nuclear
plants:
First and foremost, there is some question as to who broke the regulatory bargain.
When they agreed to allow a rate of return on all prudently incurred costs, regulators
never dreamed that utilities would experience cost overruns of several billion dollars
[today, losses in the hundreds of billions).
KALT ET AL., supra note 356, at 51. Not only did "no one" expect billion-dollar overruns, but
.the consumer was promised the new capacity at a price two or three times lower than the ac-
tual price." Id. at 58-59. The authors understate the resulting problem: "The idea that he
should now be willing to pay full price for this new capacity in lieu of having the utility forego
the opportunity to charge higher prices for their older plants-which the consumer perceives
as having already been paid for-would be a hard sell." Id.; cf. IPALCO ENTERS., supra note
280, at 23 (observing that firms now seeking nuclear stranded cost recovery "originally argued
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electric companies and consumers really bargained until reaching
the law's meeting of the minds on decades-long contracts that allo-
cate the risks of enormous, open-ended investments, consumers al-
most certainly would have gained at least some traditional risk-
shielding clauses-price indices, price caps, quantity limitations, and
force majeur clauses." 8 Consider an investment like PG&E's Diablo
Canyon plant. On December 31, 1995, PG&E listed the book value
of Diablo Canyon at $4.8 billion, while the net book value of all its
other generating assets was just $3.1 billion. 9 PG&E incurred a huge
risk by not diversifying its power sources. The true reason that its
customers do not have contract protection against this concentration
of risk is that there is no overarching regulatory contract; neither
PG&E nor other electric companies publicized these risks.
Moreover, the length of any utility/consumer contract would have
been limited. The parties would have had to treat the risk that prices
can change dramatically in long-term contracts. The greater the
term, the greater the incentive for consumers (whether bargaining
directly or through an agency) to require other protections, be it by
price, by quantity, or in some other contract clause.
Like electric companies, the public had express and implied ex-
pectations."' One expectation was that any "compact" could change
over time if needed to serve consumer welfare. 4 ' Regulation would
adjust so that electric companies could not dump wildly inefficient
that their high sunk capital costs would be offset by low incremental running costs").
438. See, e.g,JONES, supra note 378, at 18 (arguing that social contract would have to select
price base and index for long-term telephone pricing); THIERER, supra note 3, at 26 ("And even
if ratepayers had signed such a deal, a rational contract would have included the right to opt
out once cheaper service became avilable."). These terms are very familiar to utilities because
they are the kind of clauses that appeared in gas take-or-pay contracts and other long-term util-
ity fuel-supply contracts.
439. SetPG&E COSTREcOVERYPLAN, supra note 257, App. C, at 16.
440. See NARUC COMMENTS, supra note 190, at 25-26 (discussing public expectations for
social programs from regulatory bargain, including reliability, environmental concerns, effi-
ciency, and equity). In one of electricity's strange-bedfellows displays, the Heritage Foundation
makes the same point in one of its reports. SeeTHIERER, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that"even if
ratepayers had signed [a regulatory compact], a rational contract would have included the
right to opt out once cheaper service became available").
441. NRRI's COMMENTS RELATED TO FERC's SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF PROPOSED
RULEMAKING ON STRANDED COSTS 11 (Aug. 8, 1994) [hereinafter NRRI COMMENTS] (stating
that "regulatory compact evolves and is rebalanced as times and circumstances change"); cf.
JONES, supra note 378, at 18 (index by which rates would change is another important feature
of social contract).
One of the problems with regulatory-bargain claims is the lack of a contract specific enough
to supply appropriate terms for major technological and cost changes. There is an
"inconsistency between the claim that a strong regulatory bargain existed and the absence of
any specific criteria for judging investment decisions." KALT ET AL., supra note 356, at 53. Had
this relationship truly been "bargained for," there would be specific terms to cover major tech-
nological changes.
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investments onto captive consumers. As Hope shows, regulators
might change the rules to better serve competition. Another expec-
tation was, as Otter Tail reminds us, that customers might exit the sys-
tem without penalty in a quest for competitive power. Another was
that companies were not to ignore extreme costs and risks when they
invested. Yet another was that investments that failed the "used and
useful" test would not be recovered. If there is an implied regulatory
bargain, contract, compact, or deal, it would reflect such terms. And
enforcing this contract accurately would not give electric companies
full stranded-cost recovery.
B. Financial Integrity and Capital-Market Threats Do Not Justify
100 % Recovery
A second major concern that permeates FERC's and California's
stranded-cost rules is the financial integrity of electric companies.
These agencies have claimed that recovery was required for utilities'
"financial integrity," one of the interests to be protected under Hope.
Yet their orders do not show how many companies would fail without
Order No. 888's or the CPUC's special protection (though some
companies certainly would) and, quite peculiarly, they even fail to
find the total expected losses.
However one counts likely stranded costs, and in spite of some
contrary language in Order Nos. 888 and 888-A,442 those who try to
quantify the problem tend to conclude that concentrated in only
• 443
some companies. As few as 20 companies, and just 10 states, may
account for half of all stranded costs." 4 Order No. 888 subsidizes
these companies at the expense of their smarter competitors.45 Or-
442. FERC reiterated a concern with "financial stability" as one of its guiding principles in
Order No. 888-A. It claimed that open access "radically increased" the risk of not recovering
costs. See id. at 12,373. Throughout both orders, the financial integrity discussion proceeds as
if all utilities would bejeopardized if the stranded cost mechanism is not imposed.
443. In its February 7, 1997, study, as noted above, RDI concluded that half of expected
stranded costs, $100 billion, rest with a "small group of only 20 utilities." RDI REPORT, supra
note 24, at 2. It is not surprising that this distribution of losses among companies produces a
similar distribution among states. Ten states have 86% of expected stranded costs, even though
they produce only 43% of the country's electricity. See id. at 3.
It is telling that the EEI report, which is written as if the organization has been seized by the
companies with the largest stranded costs, religiously stays away from discussing how these costs
are distributed among its members. If it did address this issue, it would become clearer that
EEI's strong push for full recovery is really special pleading for its largest and most powerful
members.
444. See RDI REPORT, supra note 24, at 2-3.
445. See COMMENTS ON STRANDED COST ASPECTS OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL NOPR BY ELEc-
TRICITY CONSUMERS RESOURCE COUNCIL 14 (1995) [hereinafter ELCON COMMENTS] (predicting
that "utilities that have braced for competition will be placed at a disadvantage relative to their
poorly-managed competitors"); CILCO COMMENTS, supra note 50, at 13 (arguing that stranded-
cost protection "upsets the natural selection of winners and losers"). Cilco also argues that
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der No. 888 does not provide any facts showing enough industry-wide
jeopardy tojustify its decision to respond with generic relief.
Moreover, stranded-cost estimates generally take a static view of
utility costs. Many of the presumptions of dire financial results take
no account of increased efficiencies, new forms of risk sharing, and
other measures that might mitigate the burden of inefficient
power. Rather than consider factors like these, FERC repeatedly
opined that utilities "could" fail without full recovery. 7 It spoke of
the "prospect of not recovering such costs [which] could erode utili-
ties' ability to attract capital and be very detrimental to a diverse array
of utility shareholders" ;448 and of an inability to recover those costs
that "could impair the financial ability of a utility to continue to pro-
vide reliable service. 4
FERC did find that "[t]he financial community commenters con-
firm our views in this regard."450 They did because it is in their self-
interest to make this problem sound as severe as possible. The
"financial community" would lose billions of dollars without stranded
cost recovery. Naturally its representatives will say pass-through is
necessary to preserve financial health (their financial health). And
even if some utilities go bankrupt, that is just what one would expect
for companies that made inefficient and at times discriminatory deci-
sions.4 ' The Commission's duty to ensure just and reasonable rates
stranded costs will impede competition, enabling inefficient utilities to discourage departure to
new firms by threatening departing customers with high exit fees. See id. at 15-17; cf. IPALCO
ENTERS., supra note 280, at 1 (claiming that up-front cost recovery "virtually guarantee [s] that
today's inefficient high cost utilities will control tomorrow's generation supply").
446. There is a circularity in stranded costs in FERC's and California's overall assurance of
cost recovery. Such measures remove whatever incentive the utilities have to reduce their
losses. See ROSE, supra note 3, at 88-89 (discussing how full recovery "blunts utility incentives to
lower costs and mitigate transition costs"). The failure to mitigate increases the need to re-
cover, which in turn confirms the companies' original claim that they face a very large, irre-
ducible cost problem. See IPALCO ENTERS., supra note 280, at 18 (arguing that by utilities' re-
ceiving big subsidies, they may continue to operate inefficiently). Full recovery is a "self-
fulfilling prophecy" because it provides the funds to keep uneconomic plants open, see id., thus
helping make sure that losses will match projections.
447. See, e.g., Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,630.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 21,642 (citing NOPR, F.E.R.C. Stat. & Regs. § 32,507, at 32,870) (emphasis
added).
450. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,642; see also id. at 21,628 (noting financial commu-
nity's support for full stranded cost recovery).
451. The Texas PUC made the interesting suggestion that the Commission "address finan-
cial problems only as needed." COMMENTS OF THE PUB. UTIL. COMM'N OF TEX. 4 (1993)
[hereinafter TEXAS PUC COMMENTS]. In that way, "FERC could ensure that only those utilities
with legitimate financial integrity concerns could apply for stranded cost recovery." Id. As
FERC would not give its view of the total costs it expects stranded by Order No. 888, much less
those of any given utility, all a reviewing court can do is guess at just how much of a problem
the Commission really believes no-recovery would give to some utilities.
Economists tend not to lose much sleep over bankruptcy, at least not as long as they think
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would have been better served by rules that help these companies
operate through bankruptcy, keep their wires and plants intact, and
make sure that the most efficient successors bid for the assets. This
would have been much better competitive relief than Order No.
888's bailout provisions. Or, if FERC decided that bankruptcy really
has to be avoided, it could customize relief for the companies that
Order No. 888 truly threatens with collapse.
California was equally solicitous about its utilities' financial worries.
Coupled with and related to the CPUC's picture of a "regulatory
compact" was a strong emphasis on protecting the pocketbooks of
the state's electric companies. The CPUC claimed that it was allow-
ing full recovery of uneconomic power contracts and regulatory
commitments "[t]o assure the continued financial integrity of the
utilities," as well as to "give them an opportunity to be vital market
participants in the restructured market following the transition. 452
The "financial integrity of the utilities [was] an important goal of this
proceeding, and a goal we will pursue in making the transition to a
more competitive marketplace., 55 In speculation no more grounded
than FERC's, but just as surely music to utility ears, the Commission
opined that "[i]nvestors' uncertainty about the recovery of transition
costs may harm the utility's ability to raise capital and may result in a
higher cost of debt.' '45 If utilities had to write off all of their uneco-
nomic assets, "they could face a financial disruption that might lead to
lower system reliability and inefficient operation.
455
Nothing in FERC's or the CPUC's rules shows that the utilities'
services would be jeopardized by denying pass-through. The orders
do not show that this is a generic problem, or that full cost recovery is
needed to avoid disaster. In fact, there are roughly 250 investor-
owned utilities and approximately 3000 municipal and cooperatively-
owned power companies.456 It is true that most of the country's elec-
that the bankruptcy court is efficient enough not to waste too many assets in processing. See
ROSE, supra note 3, at 27 ("[T] he lights do not automatically go off [inbankruptcy]. The utility
may... later emerge in better financial health, merge..., or reorganize .... From an eco-
nomic efficiency standpoint, society is better off after the financial readjustment since it results in
a better allocation of resources overall.").
452. See CPUG DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 111.
453. Id. at 119 ("Maintaining the financial integrity of the utilities is an important goal of
this proceeding.").
454. Id. at 119 (emphasis added); see also id. at 59 (warning that, without cost recovery, the
"issue of generation assets alleged to have been stranded would now be plagued with doubt
and uncertainty at the precise time" of the move to competition).
455. Id. at 119-20 (emphasis added); id. at 196 (Finding of Fact No. 50: "If we do not pro-
vide for adequate transition cost recovery, the move to competition may threaten the utilities'
financial stability.").
456. See EIA UPDATE, supra note 10, at 10 (charting 244 investor-owned utilities, 10 federally
owned, 2014 other publicly owned, and 931 cooperatives).
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tricity comes from a handful of companies, and some of them have
big stranded cost problems, so simple averages are not very accurate.
Investor-owned utilities produce almost three-fourths of our power;
thirty-four of them are responsible for over half of all electricity pro-
duced.457 Some of the largest of these companies would be in real
trouble without cost recovery. In sheer numbers, however, they are
in the minority. There certainly are more companies with no expo-
sure than companies that would fail if they had to absorb their losses.
Moreover, none of the major cost proposals suggests allowing no re-
covery; the number of companies whose health would be jeopardized
by an appropriate mechanism is less than the number of companies
with large stranded costs.
Some utilities and commentators expressed anger that any agency
might upset their belief that utility stocks are perfectly safe, as if utili-
ties could exist in an economic vacuum. This is why there are so
many claims that regulation was a guarantee against the rigors of
competition.ss These claims should be treated like the claims of
other people who expect to get something for nothing. No one ever
guaranteed purchasers of these private stocks that they could raid the
public treasury if their companies got into trouble. Similarly, no one
suggested or promised that they had found a semi-private market-
place that would be forever exempt from competition, regardless of
the quality of their companies' investments.
A pipeline reliance interest did not play a part in gas restructuring
even though pipelines argued that they were not being compensated
properly for their investments. Beginning in the late Eighties, pipe-
lines began to claim that their rate of return was preventing them
from matching the earnings of similarly regulated industries. Pipe-
lines claimed that the caps on their rates prevented them from bal-
ancing losses against profits in good times.459
457. See CPI REPORT, supra note 5, at 27.
458. See supra notes 315-20 and accompanying text.
459. See infra note 468.
Those who claim that pipelines have been underpaid ignore the uncompetitive practices
that produced the shift to open access. Had competitive companies entered contracts like take-
or-pay contracts, they would not have come near market rates of return. The pipeline response
to this point is that, like electric companies, they would not have entered these contracts had
they not been pushed to do so by regulators. Essentially, their argument is as follows: "We
don't want any responsibility for our gas purchasing, at least, not unless you protect our mar-
kets from all competition." Here too the most fundamental question about deregulation is why
firms made such wildly inefficient decisions.
Two natural gas pipelines did go bankrupt during the period of gas deregulation; one was
acquired, the other has subsequently emerged from bankruptcy. The fact that their sharehold-
ers were hurt was irrelevant to the true issue, which was whether their companies made such
inefficient and at times discriminatory decisions that they should be held responsible. Simi-
larly, if shareholder-owned utilities bought overly expensive generating plants and tried to
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In an important contrast to electricity that Order No. 888 fails to
address, in Order No. 528-A FERC rejected pipeline arguments that
they deserved to recover more costs. It found that equitable sharing
"permits [pipelines] to recover a sufficiently large percentage of the
costs so that their financial viability and ability to provide service to
their customers is not undermined."4'6  FERC cannot distinguish
natural gas by arguing that electric companies' risk is so much more
extraordinary that they need to recover all of their costs, because in
the past, it has argued just the opposite. In Order Nos. 888, 888-A,
and 636-G, the Commission has claimed that it was the fact that take-
or-pay exposure was so extraordinarily large that permitted the
Commission to shift some pipeline costs to other parties.46" '
To the extent that concerns about financial integrity were based on
a desire to protect the physical network that delivers power, those
concerns could have been met without passing through all stranded
costs. FERC could have addressed that problem by requiring corpo-
rate unbundling. The significance of its decision to order only func-
tional unbundling instead is that it kept the health of utility transmis-
sion and distribution systems tied to their inefficient generating
assets. Had FERC mandated corporate unbundling, it could have
protected transmission and distribution affiliates and any economies
in the scale of their operations even if generating affiliates lost their
ability to compete. 462 Given the Commission's finding that the mar-
avoid losses by discriminatory control of their lines, arguably the shareholders should pay, just
as pipeline shareholders paid.
460. See Order No. 528-A, 54 F.E.R.C. at 61,304.
461. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,637 (making pipelines shoulder some costs was
.an extraordinary measure given the nature of the take-or-pay problem and the prevailing envi-
ronment at that time"); Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,392 ("fundamental premise" of
Order No. 500 was "extraordinary nature" of take-or-pay problem; pipelines faced "vast out-
standing take-or-pay exposure" and putting these "billions of dollars" on "any one segment of
the industry would have imposed a crushing new burden on that segment"); 12,393
(referencing "extraordinary expense"); Order No. 636-C, 78 F.E.R.C. at 61,784 (citing
.extraordinary nature" of the "massive costs" that pipelines risked incurring).
The Commission's failure to test its financial integrity concerns company by company is in-
consistent with another part of Order No. 888. It has decided to tie protection to"reasonable
expectations" company by company, customer by customer. Surely it would have been at least
as easy (and certainly more fair) to protect financial integrity on the same case by case basis.
This conclusion is particularly apparent when the major stranded costs seem likely to be con-
centrated in a handful of companies and states.
It probably is fair to point out that concern over financial integrity and use of a formula that
protects "reasonable expectations" is inconsistent. Very solvent utilities that meet the test will
be protected; shaky, nearly bankrupt companies that built plants without a proper expectation
may be denied recovery and therefore jeopardized. The reason this may not be a fair criticism
is that the Commission has not decided what to do about costs that do not meet the Order No.
888 test; there will be no surprise if it ultimately lets financially shaky companies pass those
costs along to remaining customers.
462. Such unbundling would have required an administrative allocation of losses among
equity owners and bondholders. The allocation would create problems in distributing the as-
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ket for new generation is competitive,6 5 the Commission presumably
believes that failures among companies with generating assets would
464be balanced by the entry of new companies.
Electric companies do face one disadvantage compared to pipe-
lines: Pipelines were able to shift most of their exposure back onto
producers because of the loose structure of the natural gas industry.
Electric companies, which are much more likely to own their own
"producing" supply, will not have a similar luxury. Yet balanced
against this difference is the fact that Order No. 888 only concerns a
small part of the stranded-cost problem, the wholesale costs, and the
fact that these costs seem concentrated in a small number of compa-
nies. Some utilities might need financial relief, just as at least two
pipelines (those that went bankrupt) could have used a hand; but
FERC has not developed a record to show that Order No. 888 caused
an industry-wide problem.
One kind of financial integrity argument tries to extort money by
threatening to withhold future funding. The argument seeks to ex-
sets of the unbundled companies among creditors and other interest owners. Indeed, the
CPUC's Chairman recently stated that the reason California did not mandate generation dives-
titure (although it seems to be occurring anyway) was the belief that the utilities could not se-
cure bondholder approvals in time. See Conlon, supra note 207. Conlon called the ISO "just an
opening" to a more long-term divestiture and asserted that FERC agrees that ISOs are
"transitional" to regional, independently owned grids. The divestitures mandated by the Public
Utility Holding Act took decades, even though the divisions were among holding companies
rather than operating companies, and many of the victims already were in bankruptcy, so op-
position was less likely. SeeJOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 175, at 205.
Investors buying stocks and bonds from regulated companies take the risk that there will be
agency changes to the nature of their security. Upon divestiture, stockholders presumably
would receive stock in both the unhealthy generating assets and the healthy transmission and
distribution affiliates; they should not be any worse off than before (at least, not from the cor-
porate unbundling alone) as long as the allocation is proportionate. Lenders and others hold-
ing interests secured by specific assets would have their interests go through the restructuring
as well. Commissions might have to make a division of assets if a lender had unlimited security
on generation, transmission, and distribution assets, in effect subsidizing poor generation in-
vestments with still-protected assets, but in that instance the Commission would have to ask
whether the lending arrangement had been entered prudently.
California has proceeded with partial divestiture by requiring its two major utilities to sell at
least half of their fossil-fuel plants. In some other states, divestiture seems to be a quid pro quo
for stranded-cost recovery. Interestingly, one of the most economics-based reports on electric-
ity deregulation, the Heritage Foundation's report on "Energizing America," touted divestiture
as "probably the easiest deregulatory path to follow," as "simpler than.., open access," and as
having "great appeal." THIERER, supra note 3, at 7, 23-24. The authors ultimately recom-
mended against it, however, for seemingly prudential reasons. "A de-monopolization period is
needed to right the regulatory wrongs of the past." Id. at 24. Perhaps more importantly, the
authors had to know that advocating full and immediate divestiture would reduce the report's
credibility with most industry audiences.
463. SeeOrder No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,542, 21,549, 21,553-54.
464. Someone would have to pay the transaction costs of this realignment of market shares.
But the whole idea behind deregulation is that the efficiency gains from competition signifi-
cantly outweigh the costs of transition, so it would hardly be appropriate for the Commission to
protect utilities just because of the transactions cost of opening their markets.
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ploit the fact that electricity plant is a voracious consumer of capi-
tal.46 The argument buries issues of blame and responsibility behind
seemingly anonymous market mechanisms. As the threat goes, re-
gardless of who is at fault for today's predicament, the only way that
"capital markets" will fund needed investments in the future-at
least, at a viable interest rate-is if today's costs are reimbursed. Cost
recovery becomes necessary to avoid future problems. 46 Stripped of
qualifications, the argument would force consumers to pay for the
most ill-conceived past investments so that the market will not punish
future consumers.
The capital drought argument is a poor predictor of future market
behavior. Markets are much smarter than this model. Stranded costs
465. The EEI reports annual capital expenditures of investor-owned utilities at $25 billion.
See EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 10. It calls the industry "our country's most capital-
intensive industry." Id. at 8 (reporting that electricity "requires $2.32 of capital investment" per
dollar of annual revenue, while in comparison, natural gas, another capital-heavy industry, only
requires $1.08); see a/soJOSKOw & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 175, at 3 (noting that the industry
"requires enormous amounts of capital"). Not only is approximately 10% of all capital invest-
ment related to electricity, see CPI REPORT, supra note 5, at 1, but much of the nation's power
plant is old stock that will have to be replaced, cf. id. at 24 (stating that one-half of
.operational" plants larger than 50 MW are more than 30 years old).
466. See supra note 356. Baumol and Sidak take this side too, warning of the "deterrent
consequences for investment" if investors do not recover the money they feel was promised
under an "implicit regulatory compact." See BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 1, at 105. The likely
shortage of capital is a "compelling efficiency reason for regulators to permit recoupment of
stranded costs." Id. It is for this reason that they support the "apparently implausible proposi-
tion" (one this Article argues is not just implausible, but wrong) that consumers are best served
by full stranded-cost recovery. Though consumers might seem to always be better off with the
lowest prices, this will be a "Pyrrhic" victory if utilities cannot recover their costs and capital
dries up. See id. This would be "the form of imprudence to be feared most," in which consum-
ers received "some highly transitory, short-term benefits for which [they] will later have to pay
very dearly." Id. at 113.
Baumol and Sidak do not address the, narrow conditions under which the loss to consumers
in higher capital costs would exceed the gain from not funding all stranded costs. Baumol later
joined the EEI's ECONOMISTS' REPORT, which concedes that this would be an extreme case. See
infra note 467. Similarly, they fail to explain why this risk would affect (1) future generating
capacity, in a market that will be deregulated and thus unlikely to experience another regula-
tory reform, or (2) transmission and distribution markets that do not appear under a threat of
being deregulated or undercut by lower cost suppliers.
One reason Baumol and Sidak may not have developed a sufficient economic argument for
full cost recovery is that they, like the EEI, may believe that economics is secondary to equity
concerns, which they read as dictating full recovery. See id. at 101 (tracing "disparity in obliga-
tions" between utility and new entrants to commitments made with "regulatory consent and
encouragement"); id. at 103 (arguing that considerable portion of costs "were incurred invol-
untarily.., as a result of regulatory imposition," and calling costs a problem "caused by regula-
tor's departure from the mutual expectations that underlay traditional regulation"); id. at 107-
08 (subscribing to equity arguments for full recovery); id. at 100-11 (calling it a "taking" if utili-
ties do not at least recover their investment and the cost of capital). By whitewashing all utili-
ties' investments as if undertaken by regulators rather than by private companies, Baumol and
Sidak depart the complex world in which blame and burden would be shared and enter a sim-
plistic one in which there is a sole effective cause of stranded costs (regulation) and a sole rem-
edy (make consumers pay for every last dollar). One can see why EEI would have provided fi-
nancial support for this report, see id., as well as the report that Baumol, Kahn, and Joskow
submitted as part of EEI's Order No. 888 comments.
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are concentrated in only certain kinds of generating plants and
power supply contracts, and in only certain firms. Investors can de-
vise strategies to handle such risks. And investors will know that
when FERC is moving from regulation to competition, its decisions
on past generation costs are not likely to have much impact, if any,
on the risks assumed by companies building new generating capacity.
Those plants will be subject to ordinary market tests 67 The level of
merger activity shows that there is a lot of capital eager to take risks
in return for the possible gains, but also losses, of the newly deregu-
lated market.
Disallowance of a large share of (or all) stranded costs would not
convert all electric company stocks into bad risks. Most utilities have
relatively few stranded costs, and it is easy to pinpoint the troubled
investments of the companies that do have large exposure. Capital
would shift to companies with wise investment strategies, as it does in
any market. If differences in risk-taking are pronounced, companies
perceived to have done better should, over time, secure more capital
and tend to expand. Those making poor decisions will stagnate and,
in some cases, be acquired by companies that rate better in capital
markets. It is true that the decision to make companies pay their
stranded costs would impose great capital costs on companies that
have courted nuclear power, long-term fixed-price fuel contracts, and
467. For an example of how one well-known commentator's thoughts on the recovery
mechanisms differ under the assumption of continuing regulation, see supra note 60 and ac-
companying text. Electricity deregulation presumably would be something of a middle case
under a partly-deregulated approach, because many costs are deregulated, but whatever hap-
pens to these costs might by seen as precedent in capital markets for the still-regulated trans-
mission and distribution sectors.
It is a very far-fetched idea that capital really might disappear, or that interest rates would
rise so high that the added cost would be a greater penalty than that imposed by full cost pass-
through. Indeed, though there may be some increase in interest rates from the shift to compe-
tition, if deregulation did not bring lower costs, "then by the same logic all industries should be
regulated to get the lower cost of capital." ROSE, supra note 3, at 28. The EE's economists
candidly admit that the increase in capital costs is not likely to offset the gains from not having
to pay stranded costs: "Nor do we assert that the consequent increase in the future cost of capi-
tal would fully offset any corresponding short-term gains in allocative efficienc[ies] ... [but]
legislators and regulators can not expect with impunity to change the rules of the game .... "
EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 41.
Finally, one might argue that effective competition in the new electricity market will require
great concentrations of capital. The many "BTU convergence" mergers show that many indus-
try companies share this belief. This is a rich-utilities version of the failing company argument:
If competition requires a number of very well-funded entrants, large payoffs to utilities with
billions of dollars in stranded costs will ensure deep-pocket competitors in generation. But this
argument necessarily assumes that capital markets are not efficient enough to provide large
capital pools even where electricity offers big profits, something the current flow of funds into
the industry suggests is not right. It is worth noting that economists who believe in markets
tend to believe that the government should not be in the business of supporting fledgling or
"infant" companies, a principle that presumably should apply to faltering electric companies
too.
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more generally, on utilities that failed to diversify their sources of
supply and continued to build very large generating plant. This
would be a far cry, however, from the disappearance of capital from
the industry as a whole.
One last financial-integrity argument is really a form of the regula-
tory bargain argument. Like the pipelines discussed above, electric
companies like to claim that the risk of competition was not incorpo-
rated in their return.4" They argue that allowed rates of return do
not protect a utility's periods of under-recovery (i.e., if recovery is cy-
clical, a rate cap set at only the average return does not permit the
gains needed to erase periods of loss), and that the risk of changed
regulatory fabric did not figure in their rate hearings.
4
'
The capped structure of rates has been a feature of regulated life
for decades, so investors should have factored that constraint into
their willingness to invest. Discussions of whether the risk of deregu-
lation was part of the rate of return make several errors. One error is
that investors risked their money under this capped-earnings struc-
ture even though they had to know that regulations could change.
Another is overestimating the risk to investors. The risk that a ra-
tional investor would incorporate is not the actual risk that has mate-
rialized (i.e., the deregulation that has occurred), but the discounted
present value of the risk that deregulation with cost recovery disallowed
might occur. Similarly, the loss an investor would have associated
with deregulation would not be all possible stranded costs, as often is
assumed in dire warnings about utilities' financial integrity. It would
be only the expected portion of those costs that regulators would not
protect.
The risk of deregulation may have been only 20% or 30% (or less)
in the Seventies, for instance, and that is the risk that a rational inves-
tor would have factored into his or her equation. This risk grew as
utilities sank greater proportions of their total capital into very large
plants. As Part V.A discussed, anyone paying attention to the recov-
ery history in natural gas and electricity could not have been sur-
prised to find that a large gap between market prices and embedded
468. This theory has gained some prominence with an article and then book by William Tye
and various co-authors, in work that grew out of their review of nuclear plant recoveries. SeeA-
LAWRENCE KOLBE ET AL., REGULATORY RISK (1993); see also INGAA WHITE PAPER, PIPELINE
RETURN ON EQUITY 19-25 (1995) (arguing that FERC rates of return tend to rely on unrealistic
growth forecasts and the wrong comparative investments; and that the cap inadequately mir-
rors cyclical returns). The EEI supplied the Commission with a 45-page report, plus attach-
ments, detailing Kolbe and Tye's theory. See REPLY COMMENTS OF EDISON ELEC. INST. (Jan. 23,
1995).
469. See id. at 33-39 (allowed rates of return did not compensate investors for risks).
894
1998] ELECTRICITY'S STRANDED COSTS
regulatory costs put utilities at some risk.470
Some myopia surrounds complaints over low utility returns and
stock prices. Electric companies made some very bad investing deci-
sions, as did natural gas pipelines. To the extent that costs have been
stranded because of overinvesting in capital-intensive facilities and
contracts, the losses are brought about by utility practices. Just as
natural gas prices showed that pipelines made a lot of mistakes in gas
purchasing, so too the spread of costs between today's large utilities
and new entrants shows that something went badly wrong with utility
investing.' Small wonder that some electricity stocks have fallen; so
did the supposedly secure stock of the companies that overinvested
in mainframe computers, large cars, DC-10s, and Apple computers.
470. Everyone has their own list of what factors should and should not have afforded notice
to investors that paid any attention to their investments. In addition to Hope and Otter Tail and
the many changes in natural gas pricing, opponents of stranded costs like to cite Public Service
Commission of Montana v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U.S. 130 (1933), and Market Street Rail-
way Co. v. California Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945). See ROSE, supra note 3, at 59-61.
There has been a wide range of other regulatory changes in the last ten to fifteen years that
arguably should have warned investors of the risk. See id. at 79 ("[T]hese events include ... the
beginning of competitive bidding in some states, discount rates offered to industrial customers
(including 'cogen killing'), increasing amounts of new capacity from independent suppliers,
warnings of change from investor service organizations, and reduced regulation or deregula-
tion in other regulated industries."). Of course, recovery proponents have their own raft of
cases about their right to an opportunity for recovery, usually beginning with Duquesne and
continuing with prudency cases that employ the "opportunity to recover" slogan.
471. As noted above, most utilities deny this and try to put all the blame on regulators, but
if regulators believe that utilities are entirely efficient actors trapped inside an irrational net-
work of government rules, they should leave franchises in place to preserve economies of scale
and integration and simply remove the offending rules.
472. See supra note 12 (discussing market failures of other major industries). Even if claims
about investors' legitimate expectations are not well founded, they can be very potent. FERC
cited both the American Society of Utility Investors' and United Utility Shareholders Associa-
tion's comments even though they contained nothing but rhetoric. SeeASUI COMMENTS, supra
note 310 (arguing that changing the rules now is unfair to investors);UUSAA COMMENTS, supra
note 310 (urging the Commission to consider stockholder interests). The comments served as
a reminder that there are millions of small stockholders who could be organized to demand
stranded-cost recovery. The emphasis on retired and small-shares owners who had held stock
for a long time and were looking for security contained the barely veiled threat that these or-
ganizations would trot out the worst cases, the sympathetic grandmother whose life savings
plummeted in value and the couple that saved for years for their son's college education, in
hopes that pass-through would be decided by the suffering of victims rather than the true ex-
pectations of the parties. Left out is the fact that bond and stock ownership is heavily concen-
trated in the wealthiest of Americans.
Given annual investments of $25 billion in this capital-intensive industry, see EEI COMMENTS,
supra note 23, at 10, the steady undercurrent to all capital-markets-based arguments is the
threat that we, owners of capital, will pull up our stakes if you, the Commission and ratepayers,
don't protect us from the predicament that our companies find themselves in. The argument
is a not-very-subtle form of blackmail. For a related, more general argument that businesses
enjoy a privileged position in the political process, see CHARLES LINDBLOM & EDWARD
WOODHOUSE, THE POLICVMAKING PROCESS ch. 8 (1993).
It has, of course, long been part of an agency's concerns to protect the integrity of the utility.
But that principle unfolded in the context of costs assumed to be legitimate. The cases have
not held that even imprudent utilities, companies that wildly overinvest, or companies that dis-
criminate have to be preserved.
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This leads to the oddity of the complaint that rate hearings did not
include discussions of the risk of deregulation. What firm was going
to raise the point that it might be acting so poorly that its markets
should be restructured? What utility was going to tell its regulators,
"Oh, we think there is a good chance that our costs are so inefficient
that you will disallow them in the future, so we need a higher rate to-
day to attract capital," or, 'You know, we are discriminating against
cogenerators and the small combined cycle gas generators who are
entering our franchise territory, so you should increase our return
because there are good odds you will deregulate us next year"?1
71
Although some arguments for cost protection, like regulatory bar-
gain arguments, rest upon claims to a prior agreement, others, like
the capital market threat, are by any other name claims for an enti-
tlement to government protection. The most passionate of these
claims come with reminders that some utility investors are widows or
retired people who subsist on low income,4 but rarely is there a re-
minder that as a group, people owning stock are the wealthiest
members of our society.47 5 To the extent that the effect of stranded-
Moreover, the Commission had options to meet concerns about financial integrity. See supra
notes 462-64 and accompanying text. It could have required corporate unbundling, thus pre-
serving the transmission and distribution assets and localizing losses in the generating sector
that has fallen behind the market. It could have identified utilities that actually faced financial
disaster, and allowed relief only in those cases, as the Texas Public Utilities Commission rec-
ommended. See TEXAS PUC COMMENTS, supra note 451, at 4 (arguing that FERC should estab-
lish a test to identify utilities with legitimate financial issues).
It is worth noting that the arguments about financial integrity are one of the least supported
parts of Order No. 888. The Commission never made a finding on the actual scope of stranded
costs, nor does the Order contain findings about the finances of any utility or the industry as a
whole, so there was no basis for FERC to conclude that this is a major problem. The Commis-
sion's discussion of this problem includes cites to both utility investor groups above, whose
comments are short, undocumented special interest appeals. If the Order turned on this fac-
tor, it would have to be remanded for legitimate findings.
The Commission's pages about discrimination in the industry are also short of fact. See Or-
der No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,566-69, 21,704-05 (discussing comments filed regarding undue
discrimination). The Commission justifies its conclusory treatment there in part by noting that
customers would have an understandable fear of retaliation. See id. at 21,568 (transmission cus-
tomers may be afraid to point out discriminatory practices because they are afraid of being shut
out of the market). This acknowledgment should not be enough to let the Commission get by
with so few examples. Electric companies are not about to complain seriously, though, because
FERC certainly has the authority to deregulate in this age of deregulation, and it has greatly
favored utilities thus far with its rulings on stranded costs.
473. One utility response to this point could be that this complaint arises because there has
been an arbitrary deregulation; but were that the case, and it is not, Duquesne has the answer.
Arbitrary changes in regulatory fabric to make sure utilities bear every unforeseeable loss would
violate due process. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 (1989).
474. See ASUI COMMENTS, supra note 310, at 2 (stability of the electric utility industry ap-
pealed to individual investors); UUSAA COMMENTS, supra note 310, at 2 (electricity industry is
attractive to retired people who cannot afford to take a risk with their money).
475. As Lester Thurow has pointed out in a discussion of energy company stock, the top
10% of the income strata own 90% of corporate stock. SeeTHUROW, supra note 69, at 31. Poli-
cies that shift wealth to this group result "in a sharp shift toward inequality in the distribution of
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cost reform is to redistribute collective resources, via the govern-
ment, to one group, it is a claim of the wealthy for the rest of society
to make them still more wealthy. None of this is ever stated clearly in
the debate.
C. "Cost Causation" Ignores Who Really "Caused" Stranded Costs
Order No. 888 turned to another "principle" that never appeared
in the natural gas orders: "cost causation." A number of com-
menters urged that utility shareholders pay at least some penalty
"because at least some of the responsibility for stranded costs lies with
poor business decisions by utility management.4 76 The Commission
responded that "[w]e believe it is appropriate" that departing cus-
tomers bear all costs stranded by their departure.4 It defended this
decision as consistent with "the well-established principle of cost cau-
sation, namely, that the party who has caused a cost to be incurred
should pay it."' 87 In contrast, "[a] broad-based approach.., would
violate the cost causation principle by shifting costs to customers
(such as transmission users of the utility's system) that had no re-
sponsibility for stranding the costs in the first place. 479 FERC
claimed that Order No. 500's equitable sharing was "an exception to
the time-honored principle that rates should reflect cost causation.""48
income." Id. The fact that a policy has regressive distributive effects does not mean that it is
wrong. To the extent that regulators really induced investment by promising recovery, or
commanded it through onerous rules and regulations, society may have to pay the bill even if
the result is to increase the income of rich Americans. The problem with FERC's and Califor-
nia's stranded cost treatments is that they reward this class of owners with more wealth without
determining the extent to which they deserve such compensation.
476. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,634.
477. Id. ("[T]he departing generation customer... [should] bear its fair share of the le-
gitimate and prudent obligations that the utility undertook on that customer's behalf.").
478. Id. at 21,635.
479. Id. For another reference to cost causation, see id. at 21,633 (defending pass-through
as "consistent with the traditional regulatory concept of cost causation").
480. Id. at 21,636-37. This position in turn seems to parrot dicta in one of the District of
Columbia's decisions on natural-gas recovery costs. See KN Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295,
1300-03 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In KNEnergy, a customer appealed KN Energy's Order No. 500 plan
for take-or-pay costs. In a history that has little to do with what the Commission actually said in
its orders, the court claimed that "FERC has instead taken the position that circumstances sur-
rounding the take-or-pay crisis and the transformation of the pipeline industry necessitate and
justify the crafting of new ratemaking principles." Id. at 1301. It said that FERC's allocation of
gas costs to customers who "may not have directly caused them" was "acceptable' only because
of the Commission's judgment that "the extraordinary nature of this problem requires the aid
of the entire industry to solve it" and that there were "no other alternatives." Id.
The court divined FERC's second rationale for this treatment to be that all parties to the in-
dustry would benefit from deregulation. See id. In Order No. 888, the Commission made no
effort to decide whether utilities should pay some of their stranded costs because they will
benefit from deregulation, which many surely will.
In the federal court's attempt at rule-massaging (if not rulemaking), it held that these ra-
tionales could be "reconciled with the NGA," but only "given the unusual circumstances sur-
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The idea that departing customers "cause" stranded costs
(apparently by reacting to the competitive incentives the Commission
has seen necessary to install) does not fit the rationale for ordering
open access. Order No. 888 requires open access because utilities,
not departing customers, have been building inefficient plants and
buying uneconomic power and then, armed with monopoly transmis-
sion and distribution facilities, trying to block cheaper power. Open
access exposes these facilities and contracts to competition. Deregu-
lation is occurring because of failures in utility supply choices, not
because customers are withdrawing their demand in response to
overpriced power. If utilities find their power stranded, it will be be-
cause their electricity is not competitive and customers have re-
sponded accurately to the market. It is not because departing cus-
tomers have done something wrong. If one looks for the "cause" of
stranding, one need look no farther than the inadequacy of utilities'
investing, the reason for deregulation in the first place.
This is why cost causation, and with it Order No. 888's focus on
"reasonable expectations," picks the wrong standard for gauging
electric companies' entitlement to government financial protection.
The relevant issue in a deregulated world is not (as the Order as-
sumes) whether a utility has a reasonable expectation of serving a
departing customer, but whether it ever had a reasonable expecta-
tion that it would keep customers if its service was very uncompeti-
tive. It is the excessive cost of service, not the fact of providing service, that
spawned deregulation. Deregulation's primary aim is to fix a supply
problem, not a demand problem. 8' Agencies have welcomed new
firms because too many of the major utilities have been inefficient in
the way they provide their obligatory service. The stranded cost bat-
rounding the take-or-pay problem, and the limited nature-both in time and scope--of the
Commission's departure from the cost-causation principle." Id.
It would be a bet worth taking that no ordinary reader of the English language could read
the gas deregulation orders and the related appellate opinions and emerge believing that the
Commission had done something almost illegitimate, justified only by the "unusual" circum-
stances and the "limited" nature of the remedy.
One can speculate whether KN Energy was the last straw for a Commission battered by re-
peated reversals of its gas deregulation orders. When that opinion suggested a surer basis for
stranded costs by resting them on "cost causation" (indeed, offering the Commission a chance
to use a methodology it could blame on the court), FERC took it. But this reading of Order
No. 500 through KN-colored glasses is not the most natural reading. No one could tell from
Order No. 500 that equitable sharing was a departure from mainline regulatory principles.
481. If agencies believed that what has gone wrong is that the consumer is buying too much
or too little power, power from the wrong sources, or displaying some other problem with de-
mand, they presumably would have done something other than order open access. They could
change rate structures; impose rate penalties or varying rate structures to change the effective
marginal cost of power purchases; or establish education and information programs to change
buying practices.
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des too often have diverted attention from the fact that stranded
482
costs are a supply problem, not something customers did wrong.
Though regulatory filings are not the best place to look for a bal-
anced view of an industry dispute, they do have a role to play in
studying a new rule. The adversarial process tends to produce the
strongest arguments for each side's position. From an agency's per-
spective, ratemaking comments can be an easy way to gather the
strongest authorities for the decision it ultimately undertakes and to
identify the likeliest objections. From a policy perspective, the failure
of an argument to appear in anyone's rulemaking comments is one
sign that the position may not be very credible.4 3
This sheds some light on FERC's justification that pass-through is
"consistent with the traditional regulatory concept of cost causa-
tion.' 84  FERC welcomed cost causation, its "well-established princi-
ple," like an old friend .s Its affection only deepened by the time it
reached Order No. 888-A. There the Commission claimed that its
natural gas orders were a temporary departure, caused by that indus-
try's "unusual circumstances," from this deep principle. The asser-
tion that cost causation is a fundamental guide to ratemaking is strik-
ing because virtually none of the Order No. 888 commenters
suspected that it would be a guiding principle. Cost causation played
virtually no role in the first-round arguments of the major utilities,
just as it did not affect the natural gas outcome.
Cost causation issues have been disputed frequently in battles over
which customers should bear certain costs, but the deregulation issue
is different. Here the question is whether certain costs are legitimate,
and should be borne by any customer, not how they should be allo-
cated across customers.
That cost causation is a weak reason for deciding whether stranded
costs qualify to enter the rate equation can be deduced from the
482. See ROSE, supra note 3, at vi ("The debate implies that the commission or legislature
imposes costs on the utility... [and] has shifted the focus away from the origin or controller of
these costs, the utility. In an economic sense, retail access and competition do not impose
costs-rather they expose costs that are uneconomic relative to alternative suppliers."); see also
id. at 93; ELCON COMMENTS, supra note 445, at 13.
Utility customers did not "cause" 19C/kWh nuclear plants. Customers did not "cause"
utilities to sign contracts for QF power at above avoided cost rates. Customers did not
"cause" utilities to spend exorbitant sums on demand-side management programs de-
signed first to compensate the utility for reduced demand and only second to con-
serve power. Customers cannot "cause" costs to exceed those that would otherwise
prevail in a competitive market.
Id.
483. This is not always true. Sometimes the absence of an argument mayjust mean that the
best solution to a problem is so innovative that very few people think of it.
484. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,633.
485. Id. at 21,635.
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careless way in which FERC used the concept. Although the Com-
mission introduced it as a general justification for full pass-through,
Order No. 888 almost immediately shifts to using cost causation as a
defense for an exit fee as the mechanism of pass-through.4' The is-
sue changed from whether to allow these costs into the ratebase, to the
very separate question of how to allocate them on the assumption that
they will be allocated entirely to customers. 7 In other words, the
Commission assumed rather than proved that some class of custom-
ers should have to bear stranded costs. This is circular logic because
the issue being decided is whether any customers should pay for
these losses.
The real fight over stranded costs is not about for whom an electric
company thought it was incurring costs. It is whether a company
should have incurred particular costs-built the plants it built, signed
the supply contracts it signed-no matter whose demand is being
served. It is whether the plant and contracts were necessary to supply
power. That question should lead regulators back to the reasons that
utilities made bad decisions, and to the extent of their errors.
D. Reimbursing Utilities for Uneconomic Plants and Contracts Will Not
Enhance Efficiency
The stranded cost debate has proceeded as if the main issue is the
intent of the sides to a regulatory bargain. Most utilities are smart
enough not to pretend that rewarding them for investments whose
costs they cannot recover will enhance efficiency. That is why their
claims for relief tend to focus on what they say they were promised by
486. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,635 ("A broad-based approach, in contrast,
would violate the cost causation principle by shifting costs to customers (such as transmission
users of the utility's system) that had no responsibility for stranding the costs in the first
place.").
The Vermont DPS argued that the costs allocated were "costs to provide system power supply,
not to supply specific loads." See COMMENTS OF VT. DPS, supra note 394, at 17. This portion of
the Commission's order is likely to lead to far more litigation than it imagines.
487. The way this slight of hand works is instructive. In its cost-causation discussion, the
Commission initially phrases the issue as whether costs should fall on "the departing genera-
tion customer," or instead on "the remaining generation or transmission customers (or share-
holders)." See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,634 (emphasis added). Though shareholders
already may have gained special privileges-as the possibility that they might bear any costs has
already been demoted to a parenthetical-just a few paragraphs later shareholders have
dropped from the scene entirely. Now the Commission phrases its objection to a"broad-based
approach" (like equitable sharing) as that it violates "the cost causation principle by shifting
costs to customers (such as transmission users of the utility's system) that had no responsibility
for stranding the costs in the first place." See id. at 21,635. Not only does this ignore cost shar-
ing among generation customers, but the most important allocation of costs-that between
customers (however defined) and shareholders-has dropped out of the analysis. The "cost
causation" discussion never explains why shareholders fail to bear some of the costs, or why
management's officers and agents are not viewed as having "caused" at least some of the costs.
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regulators, not on whether stranded cost recovery is efficient.
But deregulation is, after all, propelled by the high value society
has placed upon efficiency. Thus it is worth considering whether ef-
ficiency dictates one approach or another. Not surprisingly, one can
find arguments that stranded cost recovery is indeed efficient.m The
EEI offered FERC the rare opportunity to review the thoughts of
three of America's most prestigious economists on this issue: Paul
Joskow, William Baumol, and Alfred Kahn. 89 The three concluded
that long-term "productive" efficiency justifies full cost recovery.4,0
They found short-term productive efficiency of little weight, 91 and
they admitted that "allocative" efficiency suggests that utilities should
pay for their unwanted facilities, 492 but they argued that these two fac-
tors are outweighed by long-term productive efficiency when it is
added to considerations of fairness. 9
1. Cost recovery does not serve short-term productive efficiency
The economists' first conclusion is that there is little gain in short-
term productive efficiency (so it should not control the recovery
mechanism) ." They reach that result circuitously, though, by skip-
ping the necessary predicate for their position, which is to answer the
cost-responsibility question: What share of stranded costs is due to
utility mistakes, and what share to regulatory impositions? By assum-
ing that all stranded costs are caused by regulators while failing to
make any effort to prove this claim, the economists deprived the
488. See, e.g., William Baumol & Gregory Sidak, Stranded Costs, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
835, 837 (1995) (making efficiency arguments for recovery).
489. See EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36.
490. See id. at 3-4.
491. See id. at 3.
492. See id. at 4.
493. See id. at 3 ("Efficiency improvements should be the primary goals of policy reform.").
The three economists come out decisively for stranded-cost recovery in their EEI report, see id.
at 3-4, as do Baumol and co-author J. Gregory Sidak in another industry-sponsored report,
Baumol & Sidak, supra note 488, at 837. But it is perhaps not surprising to find comments that
yield less-certain interpretations in some of the authors' other writings. Thus in another 1994
article, Kahn was only willing to argue that the "larger source" of stranded costs lay in older
plant and power contracts. SeeKahn, supra note 175, at 10 (emphasis added). Kahn continued:
Beyond pointing out that economic efficiency would best be served by ignoring sunk
costs and freeing utility companies to reduce their rates to marginal costs..., I have
no particular enlightenment to offer on the question of the companies' entitlement
to recover those presumably prudently incurred costs, a large portion of which was in-
curred on orders by the regulators.
Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added). In his EEI Report, Kahn laid claim to having a lot more
"enlightenment," for instance, advising FERC on equity as well as economic concerns. Cf
ROsE, supra note 3, at 90 & n.6 (questioning consistency of Baumol's support for stranded costs
with an earlier affidavit).
494. See EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 20 ("Opportunities for improvements
in productive efficiency... are very limited in the short-run.").
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Commission of help where it most needs unbiased expertise.
Productive efficiency involves the resources used to generate
power.49' In turn, productive inefficiency occurs "when more re-
sources than necessary are used to produce a good or service, either
because it is not supplied by the lowest-cost supplier or because sup-
pliers would use fewer resources."49 6 As long as prices faithfully re-
flect costs, one can assume that utilities with the lowest prices will be
the most efficient.
49 7
EEI's economists faced the problem that if existing plants really
are more efficient, why are the average costs of some plants facing
stranded costs so much higher than those of new plants? To the ex-
tent that those costs reflect variable expenses like higher operating
expenses or plants with poor fuel choices, short-run efficiency dic-
tates shifting to new suppliers. To the extent that higher costs reflect
primarily sunk costs due to utility mistakes, there is nothing efficient
about making customers pay the price. To the contrary, economic
theory assumes that firms become efficient by paying for their mis-
takes. Losses are the stick that counterbalances the carrot of higher
profits.
The economists sidestep the uneconomic nature of stranded costs
by treating them as if they are not true economic costs. They quaran-
tine stranded costs as special regulatory costs, in a judgment that is
more political than economic. Though their report is 51 pages long,
it makes no effort to prove that regulators caused these costs. In-
stead, the report simply repeats conclusory statements that stranded
495. See id. (defining productive efficiency).
496. Id. at 20.
497. There is a catch: existing plants already have consumed resources, so the productive
efficiency question is whether society will spend fewer resources generating power from these
plants going forward than by building new plants, even if those plants would be cheaper if every-
one was starting from scratch. See id. at 39-40 ("Productive efficiency relates only to the use of
present and future resources, because these are the only resources of society that can be
economized or wasted."). The Economists' Report continues that given sunk costs, "[m]ost
existing utility plants... are superior to any proposed new ones," so they should supply new
power until society needs to build new capacity. Seeid. at 21.
The stranded-cost debate cannot really be over the use of physical resources, a standard that
in essence would treat the fixed costs of all existing plant as zero because their physical inputs
already have been consumed. Allowance of stranded costs, which in general will subsidize un-
economic fixed costs, should ensure that most of these plants will be used unless their variable
costs exceed the total (fixed and variable) costs of new plants. But denying these costs does not
mean inefficiency in production measured by physical inputs. Some of the companies with the
largest stranded costs might be forced into bankruptcy, but their assets should be sold as long
as the assets can match the marginal performance of alternative power sources. Thus even
without stranded-cost recovery, today's sunk assets still would be used when it is efficient to do
so. Indeed, the biggest risk of overuse of the wrong assets is with cost-recovery not based upon
true efficiency. If inefficient utilities are repaid for bad investments, they will have the cash to
employ resources the market would idle, all in an effort to deter new entrants.
ELECrRIcITY's STRANDED COSTS
costs result from regulation .4 " The economists assume that virtually
all uneconomic sunk costs in current plant reflect unnecessary regu-
latory requirements. Were this true, the apparently lower price of
new power would not demonstrate greater efficiency: "nonutility
generators ... competitive advantage today stems from almost en-
tirely the large gap between their marginal costs and the regulated
rates of many franchised utilities, and not from the differences in
their respective marginal costs. '' 49 It is only on this unsupported as-
sumption that they can claim that full cost recovery does not reward
inefficiency and therefore does not sacrifice the gains of competition.
2. Cost recovery will not serve long-term productive efficiency
EEI's economists may dismiss criticisms based on short-term pro-
ductive efficiency in a facile fashion out of eagerness to get to the fu-
ture. Long-term productive efficiency is harder to predict because it
depends upon guesses as to which companies will be most innovative,
as well as cost-minimizing, over time. Here the three economists
claim to find "the greatest opportunity for genuine improvements in
productive efficiency."5° They find "ample reason" to think that a
structure putting risks on investors will better deploy resources.501
Implicitly, the economists are saying, "don't worry about costs today,
because there isn't much to be gained there, but take it on faith that
tomorrow we will see real improvement if you just pay back those
stranded costs."
This stress on long-term efficiency mirrors a common assumption
among economists that "dynamic" efficiency, efficiency over time in
498. The EEI Economists' Report abounds with euphemisms and generalities. Current util-
ity sunk costs "were, in effect, undertaken jointly by utilities and regulators," costs that regulators
"reviwed," or costs where regulators "made the policy decisions with more or less specificity." EEI
ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 15 (emphasis added). Regulatorily-imposed costs are
.asymmetrical burdens" imposed on incumbents. See id. at 26-27.
Similarly, in Baumol and Sidak's brief for cost recovery, one finds stranded costs portrayed as
.outlays [that] have been approved by the regulatory agencies," and the claim that "many were
imposed on the utilities by those agencies," Baumol & Sidak, supra note 488, at 835 (emphasis
added); as incumbency burdens, id. at 837; and cushioned by the claim that "considerable por-
tions of those costs were incurred involuntarily," id. at 839 (emphasis added). Baumol and Si-
dak conclude that there is a "compelling efficiency reason [to allow] substantial recoupment,"
id. at 841 (emphasis added), a recovery that blossomed into full recovery by the time Baumol
joined the EEI Economists'Report.
The question of responsibility is a complex one, and it cannot be answered by such facile as-
sertions that only regulators (or only utilities) "caused" the costs that will be stranded.
499. EEl ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 20-21. Not surprisingly, given this begin-
ning, though the economists admit that other deregulated industries have enjoyed "substantial
improvements in short-term productivity," they claim that the chance for such gains in electric-
ity "are very limited in the short-run." Id.
500. Id. at 22.
501. See id. at 21-22 (discussing promise of long-run efficiency improvements).
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innovation as well as in resource allocation, is critical for an econ-
omy's growth. The long-term benefits of competition are an article
of faith among most supporters of deregulation. But guessing which
companies will use resources most efficiently in the long-run is no
simple task, and the EEI Economists' Report offers no reason to suspect
that the efficient companies of the future will be those that spon-
sored today's stranded assets. Indeed, other things being equal, to-
morrow's most efficient companies are likely to be the companies
with today's lowest marginal or forward-looking supply costs for each
unit of power. Regulations should encourage these companies to
take more risks and to invest more money. Moreover, they should
promote an environment of multiple firms to spur innovation. Both
low costs and a multiple-firm market suggest sending business to a lot
of today's entrants. 5°2  Guaranteeing stranded costs, which among
other things will give incumbent firms billions of dollars to fight off
entrants, is the wrong strategy.
The utility response is that regulation has distorted the costs of es-
tablished electric companies, and that if you remove their regulatory
handicap, many current utilities will be as much or more efficient
than new entrants. As with short-run efficiency, here too regulatory
costs have to be equalized before comparisons can be made fairly.
To the extent that regulation has arbitrarily increased incumbents'
costs but not entrants', consumers who pick a supplier by price alone
will just be selecting the company that has been least hampered by
regulation and not the most efficient company.3
This utility argument relies on the same claim that the bulk of the
cost differences between existing and new generation is due to regula-
tory costs embedded in old plant and contracts. Economists generally
start with the different assumption that cost differences reflect differ-
ences in efficiency. Markets police efficiency using the price mecha-
nism to punish firms that do not compete productively. Because
EEI's economists do not try to prove that large utilities' higher costs
502. As the electricity experience painfully teaches, however, a more accurate comparison
will weigh costs not only for regulatory distortion, but in addition, for the period when power
systems underwent their major expansions. A firm that serves a region where population and
demand increased rapidly during periods of high prices may have higher prices through no
fault of its own-i.e., prices that still would match or beat all other companies that added ca-
pacity in the same time period. The best measure of current efficiency probably is some com-
parison of recent new generation.
503. See EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 26-27 ("If some suppliers are subject to
regulatory cost burdens but others are not, competition among them will be distorted.... If in
these circumstances a utility loses business to competitors, it may do so not because it is less
efficient-indeed, it may be more efficient-but because it is required to perform more func-
tions than they."). The Economists' Report talks about this handicap as the problem of
.asymmetric burdens on incumbents." See id. at 26.
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stem from regulatory impediments, they never prove their long-term
productive efficiency argument either.5
The efficiency problem of Order No. 888's subsidy for stranded
costs is magnified by the exit fee used to structure recovery. Here the
Commission guaranteed delay in achieving a competitive market.
Rather than compile a company's net loss for all its departing cus-
tomers and spread those costs across all customers, the Commission
will let a utility impose an "exit fee" billing a departing customer for
the revenues "lost" due to its departure. 5°s Such "direct assignment"
will remove many customers' incentives to switch: "[T]he departing
generation customer may see little or no savings in the short-term by
switching power."5° This mechanism of recovery was opposed by the
two federal antitrust agencies, the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission, because of its obvious inefficiency."0 7
504. The Report's approach presents an intriguing contrast to a standard economic ap-
proach. For instance, its explanation of differences in rates covers just about everything except
the efficiency of the firm. See id. at 6 (attributing rate differences to "differences in fuel and
construction costs, taxes, environmental requirements and in the mix of customers, load fac-
tors and service area density").
505. Order No. 888,61 Fed. Reg. at 21,633-38 (discussing exit fee).
506. Id. at 21,636.
507. The problem with exit fees is that if a customer is going to have to pay for its old power
anyway, it generally may as well use it. In contrast, if stranded costs were recovered through a
fixed charge on all customers, regardless of whether they used an old supplier or new supplier,
they still should pick the most efficient, least-cost producer as they weighed the marginal cost of
each additional unit of power. Even ComEd's economists reach this conclusion. See COMED
COMMENTS, supra note 25, LAW AND ECONOMICS REPORT, at 55 n.54 ("Exit fees as the only in-
strument for stranded cost recovery are incompatible with a competitive and unregulated
wholesale market.").
Both the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, which conspicuously
and somewhat oddly took no position on the propriety of recovering stranded costs generally
even though that is the major competitive issue, criticized "excise fees" as a recovery mecha-
nism. See COMMENTS OF THE U.S. DEP'T OFJuSTICE 15 (Aug. 7, 1995) ("[E]xcise approach effec-
tively increases the unit price of a customer's future services, likely leading the customer to re-
duce its future electricity purchases and to accept substitutes... that are more costiy.");see also
COMMENTS OF THE STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF ECON. OFTHE FIC 35 (Aug. 7, 1995) ("Structuring
stranded cost recovery as excise charges is likely to distort price signals and lead to inefficien-
cies."); COMMENTS OF THE VT. DEP'T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 394, at 9 (arguing that Commis-
sion had found on analogous natural gas issue that "exit fees would stifle the development of a
competitive industry by forcing customers desiring to switch suppliers when their contracts ex-
pire to pay the supply costs of both their new and former suppliers"); NRRI COMMENTS, infra
note 510.
When the Commission explained its decision to use exit fees, it largely ignored efficiency
concerns and instead shifted to the different principle of"cost causation"-customers should
pay the costs they had created. FERC did not show, however, how departing customers are re-
sponsible for the gap between their utility's average costs and those in a competitive market,
which is the cost causation that should matter for stranded costs.
The Texas PUC suggested that the Commission had to deal with the problem that"direct as-
signment," though giving the most protection for recovery, "could also significantly impede the
creation of a more competitive wholesale market by making it prohibitively expensive for a util-
ity customer to obtain a new supplier," and should put only part of the costs on the exiting cus-
tomer. SeeTEXAS PUC COMMENTS, supra note 451, at 5.
Naturally, one would expect utility trade groups to want to prolong their members' control
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Charging departing customers with the full estimated lost revenues
discourages customers from leaving. Even the Commission admitted
that full stranded cost recovery "may delay some of the benefits of
competitive bulk power markets."w In Order No. 888-A, it added
that "[t]here is no question that, without the stranded cost recovery
mechanism, some customers would be far more likely to switch to
lower-cost suppliers and enjoy sooner the benefits of a competitive
power market."'09 Those who opposed full recovery were generally
more blunt.
510
Full cost recovery is also inefficient because it removes the utility's
incentive to seek out savings in its own operations. It is little surprise
that one gas industry report found that pipelines sharply reduced
over their markets as long as possible, and so to endorse exit fees because these are likeliest to
deter customers from shifting to other suppliers. See EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 84
("Direct assignment is preferable to a general surcharge or general access fee because it would
ensure that the customers for whom the costs were incurred pay them."); id. at 93 (listing direct
assignment as "first-best" solution).
Moreover, exit fees seem to contradict language that FERC may now regret in two of its
natural gas adjudications, in which the Commission held that exit fees on departing natural gas
customers were inconsistent with competition. The Commission will have some trouble with its
language in Transwestern Pipeline Co., 44 F.E.R.C. § 61,164, at 61,536 (1988) ("assessment of an
exit fee is inconsistent with the Commission's objective that prices under the GIC be con-
strained by market forces"); El Paso Natural Gas Co., 47 F.E.R.C. § 61,108, at 61,314 (1989)
(reaffirming Transwestern reasoning, and adding that exit fees fail to let customers know "full
cost consequences" of exit decisions in advance).
In Order No. 888-A, FERC came up with what probably are good-enough reasons, given the
deferential review of agency orders, to distinguish these cases. In Transwestern, the pipeline was
trying to levy charges on customers after they had left the system entirely, customers whom Or-
der No. 888 does not affect in electricity. See Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,394-95 &
n.613. One order in this sequence even held that, in some circumstances, exit fees would be
proper. See id. at 12,395 & n.619 (exit fees may be approved under "appropriate" circum-
stances). And as for the El Paso case, El Paso's customers were trying to depart from the system
entirely, not stay on the transportation network but use it for third-party energy. See id. at
12,395-96 (discussing differences in El Paso's rejected exit fee).
508. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,633; see also id. at 21,636 ("[It is possible that some
customers may not be able to afford to leave as soon as they would like."). While the Commis-
sion claimed that "[n]umerous parties representing all constituencies support direct assign-
ment," id. at 21,633, others objected that, among other things, it"would discourage customers
from switching to other generation providers and would thereby inhibit competition," id. at
21,634 (citations omitted). Some understandably questioned whether departing customers
were the sole cause of stranded costs. Id. (footnote omitted).
509. Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,374.
510. See, e.g., NRRI COMMENTS, supra note 441, at 19-20 ("The Commission's proposed pol-
icy cannot help but appear to be protection for inefficient utilities .... Even if the Commission
were able to implement its proposal unchallenged, it would take years for the benefits of com-
petition to reach consumers."); COMMENTS OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF S.F. 11 (Aug. 7, 1995)
[hereinafter S.F. COMMENTS] (discussing what City calls FERC's proposition "that those that
seek to avail themselves of competitive alternatives must reimburse the incumbent utilityen toto
for the very costs that rendered its rates uneconomic in the first place.... IT] he Commission
may have created a zero-sum game, in which savings from competitively acquired power are
offset dollar-for-dollar by stranded investment responsibility."). The most specific charges of
delay arose in comments about FERC's use of exit fees. See supra notes 507-08 and accompany-
ing text.
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their take-or-pay costs because they "had powerful incentives to hold
restructuring cost levels down." '' Full recovery, in contrast, "[b] lunts
utility incentives to lower costs and mitigate transition costs. 512 Pro-
grams like FERC's and California's remove efficiency pressures.
3. Cost recovery does not serve allocative efficiency
The three economists admit that stranded cost recovery will send
the wrong "allocative" signals. Allocative efficiency "requires either
that prices be set precisely at marginal or incremental costs or...
[with] mark-ups... to the extent necessary to recover those capital
costs." 4 Do the rates let customers know how much it really costs to
generate each kilowatt they purchase? If prices are bloated with his-
torical costs built into an outdated plant, rates will not come close to
real costs.51 5 Though allocative efficiency will be lost with full cost re-
covery, EEI's economists believe that "the balance of equity and pro-
ductive efficiency considerations weighs heavily toward ensuring con-
tinued recovery of approved costs during a finite transition period."
51 6
From their perspective, the most important value is the long-term ef-
ficiency of competition. 17
One should not fault EEI's economists for falling to prove the
regulatory predicate of their argument for a full subsidy of stranded
costs. Most lawyers and others who filed comments did no better.
Even if economists have no comparative advantage in interpreting
history, there is no reason why they should be precluded from com-
peting with lawyers for advocacy work. But the Commission should
view the EEI Economists' Report for what it is, assertions contained
in a very interested party's briefing, rather than an objective demon-
stration, or even an indication of how such a demonstration would be
made.
Making regulated companies bear a good share of stranded costs
511. INGAA BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 26, at 1, 7.
512. ROSE, supra note 3, at 88-89. For pipelines, in contrast, incentives were preserved be-
cause "pipelines were not permitted to recover their restructuring costs fully because of Com-
mission policy, competitive pressures, or both." See INGAA BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note
26, at 7.
513. See EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36, at 40 (describing how stranded cost re-
covery holds prices farther above marginal costs than required for efficiency).
514. Id. at 22.
515. See id. at 40.
516. Id. at 49. The economists admit that "[t]here is therefore an undeniable conflict be-
tween permitting utility companies recovery of their stranded costs and allocative efficiency,"
id. at 40, though they say it is a "second order" conflict and one that can be mitigated, see id. at
40,49.
517. See id. ("The most important thing that policy makers can do is to put in place a struc-
ture that encourages the long-term efficiency gains that competition promises.").
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advances efficiency in several ways. First, it ensures that companies
have every incentive to operate at maximal efficiency by selling un-
economic assets and minimizing costs on assets they do operate,
since they will have to pay for the stranded costs.5 8 Second, it clears
the way for new entrants to appear and force competition into the
industry because it prevents the use of cost recoveries to set prices be-
low costs. 9 Third, it guarantees that consumers will get the full
benefits of lower prices that competition can bring.
In contrast, the decision to protect utility investments and shield
them from market forces, even where their inefficiency and their dis-
crimination in shielding them from market forces has risen to a level
that requires deregulation, is inconsistent with the economic reasons
for deregulating.50 Efficiency is not an impressive argument for Or-
der No. 888.
E. Full Cost Recovery is Likely to Maximize Litigation
One argument often raised to justify full stranded-cost pass-
through is that it achieves a great long-term gain for consumers by
concessions on stranded costs. 52' In this reading, full pass-through is
the price of paying off large and politically sophisticated companies
that could use their power to delay change through political and le-
gal opposition. And, indeed, if deregulation produces gains as large
as $50 billion or more a year,22 while stranded costs fall somewhere
in a range from $50 to $200 or even $300 billion,52s a Commission
that had no other alternative still might forgive all stranded costs and
proceed with deregulation.
The desire to avoid litigation costs has been important in other de-
regulations. For instance, one justification for Order No. 500's equi-
table sharing was FERC's concern with the cost of litigating responsi-
518. In contrast, rewarding companies that have bought the wrong assets shifts resources
away from economically efficient firms toward inefficient companies. As one would expect,
utilities that played by the rules and did not amass large stranded costs make this point vocifer-
ously. See supra note 445 and accompanying text.
519. For a discussion of full cost recovery's impact on predatory price setting by utilities, see
TEICHLER, supra note 71, at 7.
520. The reliance argument undermines the purpose of deregulation if it is carried to the
extreme that allows full stranded-cost recovery. If regulations like qualifying-facility require-
ments were the only reason that utilities operated inefficiently, then FERC could have reinvig-
orated the market simply by repealing the offending regulations. The many steps taken to en-
courage new companies to enter the generating market make little sense if regulators assume
that utilities have been doing a good job.
521. See Conlon, supra note 207 (observing that if utilities did not get relief "to some de-
gree," they would not have supported deregulation). The issue, of course, is not whether utili-
ties should get a "degree" of relief, but why they should get the windfall of total relief.
522. See generally supra note 59.
523. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
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bility for high-priced gas.524 That is why the Commission created a
structure where pipelines were to bear between 25% and 50% of
take-or-pay gas costs, but customers were saddled with a strong disin-
centive to sue because an appeal might let pipelines recover all pru-
dent gas costs. Order No. 500 sought "to avoid, to the extent possi-
ble, lengthy and potentially complex hearings" on blame for
stranded gas costsY2 The CPUC was just as blunt about its desire to
avoid "the litigious, adversarial environment of the hearing room. 526
The problem with such a motive is that FERC's and California's
stranded-cost solutions placate only one side, the utilities. Even if
measured just by litigation-avoidance attributes, the solutions are
failed remedies. Full stranded-cost recovery does almost nothing for
electricity consumers. By offering them so little on stranded costs, it
forces consumers to fight over every aspect of the recovery mecha-
nism. Order No. 888 should create far more disputed issues than it
solves.
527
Many new issues have come into play. First, of course, any costs
that have not been "recovered" will be fair game. The prudence
analysis will be a strange one because the general findings concern-
ing the inefficiency of large plants in Order No. 888 are strong evi-
dence that utilities were imprudent. Still, litigation involving unre-
covered assets will center on timing issues of whether the inefficiency
was evident years ago when investments were made.528
524. See Order No. 500, 52 Fed. Reg. at 30,341, 30,343 (expressing confidence that resolu-
tion of take-or-pay costs would be achieved best by settlement rather than costly and protracted
litigation).
525. See id. at 30,341.
526. See CPUC ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING, supra note 203, at 7-8.
527. In one of its attempts to show that the Order was balanced, the Commission treated
the immediate cost from stranded costs as insignificant compared to the long-term benefits
customers should reap from competition. See Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,393:
[T]he stranded electric costs that are subject to the direct assignment provisions of
Order No. 888 are ordinary costs that have always been, and are currently, included in
the utility's rates for electric generation approved by the Commission.... [AII that
the direct assignment provisions of Order No. 888 require is that certain custom-
ers ... bear certain generation costs that they were previously bearing.
Certainly stranded costs are costs that some customers almost certainly would bear anyway if
there was no open access, i.e., if regulators worked hard to prevent customers from shifting to
any competitive sources of supply. The problem with this argument, as with the Order overall,
is that it once again ignores utility responsibility for these high costs. Sure, customers might
have to pay even astronomical costs in a corrupt regulatory regime that created power mo-
nopolies and would not let customers shift on any condition, but this hypothetical state of af-
fairs hardlyjustifies Order No. 888.
528. Order No. 888 does not make it clear whether unrecovered costs in the rate base can
be challenged, even though such a challenge would seem to violate the general intent that old
prudency issues not be relitigated. The Commission did say that "we clarify that we do not in-
tend to relitigate the prudence of costs previausly recovered." Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at
21,664 (emphasis added); see also Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. at 12,391 (same). But
.recovered" costs are not identical to costs allowed in the rate base. If the prudency shield is
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Second, orienting recovery of stranded costs around a company's
"reasonable expectation" of continuing service creates a large new
area for disagreement. Utilities can recover only to the extent, and
for the period, that they had a "reasonable expectation" of serving a
departing customer, and only for costs attributable to the departing
customer.52 Every element of the reasonable expectation standard
can be disputed. Though FERC has suggested a few guides to weigh-
ing the evidence, its insistence that each case be decided on its own,
under all the circumstances, suggests the potential for great factual
intricacy.50 Departing customers will deny that capital costs were in-
curred to serve their demand and try to foist the costs off on other
customers. Also, they will deny that there was a reasonable expecta-
tion that they would continue as customers. If a utility has a nuclear
plant with average costs per kilowatt hour somewhere between nine
and fifteen cents, will FERC let a customer show that it was foresee-
able that new combined cycle plants would have costs of three to five
cents, and then argue that no utility could have a reasonable expecta-
tion that customers would keep buying such expensive nuclear power
indefinitely? Even if the utility had a reasonable short-term expecta-
tion, surely that expectation became less and less reasonable as time
passed and the price gap between the two plants widened: It was
foreseeable that if the cost differential grew, more and more custom-
ers would leave. The threat to cost recovery increased even more af-
ter FERC imposed open access on natural gas in 1985. Many cus-
limited to costs recovered, this is a statement of the filed rate doctrine. If costs allowed in the
rate base for past recoveries cannot be relitigated even with regard to whatever future recovery
remains, the protection is much broader.
529. Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,635, 21,651-54.
530. See id. at 21,653 ("Whether a utility had a reasonable expectation of continuing to
serve a customer, and for how long, will be determined on a case-by-case basis, and will depend
on all of the facts and circumstances." (footnote omitted)). The morass into which recovery
disputes may fall is suggested by the Commission's statement that the expectations test"would
be easily met" if state law imposed exclusive service territories and a mandatory obligation to
serve, at the same time that it has indicated that a notice of termination in a power contract
creates a rebuttable presumption that the utility had no reasonable expectation of serving the
customer beyond the specified period." Id. at 21,651, 21,653.
Neither of these presumptions appears particularly well-founded. The first gives utilities too
much protection. Deregulation should be ajudgment that the ordinary regulated franchise did
not constitute a guarantee that utilities would be protected from competitive forces or from the
consequences of their own inefficiency and discrimination. A mere obligation to serve should
not become a shield to cover a multitude of investment sins. On the other hand, the notice
provision standard is too harsh. Many parties insert notice provisions in contracts that they
fully expect to continue, as a matter of prudence. Thus notices will appear in contracts with
long-term, contented friends who expect to be in business together for years, but also in con-
tracts with the most suspicious, marginal-cost-addled power users. These presumptions ought
not and with luck will not let the Commission escape the full weighing of long-term plans of
both parties and their communications with each other, before it makes the fairest decision on
reasonable expectations.
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tomers should find it easier to dispute the duration of this expecta-
tion than its initial foundation.
Cost causation has its own host of issues. Utilities may not have
specific plants earmarked for specific customers, but they will have
no reason not to try to recover the most revenue they can allege from
each departing customer. The customer, in contrast, has every rea-
son to argue that its power would have come from excess capacity,
and to dispute its responsibility for utility costs. 3 '
Then there is mitigation. Though FERC refused to make utilities
pay some stranded costs as an incentive to minimize costs, 5 3 2 it did re-
quire two kinds of mitigation. The utility will have to show that it
took reasonable mitigation steps, and the Commission will subtract
the "competitive market value of the power.., from the revenues
that the customer would have paid had it stayed on the utility's gen-
eration system."5 33 Customers will have a right to get the utility to es-
timate this market value credit, and a right to broker their capacity if
they think they can get a better deal.3 4 The "true" market value of
released capacity offers yet another area for dispute.
The room for dispute seems smaller in California, in part because
the CPUC did not use a "reasonable expectations" standard, and be-
cause stranded costs are going to be tested in the marketplace as it
develops, but primarily because the CPUC seems unlikely to permit
much debate. The utilities may predict the future fairly well when
they claim that "[r]ecovery of transition costs, consistent with AB
1890, is now a matter of law."535
Though the Power Exchange will establish the benchmark for
power costs, there still should be room to dispute whether the com-
panies auctioned their generation plants in a process that truly cap-
tured a market price, prudently renegotiated their Qualifying Facility
contracts, and prudently maintained or shut down nuclear plants.
531. For instance, the Vermont Department of Public Service argued that it will not be easy
to directly assign generating costs to departing transmission customers. It claimed that"[t]he
costs being debated relate to the costs to provide system power supply, not to supply specific
loads." COMMENTS OF VT. DEP'T OF PUB. SERV., supra note 394, at 17. This argument is an
ironic reversal of the conclusion that utilities drew from calling stranded costs "system costs."
The utilities concluded that some part of a "system" outside the utilities should bear those
costs.
It is fair, at a minimum, to anticipate that the assignment of lost revenues to departing cus-
tomers will be another fruitful area of litigation.
532. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,634.
533. Id. at 21,644, 21,654.
534. See id. at 21,658-61. Customers will not waive their right to challenge the estimated
market value if they try to broker the capacity opened up by their departure. See id. at 21,661.
535. SOCAL TRANSITION COST POLICY, supra note 255, Executive Summary at 2. The CPUC
seems to agree with this reading in result. See Decision 97-06-060, supra note 293, at 34-41
(agreeing that transition cost recovery is mandated by law).
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The outcome of California's deregulation to date, however, does not
give cause for hope that the CPUC will hold utilities to a high stan-
dard of performance anywhere in the stranded-cost process.
Estimating who will benefit from litigation over Order No. 888 de-
pends upon the relative power of the parties, as well as the merits of
their positions. Lawsuits are messy, costly mechanisms that respond
to power and resources, so the cases will reveal a lot about the indus-
try's balance of power. Natural gas deregulation is a reminder of
how far seemingly clear legal rights can be realigned by unequal re-
sources. It appeared to be a great victory for producers when FERC
refused to intervene in take-or-pay disputes and left those battles to
the courts.516 After all, courts generally enforced take-or-pay contracts
when these cases reached them.37 Yet in spite of the law's falling with
producers in take-or-pay disputes, pipelines extracted the lion's share
of settlements.3 8 What can be predicted in electricity is that, given
the much greater amount at stake, far more resources will be spent
litigating responsibility for its stranded costs than were devoted to the
pass-through of stranded gas costs.3 9
Even if one assumes implausibly that there will not be much litiga-
tion over Order No. 888 recovery mechanisms, neither the Order
nor California's mechanism can be justified by the theory that the
costs of litigating the right to recover would have exceeded any bene-
fits.540 Such a trade-off might have been attractive if all that stranded-
536. The Fifth Circuit stayed one take-or-pay case pending Commission action, Wagner &
Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1988), but the Commission quickly decided
that it would not be the forum to decide what it views as private contract disputes. This deci-
sion articulates the Commission's substantive belief that take-or-pay disputes "are primarily a
matter for resolution between the parties involved." Ceiling Prices; Old Gas Pricing Structures,
Order No. 451, 51 Fed. Reg. 22,168, 22,183 (1986) (footnote omitted).
537. For a good tally of take-or-pay cases, see J. Michael Medina et al., Take Or Litigate: En-
forcing the Plain Meaning of the Take-or-Pay Clause in Natural Gas Contracts, 40 ARK. L. REv. 185
(1987), updated in J. Michael Medina, A Report from the Battle Zone: The Take-or-Pay Wars, 58
OKLA. BJ. 2254 (1987), and J. Michael Medina, Take-or-Pay Oklahoma Style, 60 OKLA. BJ. 705
(1990).
538. See supra note 121 (relating take-or-pay settlement amounts). In spite of the uncer-
tainty over the accuracy of the costs listed, this seems to be the only possible conclusion from
the wildly pipeline-favoring settlement ratios identified in Order No. 500-H.
539. But see EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 74 ("An informal survey of EEl members indi-
cates that the number of cases likely to be filed at FERC seeking to recover stranded costs from
wholesale requirements customers under existing contracts will be far less than those filed dur-
ing restructuring of the natural gas pipeline industry."). This contention is another example of
special interest pleading. Of course EEI members will say that they won't be litigious, if they are
given full pass-through. Promise electricity consumers that you'll make utilities pay all stranded
costs, and consumers will be just as happy to look on Order No. 888 with equal favor and stay
out of the courts.
540. This may be what EEl's economists mean when they announce (and by so doing, un-
derline the threat) that "[m]aking provision for the recovery of costs that would otherwise be
left stranded by competition will undoubtedly increase the willingness of utilities to cooperate
in the transition.... Whether their resistance is evidenced through lobbying, litigation, or oth-
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cost adjudication would show is that regulatory commissions some-
how manufactured electric companies' bad investments. Then the
final result might be a series of orders making customers pay these
costs anyway. In this event, Order No. 888's and California's restruc-
turing might embody a grandly prudential judgment that individual
litigation over recovery issues would cost more than it would be
worth.
The first problem with this litigation-avoidance theory is that there
is no administrative record for such a finding. Neither FERC nor the
CPUC made any findings about litigation costs or the probabilities of
litigation success, weighed the evidence relevant to such a balance, or
gave any sign of reasoned decisionmaking on this point. Equally
problematic is the one-sided nature of the Orders, which encourage
litigation. FERC and California have given utilities almost complete
relief for stranded costs, while giving customers virtually no benefit.
In contrast, Order No. 500 was a true litigation-avoidance rule; it
tried to give each side more than they might expect from ordinary
litigation, and so muted the pressure for dispute. Customers have
every reason to challenge the stranded cost provisions in the electric-
ity orders, and no particular reason to accept them.
Finally, the litigation-avoidance argument wrongly assumes that
utilities would fight any order except one that provides for full pass-
through. The opposite is true-in a market unblessed by Commis-
sion intervention, electric companies would risk paying for all
stranded costs. Utilities would have an incentive to avoid litigation in
any number of intermediate remedies, including an equitable shar-
ing formula like that in Order No. 500. Going from full recovery to
equitable sharing might increase utilities' incentive to sue at the
margin, but it would reduce customers' disaffection much more. On
balance, this kind of measured relief would have created a much
wider pool of support for Order No. 888.
VI. GENERATING PROGRESS
The most important electricity questions involve the future, not
erwise, it will inevitably delay the attainment of benefits from competition and consume some
of them in unnecessary transaction costs." EEI ECONOMIss' REPORT, supra note 36, at 41.
It may well be true, as the EIA interprets Order No. 888, that FERC"recognized that utilities
may not be willing participants in the absence of assurance concerning the recovery of
stranded costs of investments." EIA UPDATE, supra note 10, at 54. Certainly utilities will say that
they will not participate without an assurance of recovery, if they have any reason to think that
this will increase their relief. So would any party. But Order No. 888 does not show that these
companies can defeat deregulation unless they get full stranded-cost protection, nor does it
discuss the new incentive it has created for customers to refuse "participat[ion]," to see if they
too can bully their government regulators.
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the past. FERC and California have decided what they want to do
about stranded costs and are unlikely to change. But most states have
yet to deregulate, and so the great majority of stranded costs remain
unallocated.54" ' If these states return to the cost responsibility stan-
dard that FERC used in natural gas, they will produce more efficient
and fair results.
This standard would not require utilities to pay for all of their
stranded costs. A cost responsibility rule calls for balance. There is
no need to replace the one-sided rule in Order No. 888 and Califor-
nia's deregulation with another equally one-sided rule, as if policies
can only be taken from extremes. Regulatory distortions probably
were greater in electricity in most states than in natural gas, so utili-
ties presumably would recover more than pipelines under a well-
administered cost responsibility test. But first those relative responsi-
bilities have to be established.
The one-sided nature of the early recovery mechanisms suggests
that utility concerns dominated the stranded-cost debate. This is not
surprising given the amount at stake and the superior organization of
most utilities compared to the groups who want lower rates, particu-
larly consumer groups. The fact that utility concerns seem to have
captured the treatment of stranded costs, however, and that a fair al-
location of those costs requires a determination of regulatory blame
as well as of company error, suggests that the body deciding the fate
of stranded costs should not include commissioners who were in of-
fice when the uneconomic costs were incurred. These commission-
ers would be sitting as judges in their own case, were they to decide
the balance between firm error and regulatory distortion.
Finally, though Order No. 888 and California's restructuring are
certain to remain fundamentally the same, mitigating steps remain
possible even there. FERC and the CPUC can interpret their rules to
salvage at least some of the responsibility that electric companies
should bear for today's cost excesses. Other states can learn from the
mistakes in these two proceedings, and can return to cost responsibil-
ity (the principle of free markets and efficiency, as well as of FERC's
natural gas deregulation) as the foundation for a better recovery
mechanism.
A. Cost Responsibility Should be the Key to Cost Recovery
The principle best suited to allocating electricity's unwanted costs
is the principle that markets use, and that FERC applied to natural
541. See supra note 10 (discussing various state initiatives in brief).
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gas: cost responsibility. This principle suits efficiency concerns, ac-
cords with the only well-grounded expectations of the parties, and al-
lows enough variation to accommodate the places where unwise
regulatory intervention, rather than utility mistakes, is responsible for
unwise investments.
One way to see why cost responsibility should be the guiding prin-
ciple is to consider the functions implied by the structure of regu-
lated electricity. Although traditional regulation gave regulators the
power to cap rates and control entry, perhaps its most significant as-
pect is that it left power ownership and planning, the entrepreneurial
function, in private hands. 2 The companies kept title to their plants
and contracts; they retained all profits they could reap under their
rate caps; and they still planned the mix of power sources, plant sizes,
and other aspects of capital investment.54 The state did not assume
responsibility for investment decisions or their implementation. The
result of differential company efficiency has been a wide range in av-
erage power costs and in the type of power generation among regu-
lated utilities.
That American regulation respected firms' supposed comparative
advantage in structuring power sources can be read from relative
staffing. In virtually every utility rate hearing, the staff and other re-
sources the utility devoted to its application dwarfed those of the
overseeing agency.'
Second, the primary purposes of regulating and deregulating
power are economic. This is another reason that it is fair to apply an
economic test to losses incurred on a regulated company's watch.
The Federal Power Act requires 'just and reasonable" rates and bars
discrimination. 55 State acts generally use similar terms. Whatever
the actual motive for regulation, the theoretical justification for rate
caps and entry barriers was to have government push prices down to
the "efficient" level where excess profits would not exist and pricing
would approximate marginal costs. 6 Deregulation has occurred
primarily because Congress and many states have come to believe
that government-aided competition is more efficient in doing this
than traditional regulation. 7
542. See ROBERT CRANDALL, ECONOMIC DEREGULATION AND CUSTOMER CHOICE: LESSONS
FOR THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 61-63 (Brookings, 1997).
543. PURPA and its QF contracts muddy even this comparison because utilities were, to
some extent, forced to buy power from other suppliers. But even here, there was mixed re-
sponsibility. See infra notes 566-68 and accompanying text.
544. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
545. 16 U.S.C. § 813 (1994).
546. SeeYELLOW REPORT, supra note 14, at 47.
547. Cf. JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 175, at 8 ("The electric power sector is notable
1998] 915
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:775
Economic standards punish firms that make mistakes and reward
those that guess or plan well. A cost responsibility structure that pe-
nalizes firms for mistakes they made while permitting them to pass
on costs imposed by agency mistake accomplishes that aim. To the
extent that we are making this massive change in industry structure
to lower rates and spur innovation, this benchmark of markets ought
to guide the allocation of losses.
Section V discussed each argument that FERC and the CPUC gave
as substitutes for a cost responsibility standard. Each has a funda-
mental flaw. For instance, the regulatory "bargain" or "compact"
never protected electric companies if their costs greatly exceeded the
unfolding market. To the extent that agencies forced electric com-
panies to sign contracts or build plants that they opposed, or that
they never would have built without promises of recovery (not prom-
ises of an opportunity to recover, but of recovery itself), agencies be-
came the true decisionmakers, crafted the companies' path, and
should be held responsible.! 8 But to the extent that agencies merely
approved plans embodying what we now know are firm mistakes,
plans laid before the agencies by better staffed and organized firms
that stood to reap profits from capital-intensive operations, regulators
should not be blamed for company mistakes. This division of losses
may be made fairly in the context of a cost-responsibility rule.
A cost responsibility standard avoids the irrelevancies of financial
integrity and cost causation. None of the stranded-cost studies show
that a majority of electric companies face crippling stranded costs, or
that having some companies fail would drive capital from the elec-
tricity markets. The bankruptcy of the companies that entirely mis-
read their evolving market may be the quickest way to redistribute
their assets, bring in new management, and spur better operation. It
is true that some of these companies are among our largest utilities,
but if FERC, the CPUC, or other regulators believe that they must
protect some big companies from failing,59 let them design limited
because of its economic importance, so policy directed specifically toward it most naturally fo-
cuses on economic efficiency rather than on general goals best pursued through economy-wide
policies.").
548. There is an unfairness in making consumers pay all costs of regulatory errors because
the consumers who pay these costs often had no say concerning (and even may have opposed)
the agency rule. This is why careful stranded-cost studies have to look at the extent to which
agencies really commanded the companies' investments, compared to the extent to which the
companies captured the agency process (or at least the agency did not stand in the way of
company decisions).
549. The outcome does repeat a tendency that some have seen in ordinary rate hearings,
namely, to honor an "implicit understanding that no PUC shall allow a utility to go bankrupt."
KALT ET AL., supra note 356, at 22. This inclination results in greater rewards for the inefficient
than the efficient, because it forces agencies to "be more generous in judging investments by
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measures for these few companies. The companies would not need
full recovery; there would be plenty of room for mitigation incentives
and for shareholders still to pay some penalty.
As for cost causation, this principle would distribute costs by re-
sponsibility when properly applied. It does not, however, mean re-
sponsibility among customers, as if consumers' demand for power
should be blamed for electric companies' selection of the wrong as-
sets to supply that power. True cost causation means responsibility
for particular uneconomic assets-supply accountability-and this
responsibility needs to be divided between the companies and their
regulators.
Finally, though past practice is not a sufficient reason to adopt a
rule, it is worth noting that a cost responsibility test would be the
same measure that FERC used in its primary natural gas rules. The
difference would be that this time, agencies should explain how and
why they are applying the standard. They could at last clear the
ground for a rational public resolution of stranded costs by facing the
repressed issue of which participants really are to blame for the mas-
sive losses facing the industry.
A cost responsibility standard is a powerful argument against fed-
eral treatment of stranded costs. The level of regulatory error varies
by state, and states are the unit of government most likely to be able
to accurately recreate just what went wrong. Moreover, because there
are not that many large utilities per state, states are far better
equipped to customize remedies if circumstances vary by company.
It is true that the cost-recovery mechanism will affect the competi-
tiveness of states and their ability to compete in the national econ-
omy, but this is another reason why it is better to decide the remedy
at the state level. It is only fair that states make the tradeoff between
preserving the skills and ability of current suppliers and their com-
petitive position.5 ° It is difficult to see any fairness in imposing a rule
utilities in poor financial condition than investments by utilities in good financial shape, even
though the later are usually much better managed." Id. at 22. But if this is all Order No. 888
really intends to do on stranded costs-protect bankrupt companies that engaged in poor
management-FERC should say so and let the courts decide where the chips should fall.
550. See CPI REPORT, supra note 5, at 5,9-10 (arguing that variation in cost problems makes
it only fair that states decide stranded-cost remedy, and noting that forced regional standards
may make lowest-cost states want to move more slowly toward restructuring than others). But
see IPALCO REPORT, supra note 280, at 30-34 (trying out argument that commerce clause re-
quires national standards for, among other things, fair protection of consumers). Simple math
suggests that low-cost states would find their rates rising if they were merged into larger re-
gional suppliers, with no other changes. As a result, low-cost states are certain to require pro-
tections before signing off on changes like open access or, more importantly, mergers. But
even low-cost states may find room for improvement. See Speech of Cheryl Parrino, Chairper-
son of the Wisconsin Public Utilities Commission, ABA Annual Convention (S.F. Aug. 5, 1997)
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like Order No. 888 on retail costs nationally. In states where compa-
nies made the primary investment decisions and made them incor-
rectly, there is no good reason for the federal government to inter-
vene on top of a prior state regulatory process and force consumers
to pick up the tab for company errors. Conversely, if a state whose
regulators forced unwanted costs onto companies tries to block pass-
through, state courts are qualified to hear the resulting constitutional
challenges just as much as federal courts. Moreover, because there
will be a due process question, those dissatisfied with the final state-
court decision may seek a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.
The regulated firms that are happy with Order No. 888 naturally now
want to replicate it in every state through a federal bill, but this is an
argument of self-interest, not a broader policy.
B. If Utilities Deserve Different Treatment Than Pipelines, FERC and the
CPUC Have Not Yet Shown So
The fact that FERC and state commissions can only reach a fair al-
location of stranded electricity costs by deciding the responsibility
that utilities bear for their mistakes, overinvestments, and discrimina-
tion does not mean that the electricity industry would end up with
the same proportionate burden as natural gas pipelines. There is no
reason to expect this balance to be the same in electricity as in gas.
One important distinction between the two industries is the painful
cure already doled out to electric utilities for unwanted nuclear
plants. Nuclear plants provide much of the nation's electricity-22
percent in 1991.s"' Utilities have written off over $20 billion for these
plants.55" 2 To the extent that commissions already have adjudicated
the blame and cost that utilities should bear, the residual costs pre-
sumably would be passed through in their entirety.
A distortion more direct than in natural gas comes from qualifying-
facility ("QF") contracts. These contracts forced utilities to buy very
uneconomic power. Under the peculiar structure of PURPA, states
set the standards under which utilities had to purchase power that
matched the utilities' avoided costs.
5 3
(noting that though Wisconsin has sixth or seventh lowest rates in country, and though co-ops,
municipals, and industrial customers opposed retail competition, Wisconsin PUG expects sav-
ings if generation is opened to competition).
551. See EIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 13, fig. 12. Not only is nuclear power second only to
coal, but what is striking is that the amount of power produced from each of these sources has
increased a lot since 1970. Nuclear power provided only 1.4% of the country's electricity in
1970, compared to 22% in 1991. See id at 12.
552. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
553. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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It is fairly obvious today that "[m] any state PUCs and legislatures
greatly overestimated long-run avoided costs, thus forcing utilities to
buy huge amounts of overpriced power. 554 Some state commissions
overestimated the amount (as well as price) of the power needed.s55
SoCal, one of the countries' largest utilities, claims that QF contracts
will be its largest source of stranded costs, with its above-market QF
payments having a net present value of about $5 billion."" It insists
that "t] hese QF contracts are the direct result of legislative and regu-
latory mandates. ' 57  PG&E believes it will have $5.3 billion in
stranded QF costs.M The EEI estimates the net present value of QF
contracts nationally at $38 billion.5 9 Another recent study projects
the losses at $42 billion, on top of an even greater $53 billion in high-
cost power contracts with other utilities.' ° Not surprisingly, an indus-
try association like the EEI does not feel that its members should
bear these costs. 6 In many states, the level of government involve-
ment in these contracts probably is markedly higher than in the or-
dinary take-or-pay contract."
554. Black & Pierce, supra note 175, at 1347.
555. See EIA REPORT, supra note 15, at 24. The administration of qualifying facilities dis-
torted the amount as well as cost of power. "In some States, the avoided cost pricing formulas
forced utilities to pay for QF capacity that they did not need because the supply and demand
balance for electricity was not considered in avoided cost." Id.
Another problem is that this pricing structure gives potential qualifying-facility producers
every incentive to push this administrative process to produce an unrealistically high avoided
cost, but then removes their incentive to be efficient. "[Tlhe price for wholesale electricity
from QFs, still the vast majority of non-utilities, bears no relationship to the production costs of
the selling company." Id. at 30.
556. See SOCAL COMMENTS, supra note 201, at 6. Of the $3.5 billion that SoCal seeks to pro-
tect as 1998 transition costs, it attributes the largest amount, $1.62 billion, to QF contracts. See
supra note 259. SoCal has claimed that the CPUC's decision "to rush headlong into a program
to support QF energy sources" will, by 2000, "have cost Edison electricity customers at least $14
billion (in nominal terms) in increased rates." See SOCAL RESPONSE TO RULEMAKING NOTICE,
supra note 239, at 8.
557. SOCAL COMMENTS, supra note 201, at 11-3. In its transition cost policy report, SoCal
claims that "California's active role in supporting the development of a QF industry led to the
Commission mandating that utilities sign long-term (20- to 30-year) contracts with QFs.").
SoCal Transition Costs Arising From QF Obligations, SCE-4, Executive Summary at 2 (Oct.
1996).
558. See PG&E COMPETITION TRANSITION CHARGE, supra note 252, at Ex-3.
559. See EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 20.
560. See RDI REPORT, supra note 24, Key Findings. Worse, one of the studies' "key find-
ing[s]" was that "over 60% of the contracts do not expire until after the year 2010." Id.; Media
Release, at 2.
561. See EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 19 (In the Institute's phrasing, these costs arose
because "states often required utilities to purchase power at rates far in excess of actual avoided
costs or when additional generation resources were simply not needed.").
562. But see infra note 578 and accompanying text. Congress made another unusually bad
decision in the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act, which tried to protect what seemed to
be dwindling natural gas resources. The Act for a time forbade utilities from building new gas-
fired power plants. This was an unfortunate interference, coming at a time when many state
commissions were urging nuclear-plant investment. It has turned out that nuclear power is far
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Another large group of costs are "regulatory assets," which can in-
clude everything from storm property losses to deferred fuel charges.
The EEI's figure for these costs is at least $75 billion&5  Although
companies have every incentive to inflate their regulatory-asset ac-
count with ordinary business expenses,- some of these costs are de-
ferred costs whose recovery has been guaranteed by commissions.
Any demand-side management expenses may fall into this category.565
It is not possible to know how far utilities really should be held re-
sponsible for their stranded costs because FERC and the CPUC have
so carefully failed to develop the record needed to make this deter-
mination. But here as elsewhere, it is unwise to take the regulatory
victim argument at full face value. The CPUC, for instance, did push
California's utilities toward qualifying-facility purchases, helping to
make sure that the major companies bought a lot of their power
from QFs.566 These contracts are the largest single source of stranded
costs in California. 67 But the CPUC should have established how far
California utilities opposed, and how far they advocated, or even
championed, their QF contracts. It turns out, for example, that half
of SoCal's QF purchases were made from Mission Energy, a wholly
owned affiliate. 568
DSM costs are a major part of regulatory costs. Though utilities
and away our most expensive power source, even without adding the cost for the still-unsolved
waste disposal and storage problems; gas-fired plants are the cheapest form of generation.
563. See EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23, at 23. For the Institute's listing of the categories that
fit into this group, see id. at 24-25. In its 1997 stranded-cost report, RDI came up with $49 bil-
lion. SeeRDI REPORT, supra note 24, Key Findings.
564. All one need do is look through EE's list of regulatory assets to realize how difficult it
will be to figure out which of these costs truly were "stranded" by regulation. The organization
lists "Extraordinary Property Losses," "Unrecovered Plant and Regulatory Study Costs,"
"Deferred SFAS No. 19 Costs," "DOE Decommissioning Assessment," "Deferred Fuel Costs,"
"Deferred DSM Costs," "Deferred Pension, Other Post Employee Benefits (OPEBs) and Early
Retirement Costs," "Environmental and Storm Damage Costs," "Deferred Contract Buyout
Costs," "Phase-in, Synchronization and Other," "Deferred Losses from Disposition of Utility
Plant," "Research, Development and Demonstration Expenditures," "Unamortized Loss on Re-
acquired Debt," and "Unrecovered Purchase Gas Costs." See id. at 24-25. Readers will quickly
get the strong impression that this is not the end of the list.
565. See id. at 22. The EEI estimates that utilities "have spent an estimated $12 billion in
DSM programs alone from 1985 to 1993." Id.
566. In 1991, SoCal Edison bought 32% of its power from QFs, PG&E 25%. See YELLOW
REPORT, supra note 14, at 80.
567. See SoCAL TRANSITION COST POLICY, supra note 257 (discussing QF stranded costs).
Fully $1.62 billion of SoCal's $3.5 billion in 1998 stranded costs came from QF contracts. See
id.
568. SeeYELLOW REPORT, supra note 14, at 80. This problem of responsibility is not limited
to cases where QF purchases went to the utility's affiliate; cf ROSE, supra note 3, at 57
(suggesting that compensation "limited to the part of the agreement that was beyond the con-
trol of the utility" should not include "those parts that were not mandated by the commissions
and were utility controllable, such as fuel escalation clauses not based on an actual index of
fuel prices or the failure to include termination terms in the contract").
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portray all of these costs as imposed by regulators, Bernard Black and
Richard Pierce have argued that many utilities exploited demand
management programs once they realized that these programs of-
fered a way to inflate their rate base.9 The programs expanded
through an unholy alliance of utility executives, who of course
wanted higher returns, and environmentalists, who were willing to
support the utilities if they saw new incentives for conservation.57
PUCs went along because they could please two powerful constituen-
cies who rarely agreed about anything. It is not at all clear that the
bulk of these costs were prudently incurred, or why they should be
passed on in full to customers.
Agency involvement in utility planning, including approval of new
facilities, does not mean that agencies were pulling reluctant electric
companies into investments they really did not want to make. When
California created a new agency for licensing large plants, for in-
stance, the review "significantly reduced utility plans for new generat-
ing facilities."5 Contrary to the common utility portrayal of the
company as a victim deserving entitlement, the CPUC's involvement
may have prevented even greater stranded costs.
Consider SoCal's attempt to shift blame for its nuclear facilities to
the CPUC in one of its transition cost filings. SoCal stated that it had
"no viable alternative to additional nuclear generation" when it
planned two of its SONGS units.573 Moreover, SoCal complained
about facing a court injunction against expanding certain oil-and-gas
plants, "increasing concern for Los Angeles Basin air quality," and
dwindling gas supplies. 74 Against this background, the CPUC
"approved Edison's application for a Certificate of Public Conven-
ience and Necessity. ' 75 As for SoCal's Palo Verde plant, here the in-
vestment was made "with the knowledge of [the CPUC] and the Cali-
fornia Energy Commission. ' '76 Moreover, there was a "lengthy record
of consultation between Edison and the Commission" on both proj-
ects, and Commission reviews "culminated in the authorization of
SONGS 2 & 3 and Palo Verde.,
577
What record is there that "approval," a "lengthy record of consulta-
tion," investment "with the knowledge" of the CPUC, and authoriza-
569. See Black & Pierce, supra note 175, at 1357.
570. See id. (discussing compromise between utilities and environmental groups).
571. See id.
572. YELLOW REPORT, supra note 14, at 35.
573. See SoCal Transition Costs for Nuclear Generation, SCE-5, at 5 (Oct. 1996).
574. See id.
575. Id.
576. Id. at -6.
577. Id. at 6.
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tion, constituted a promise to insure the risk of these extraordinarily
expensive plants? Where is the showing that SoCal was resisting,
rather than urging, these investments? Who conducted the major
planning and project justifications, SoCal or the CPUC? These are
the kind of questions that an even-handed investigation into cost re-
sponsibility would have to ask and answer.
The imbalance of resources between electric companies on the
one hand, and commissions on the other, makes it unfair to pretend
that it was the agencies that were doing the planning all along, with
the companies only serving to carry out plans imposed by the state.
A proper stranded cost review would look to see whether utilities op-
posed, or instead fought for and urged, the categories of cost that
they now claim were purely regulatory in origin.
In this age of deregulation, it is particularly important for agencies
to make sure that markets function competitively. 57 Just as it is im-
portant to understand where agencies should not interfere, so it is
important to understand the places where they are effective and, in-
deed, where more controls may be needed.
Agencies have to fight for legitimacy by making the fairness of
their orders transparent to the larger society upon which their man-
dates will fall. Agencies squander legitimacy when, like FERC and
the CPUC, they protect utilities from paying any stranded costs in
spite of the companies' leading role in incurring those costs.
578. Similarly to electricity costs, which are not solely the result of regulatory interference,
natural gas losses were not without their regulatory roots. The NRRI, for instance, in an admit-
tedly extreme reading of the history, thinks that the natural gas industry was more, not less,
pressured, and pipeline decisions more, not less, distorted, by regulators. It argues that"[iun
the recent history of the electric industry there have not been any 'berating' of electric utility
management to sign wholesale power contracts." See NRRI COMMENTS, supra note 510, at 6.
The Commission, perhaps puzzled by this reading, gave it a footnote all its own in Order No.
888. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,629 n.570 ("According to NRRI, the Commission
did not 'berate' electric utility management to sign uneconomic contracts in the manner that
NRRI contends the Commission and Congress 'berated' pipeline management.").
Though FERC has not developed a record that permits a fair comparison of the extent that
regulatory pressure distorted decisions in the two industries, and though this factor will vary by
company and with state regulators too, it seems difficult not to begin with a presumption that
electric companies were under more pressure when one considers nuclear plants, PURPA's
qualifying facilities, and the variety of state integrated resource plans and demand management
programs, as well as the environmental and social goals that have been imposed on electric
companies from time to time. The most plausible starting hypothesis is that the electric indus-
try has suffered a greater degree of government involvement in its decisions than pipelines did
in the natural gas business.
The lack of a record showing why current plant costs are inefficient and the role played by
discrimination has deprived the industry and society of the findings needed for a more rational
comparison of these industries' costs.
579. For some ideas on what this kind of regulation may require in the natural gas industry,
seeJohn Burritt McArthur, Antitrust in the New [DeiRegulated Natural Gas Industry, 18ENERGYL.J.
1 (1997).
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C. FERC's and Calformia's One-Sided Mechanisms Suggest
Problems of Capture
The one-sided nature of FERC's and the CPUC's stranded cost
treatment again raises the old regulatory concern with capture. It
has long been a postulate of political science that focused, concen-
trated interests are better equipped to influence their political envi-
ronment than diffuse consumer interests.8 In the regulatory arena,
capture theory predicts that regulated companies will have the re-
sources and ability to dominate their agencies, and that consumer in-
terests will not organize as effectively. This postulate emerged as it
became apparent that the early regulatory state was not controlling
companies as vigorously as expected.58 The theory gained a second
life when it was adopted by economists in the Seventies and Eight-
ies.
From its title, "capture" theory sounds like a theory of bribery, but
the theory is far more sophisticated. Having larger, concentrated in-
terests may of course give regulated companies more resources to pay
bribes, but no one has shown that overt corruption is a major factor
in American administrative performance.8 Instead, on one level,
capture can occur because concentrated interests are better able to
mobilize and present their views to government bodies. 84 It takes
580. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957)
(presenting economic model for competition within political system); WILLIAM NISKANEN,
BUREAUCRACYAND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); seealso infra note 582.
581. See, e.g., EDELMAN, supra note 308, at 24 nn.1-5 (citing five major post-War studies of
administrative behavior that support an "instrumental" theory of agencies "as economic and
political instruments of the parties they regulate and benefit, not of a refined 'society,' 'general
will,' or 'public interest'"). Edelman claims that this instrumental function"has been observed,
demonstrated, and documented by every careful observer of regulatory agencies." Id. at 56.
582. See generally Gary Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influ-
ence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983) (presenting a theory of competition among pressure groups for
political influence); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19J. LAW &
ECON. 211 (1976) (presenting model for theory of regulation derived from a"generalization of
Stigler's model"); Peltzman, supra note 64; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) (analyzing the potential uses of public resources to pro-
vide a "scheme of the demand for regulation" and addressing characteristics of the political
process to provide "elements of a theory of supply of regulation").
583. Cf Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335,
337 (1974) (arguing that evidence showing regulatory problems caused by agency misman-
agement is "weak").
584. See, e.g., Stigler, supra note 582, at 10-13. Stigler takes two conditions, that politics re-
quires simultaneous decisions by large numbers of people and the fact that on any given issue,
many people will be unaffected, and derives a model in which those with strong preferences
and resources will organize to maximize favorable political outcomes. "This does not mean
that every large industry can get what it wants or all that it wants; it does mean that the repre-
sentative and his party must find a coalition of voter interests more durable than the anti-
industry side of every industry policy proposal." Id. at 11. The result is that strongly felt major-
ity and minority views tend to prevail, while weak preferences end up disregarded. See id. at 12
(discussing the channels of decisionmaking in the industry); cf Peltzman, supra note 582, at
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money to lobby Congress, money to mobilize "grass roots" move-
ments, money to write briefs, and money to keep up with agency de-
cisions. A more insidious pressure arises from the frequent interac-
tion between regulated companies and regulators. The resulting ties
make it easier for the companies to persuade the agency of their
views. "5 The fact that the companies are natural sources of employ-
ment for retiring administrators, and the likely source of new com-
missioners, still further raises the odds that administrators will share
the assumptions and perspectives of those they are supposed to po-
lice. 86
The extreme favoritism that Order No. 888 and the CPUC's de-
regulation display to electric companies, at the expense of consumer
interests and the advent of true competition, suggests that both FERC
and the CPUC shared the utilities' perspective on stranded costs. No
one can conclusively demonstrate that the agencies were "captured"
by the outcome of the orders, when all we have are their explana-
tions dressed up in the garb of regulatory prose. 7  General state-
ments about public interest and efficiency are too vague to decide is-
sues like stranded cost recovery (or to reveal an agency's true
motives), but several factors suggest that the interests of electric
companies have controlled the stranded-cost agenda.
240 (modifying and extending Stigler's model by making room for an interaction between
producer and consumer interests, as well as changes in outcome as the gains to consumers
grow). By reducing capture to success in a competition before regulators, the theory perpetu-
ates the innocence with which most of neoclassical economics is permeated. (Regulated com-
panies may dominate their agencies, but it is only because they have better tools to play within
the rules of the game, not because they are corrupting the agencies.)
585. This bias is the natural consequence of what Murray Edelman, talking about interac-
tions among staff members rather than between them and the regulated, calls "value conta-
gion." EDELMAN, supra note 308, at 53. The tendency of people who work together, attend the
same conferences, read the same trade journals, and worry about the same issues to share cer-
tain general assumptions that set them off from society at large is not limited to staff within
agencies. See id. (concluding that the phenomenon of group conformity has been established
in research studies and "is observable in the agencies themselves as well by every employee or
observer sensitive to it").
586. Id.
A certain number of staff members [and Commissioners] of every agency can expect
to end their careers as employees or officers of the firms they are regulating, and the
possibility occurs to every staff member [and Commissioner].... Such an expectation
is of course wholly compatible with the role-taking we are discussing, and inevitably re-
inforces it.
Id.
587. One study has characterized results in which utilities or rate payers pay nothing as a
"winner-take-all" outcome. See BAXTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 57 (identifying and examining
strategies that regulators and utilities may use to address transition costs). Such approaches
occur because, "[left to their own devices, most financial stakeholders will pursue their self-
interests." See id. This "logjam" can be broken with a promise that "no party will bear all costs,
that costs will be allocated across financial stakeholders." See id. Unfortunately, neither de-
regulation discussed here adopted such a remedy.
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First, electric companies brought vastly greater resources to bear
on the commissions than anyone else. Utilities filed the bulk of the
comments before FERC and the CPUC, as one would expect from
the prediction that a "concentrated" interest will intervene with more
weight than a diffuse interest. Some companies filed several hundred
pages of comments, supplements, and requests for rehearing and
clarification, with voluminous expert reports attached. The prize
among those seeking stranded-cost protection almost certainly goes
to EEI, the utilities' primary trade association. EEI purportedly
planned to raise $3 million for lobbying on electricity restructuring
in 1996 and 1997.i Its main brief, which listed eight authors, ran to
105 pages of comments, but that was only the start. Attached was a
51-one-page report by three economists, a second 41-page expert re-
port, and its latest annual report on the industryi5
Of perhaps more importance is the level of detail at which a party
can address regulatory issues. It takes a lot of money to prepare a
well-phrased brief on the many issues and claims that surround elec-
tricity deregulation, to say nothing of the supplemental briefs as new
problems and questions arise. Perhaps the most ostentatious is EEl's
economic report because it was prepared by three of the major fig-
ures in American economics: William Baumol, Paul Joskow, and Al-
fred Kahn.591 Baumol is the father of contestable market theory,
which provides the theoretical underpinning for much of the deregu-
lation in both antitrust and administrative law;592 Joskow has been a
well-known author on electricity for over three decades; 93 and Kahn
588. See CRANDALL& ELLIG, supra note 3, at 63. EEI may have spent even more, although its
lobbying naturally is not limited to stranded cost issues. In 1997, EEI seems to have spent
$5,000,000 on lobbying in just six months. SeeLobbyists Spend $100 Million a Month, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 7, 1998, at A4 (reporting data compiled by Associated Press).
589. See generaUy EEI COMMENTS, supra note 23.
590. See id.
591. See EEI ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36.
592. Each of EEI's economists is so well known that, rather than listing their individual pub-
lications, as is commonly done in expert reports, the Report merely cites the volume of their
work. It credits Baumol with 30 books and 400 articles as well as "a number of professional
awards and honors";Joskow with two books and 80 "articles, notes, and comments"; and Kahn
with several books, "hundreds of articles," and "numerous professional awards and honors."
EEl ECONOMISTS' REPORT, supra note 36. Unspoken is the fact that some of these books and
articles are among the most influential in American economics. Baumol's best work may be his
writings on contestable market theory. See Elizabeth Bailey & William Baumol, Deregulation and
the Theory of Contestable. Markets, 1 YALEJ. REG. 111, 111 (1984) (presenting "basic contestability
theory" and reviewing "major regulatory reform activities"); WILLIAM BAUMOL ET AL., CON-
TESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); William Baumol, Contestbl.
Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industrial Structur4 72 Am. ECON. REvx. 1 (1982). And Alfred
Kahn was one of the primary administrative figures in deregulation when, as President Carter's
Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, he did so much to deregulate the airline industry.
593. See generallyJOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 175.
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is the former market crusader who chaired the Civil Aeronautics
Board and author of The Economics of Regulation.'" EEI made sure
that the Commission would listen by having one of these well-known
economists in its camp. To have all three is a potent display of the
group's clout. No consumer group was able to pay for even one fig-
ure of comparable stature. 5
Second, the domination of the debate by utilities shows up in
FERC's failure (one that beset the CPUC as well) to estimate the
scope of utility errors and discrimination, to penalize such failings in
the recovery mechanism, or to even make findings on the size of
stranded costs. These most obvious factors, which should have pro-
vided a counterweight to arguments over regulatory compacts and
reliance, simply disappeared from the analysis. Yet if FERC and the
CPUC are right to proceed with deregulation, utilities cannot be en-
tirely blame-free for the problem that has befallen their industry.
There never will be a conclusive proof about capture theory. Even
if the theory correctly identifies some factors acting upon agencies,
there is no reason to expect that it identifies all relevant factors and
explains every decision. 6 Moreover, the theory is very hard to apply
because interests change when markets change. It is always possible
to claim that companies that do well under changed circumstances
had the most compact interests before the changes occurred. Even
in a static analysis, there is great temptation to define the party that
prevailed as the one that just must have had the more organized in-
terests. In economists' terms, the "ex post" victors may be rewriting
594. ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1970).
595. The imbalance in the number and quality of the comments is so great that it suggests
several measures that might produce a fairer context for decisions. First,just as it is fair game
for ajury to consider how much an expert was paid to give an opinion, so administrators would
benefit from knowing how much experts were paid for their supposedly independent attach-
ments and reports. Second, to truly balance information, agencies could require utilities to
prepare a budget estimate or cost ceiling for their participation in a given rulemaking proceed-
ing, file this report when a NOPR first is issued, and then make the company provide selected
consumer groups the same budgets. Although utilities would object that they should not have
to fund their opposition, these would be pass-through expenses; in essence, the question is
whether regulatory outcomes would be improved if consuming interests (ratepayers) funded
an organization that represented them directly, at least to the same extent as they fund the
companies whose power needs to be contained.
596. See generally DERTHICK & QUICK, supra note 64 (providing sophisticated argument that
deregulation, including natural gas deregulation, cannot be explained by special interest cap-
ture, agency power maximization, or purely by reformers' ideas, but attributing high portion of
explanatory power to ideas). Derthick and Quirk chart a three-stage evolution of deregulation
from a policy literature about reducing costs, to political advocacy by leaders including Presi-
dents Carter and Ford, and, finally, to "a preferred style of policy choice in the nation's capital,
espoused more or less automatically, even unthinkingly, by a wide range of officeholders and
their critics and used by them as a guide to position taking." See id. at 35. In other words, this
process cannot be understood unless one looks at it as a change in ideology.
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the perceived "ex ante" balance of power. Nonetheless, capture the-
ory does point to an imbalance in the process of decision that may ex-
plain the highly skewed results on stranded costs.117
The postulate of capture serves as a reminder that utility commis-
sions may not be the best bodies to handle deregulation, or at least,
not its stranded-cost aspects. The question of regulatory blame is
central to deregulation because it is the flipside to company mistakes.
It is no accident that electric companies have used the "regulatory
compact" defense to make distortions by regulators the centerpiece
of their claim for government entitlement. This has turned out to be
a deft choice because it has helped push the discussion away from re-
sponsibility for hundreds of billions of dollars in miscalculations. It is
no surprise that commissions have been so squeamish about looking
at the question of blame very closely. The utilities are indeed right
that any fair history of the last few decades of electricity investment
has to focus heavily on ill-advised commissioner interventions.
One can see the problem easily by looking at California. The
CPUC's forceful role has cast it as the champion of the market, a
pioneer of better forms of power supply. The CPUC had found that
California's prices were roughly 50% above the national average.598
Nationally, California's prices are two to three times those in the low-
est-cost service areas.5" Anyone who starts asking how this can be in-
evitably will be drawn into the Commission's past performance, just
as surely as they ought to be drawn to study the past performance of
PG&E, SoCal, and SDG&E. Yet California's restructuring has diverted
attention from the important question of why its electricity is so ex-
pensive in the first place, shifting interest instead to the supposed
benefits of the coming competition. The CPUC has put its mistakes,
and those of the companies it regulates, off limits. It hardly could
have taken a more inconsistent position. On the one hand, the
CPUC has announced that regulation served the state well in the
pasto (in spite of the fact that SoCal, PG&E, and SDG&E have costs
597. One sign that capture theory is not a full explanation is that it does not explain why
FERC has pressed deregulation so aggressively in both the natural gas and electricity industries.
598. SeeCPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 192 (discussing Finding of Fact No.
22).
599. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing how average utility costs vary
across the country).
600. The deregulation order repeated the CPUC's earlier assertion that the old form of
regulation, "cost-of-service regulation[,] has served our regulatory objectives reasonably well in
past years," but that "it is no longer compatible with the changing electric industry and is in
need of reform," implying that the last few decades of regulated service had not really pro-
duced major problems. See CPUC DEREGULATION ORDER, supra note 27, at 82. This myopic
obscurantism is at odds with the predicament of California's power suppliers today, as well as
the Commission's proper dissatisfaction with the high cost of power from existing plants and
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at least 50% over the national average). On the other hand, the
CPUC is forcing these companies to divest many assets and move into
a competitive market because only this supposedly will provide an ac-
ceptable level of performance in the future.0'
Consider the claims that should be raised in a hearing over the
CPUC's role in California's electricity prices. As the Commission
noted, "many" commenters believed
[that] contracts utilities signed with qualifying facilities over the
past decade as part of this Commission's competitive procurement
program are uneconomic; that the costs related to all forms of
regulation in California are higher than in other states; and that
legislative and Commission mandates are more extensive and costly
6,02than those imposed on utilities in other states.
A fair analysis of these claims cannot be made without an intensive
scrutiny of the Commission's past performance. The inquiry should
be much more far-reaching than the kind of questions that arise
when an electric company or pipeline claims commission approval
for a single asset. It would be hard for administrators who had been
part of the old rate process to conduct the inquiry into their own past
practices fairly and openly. Judging from the content of the CPUC's
deregulation, some agencies have found it impossible to devise a fair
mechanism to impose responsibility for the errors and mistakes that
occurred on their watch.
The CPUC made some bad mistakes, but so did its jurisdictional
companies. Unfortunately, the agency has compounded its errors by
devising a system that enables utilities to avoid paying for their share
of the mistakes. As the conflict of interest sketched above suggests,
states will be well-advised to appoint special bodies to decide
stranded costs. The members should have accounting and energy
backgrounds, but not have been decisionmakers over the costs in
dispute. We would not want a board of electric company directors
deciding whether they should recover their own stranded costs. No
more should we want a commission deciding the extent to which its
past conduct is to blame for these costs.
Whatever the cause, one of the functions of FERC's and the
CPUC's stranded-cost decisions is to avoid any inquiry into commis-
sion failures. Unfortunately, the price for that shield seems to be
avoidance of inquiries into failures by electric companies as well.
The desire to avoid such an analysis may explain the imbalance in
supply contracts.
601. See supra notes 207, 267 and accompanying text.
602. CPUC NOPR, supra note 203, at 35 n.30.
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both agencies' orders, which rely on company mistakes in justifying
deregulation but ignore the same conduct when it comes time to de-
cide who will pay the cost of transition.
Just who has controlled an administrative outcome sometimes can
be seen in the terms adopted to frame the debate. The choice of
concepts and slogans is significant. In the battle of symbolic values
that sets the stage for political contests, the choice of labels, and their
ability to clarify or to conceal, can determine the outcome.63 When
one confronts an outcome as one-sided as the stranded-cost decisions
discussed in this Article, one prudent reaction is to pay more atten-
tion to the phrasing of the debate. Did the symbolic dispute match
what was really at stake?
In this regard, the labels "stranded" and "transition" are far more
likely to obscure than clarify. "Stranded" implies costs spawned by a
force beyond anyone's control. Getting "stranded" is what happens
to storm .ictims. 6°4  "Transition" is hardly any better. "Transition
costs" sound like costs necessitated by the shift to deregulation-by
the process of changing, by the cure and not the disease. 6" Both
terms obscure the fact that these costs are the costs of electric com-
pany investments that have failed in the marketplace. Whatever else
they are, stranded costs also are "investment failures," "economic
603. As DouglasJones of the NRRI said when he was looking into the origins of the idea of
the "social contract" in regulation, "proponents and opponents of any idea, of course, can
choose their terms of characterization, [but] clarity of thought about the matter is generally
aided if those terms carry with them neither a halo nor excess baggage." SeeJONES, supra note
378, at 12. Years before "stranded costs" had become electricity's buzzword, Jones observed
that the slogan "stranded plant" can prevent the possibility of "objective discussion." See id. at
13 (describing the relevance of selecting terms and the accompanying connotation that at-
taches to slogans during policy debate). "[Words matter, and public policymaking is best
done with as neutral a description of an issue as possible." See id. Fairness in terminology has
been unfortunately lacking in the "stranded cost," "transition cost" debates. Seegenerally Murray
Edelman, The Creation of Political Beliefs Through Categorization, (INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON
POVrERTY, Disc. Paper No. 258-75 (1975)) (arguing that "linguistic categorizations influence
public opinion and perception during the policy making process").
604. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "stranded" as something that "has
been driven or washed ashore; that has run or been left aground," as well as something
"[a]bandoned in an isolated or inaccessible position... esp. by the withdrawal or failure of a
means of access or transport." THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3083 (1993).
While the term is not automatically wrong for electricity-it can incorporate stranding by the
%ictim's own mistake-there is an unmistakable feeling of outside forces, like a storm or rough
sea or failure of expected suppliers, causing the victim's predicament.
This terminological problem illustrates the distortion that has dogged this debate, for what-
ever reason, and shifted its concerns from the true causes of uneconomic costs. It is a bit of an
understatement to say that terms like stranded cost "are not in the lexicon of any other sector
of the American economy." IPALCO ENTERPRISES, supra note 280, at 15.
605. The first definition of "transition" is an "action or process of passing or passage from
one condition, action, or... place to another." THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DIC
TIONARY, supra note 604, at 3370. Convert this noun into an adjective, and you have a cost that
came about because of the transition process, rather than the underlying inefficiency that ne-
cessitated the transition.
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miscalculations," "white elephants," "Edsels," and any other term that
connotes managerial error. The requests for relief by large compa-
nies and their wealthy shareholders are requests for "subsidies,"
"entitlements," "welfare," and a "regressive tax" by some of the coun-
tries' wealthiest corporate and individual citizens.
The choice of obscuring language may be fitting, because it so
matches the administrative failure to address the ways that electric
companies are responsible for their poor performance, but it is a
poor choice of words for those who care about the real interests in
dispute.
FERC's and California's failure to develop and explain a proper
basis for stranded-cost recovery sheds a new, harsh light on the natu-
ral gas restructuring orders. One thing that has become clear about
those orders is the inadequacy of FERC's explanation for Order No.
500's equitable sharing formula. Though the Commission found
that "no one segment of the natural gas industry or particular cir-
cumstance appears wholly responsible" and that "all segments should
shoulder some of the burden of resolving the problem,"6 the Com-
mission never identified the responsibility of any of the parties. It
failed to isolate the share of uneconomic gas costs that should be
traced to pipelines. 67 It did not even discuss how to determine that
responsibility. Nor did the Commission discuss the extent to which
the regulatory fabric should be blamed and how the Commission
would weigh that against pipeline errors.6O8
The allocation of responsibility that actually developed as pipelines
applied Order No. 500 was just as unreasoned. Though producers
may be least responsible for pipeline errors," producers bore the
brunt of stranded gas costs. Yet because FERC had pushed take-or-
pay contracts aside as private contract disputes,60 the Commission es-
caped explaining why producers should have absorbed over four-
fifths (or any) of the settlement costs. Moreover, the undeveloped
reasoning in Order No. 500 extends to the remaining liabilities div-
606. Order No. 500,52 Fed. Reg. at 30,337.
607. See id. at 30,336-39.
608. See generally id. at 30,334.
609. Many producers relied heavily on pipeline commitments in their drilling programs.
Take-or-pay contracts were a mechanism for "pipelines and their customers to compensate the
producer in part for the risks the producer incurs in making substantial investments in order to
meet the supply needs of these pipelines and their customers." Order No. 528-A, 54 Fed. Reg.
at 52,334, 52,349; see also American Gas Ass'n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1496, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(discussing and deferring to Commission's view of these contracts as giving producers "some
minimum level of revenue to cover operating expenses and debt").
610. See American Gas Ass'n, 912 F.2d at 1504-08 (discussing reasons FERC properly rejected
demands that it intervene in take-or-pay contract disputes).
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vied up between pipelines and their customers. FERC designed the
allocation of residual responsibility to make pipelines bear 25% to
50% of these remaining take-or-pay costs. 61' The burden seems to
have ended up with pipelines absorbing just under 40% of these
costs, their customers 40% under a fixed charge, and the rest being
612at risk in a volumetric rate. These percentages lack any obvious
link to decisions pipelines made or failed to make.
It hardly bears adding that if Order No. 500, the only order with
express recovery language, is poorly elaborated, the combination of
Order Nos. 380 and 436 (and Order No. 636 with its departure from
Order No. 500) is no better. The Commission did not explain why
pipelines should pay only some take-or-pay transition costs, rather
than all other losses from voided minimum bills and forced open ac-
cess. Nor has it yet come up with a sensible explanation for why Or-
der No. 636's transition costs should get the opposite treatment from
Order No. 500's.
In short, the gas restructuring orders lack the factual and theoreti-
cal basis for anyone, be it a reviewing court, parties in the industry, or
the Commission in 1996, to fix the precise responsibility for stranded
costs in electricity. This does not mean that Order 500 was wrong.
The solution may have worked, and it certainly was fair in making
pipelines bear a lot of their losses. The acknowledgment that pipe-
lines should bear significant costs tracks the critical understanding of
deregulation that pipelines were making inefficient decisions.
It does not make much difference what the Commission says if one
believes that administrative agencies only serve as masks to disguise
and legitimate the division of spoils among interest groups. For
those who believe that agencies serve to "create and sustain an im-
pression that induces acquiescence of the public in the face of private
tactics that might otherwise be expected to produce resentment, pro-
test, and resistance, '61 3 the lack of foundation for allocating costs in
natural gas deregulation is no surprise. This is business as usual. Yet
interest group politics are hard to square with a lot of administrative
behavior, including the eagerness with which agencies like FERC
have embraced deregulation and reduced their own power and juris-
diction. For those who believe that principles do matter, and that
statutory purposes should make some outcomes off-limits and guide
611. See Order No. 500,52 Fed. Reg. at 30,343.
612. See, e.g., NRRI COMMENTS, supra note 510, at 9 (using Order No. 500-H numbers to
show that pipeline customers bore 60.7% of unsettled take-or-pay costs, while pipelines ab-
sorbed just under 40%). When this is added to the uncompensated losses from Order Nos. 380
and 436, pipelines clearly bore a great share of the restructuring.
613. EDELMAN, supra note 308, at 56.
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choices in other areas, the lack of a clear theory guiding stranded
natural gas costs is a conspicuous failure.
All it takes to see the cost of the Commission's natural-gas failure is
to look at electricity. Had FERC used its Order Nos. 380-636 se-
quence to analyze what really went wrong and developed the princi-
ples upon which the Commission allocated the resulting burden, all
parties in the electricity industry would know where to begin dealing
with that industry's stranded costs. Instead, the Commission's com-
pliant shift to a new set of principles (reliance, financial integrity and
cost causation) in electricity, like choosing a new dish in the cafeteria
line, underscores its failure to define an appropriate set of guidelines
in the first major energy deregulation.
D. Enforcing Cost Responsibility
Left for last is the future. Order No. 888 and California's deregu-
lation have progressed through years of hearings and debate and are
not going to be changed. Their failure to ground stranded-cost re-
covery on cost responsibility, the principle that FERC defined as the
proper principle in natural gas deregulation, is not going to be re-
versed. But there is a great deal of room for courts and other states,
as well as the Commission and the CPUC, to improve matters.
Reviewing courts will have to decide whether the Commission has
found an adequate reason for deviating from its natural-gas prece-
dent. Another way to phrase the problem is whether a rate mecha-
nism that ignores cost responsibility but is part of a rule designed to
remedy great cost overruns can produce 'Just and reasonable" rates.
Ironically, because the Federal Power Act's mandates are so broad, as
are FERC's for natural gas, this issue may end up being defined by
the latitude left to agencies to reach conflicting results that still fall
within their discretion.
FERC's failure to address how it arrived at its various remedies in
natural gas is regrettable when seen in light of the questions now
open in electricity. Though FERC did not explain why utility respon-
sibility was the principle guiding natural-gas cost recovery, it made
clear that the 100% recovery in Order No. 888 is contrary to the
heavy burdens the Commission imposed on natural gas pipelines. 14
614. See Hollis & Ralls, supra note 2, at 16:
Arguably, the Commission is making the same mistake now [as in ignoring take-or-pay
costs in natural gas], but in the opposite direction. Instead of burdening utilities
alone with the full costs of restructuring the industry, it is burdening consumers with
these full costs. Second, in the natural gas context, as upheld in AGA, the Commis-
sion itself was vigilant in ensuring that pipelines did not attempt to insulate themselves
from competitive forces by imposing fees or charges on exiting customers that would
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At least on the surface, the effect of full electricity pass-through
would seem to be just as anticompetitive, just as necessary to avoid,
and just as much of a blockage of the goals of deregulation in the
electric industry as it would have been in natural gas.
As FERC is not going to rewrite Order No. 888, it can at least hold
utilities to the burden of proving true prudence for those stranded
costs that have not yet been "recovered," and make sure that its miti-
gation standard is more than just words. In addition, it can interpret
the reasonable-expectations test restrictively by taking seriously the
cost justification for deregulation. Many of the largest electric plants
were built as if utilities were free to make the largest possible invest-
ments without any need to hedge, limit, share, or otherwise cushion
the risk that their massive investments might rest on the wrong tech-
nology. The long term needed to pay out these costs itself increased
the risk that unexpected changes in technology would push custom-
ers to bypass the chosen technology. Such an increase in market-
driven economic change should reduce reliance under any test of
reasonable expectations.
Mitigation is another area where FERC and the CPUC can impose
some discipline. Mitigation should include efforts to lower costs at
uneconomic plants, careful analysis concerning which plants should
be closed rather than operated, and efforts to renegotiate overpriced
power supply contracts. But none of these steps, welcome though
they would be, can erase FERC's failure to apply the right principle
to stranded costs in the first place.
The CPUC can exercise its oversight to make sure that the state's
utilities auction plants to get the best price, sell assets that can be bet-
ter operated by third parties, and shut down plants whose power costs
more than the marginal cost of generating. Here too, however, there
is no way to fully avoid the errors that are built into the recovery as-
surances of the existing mechanism.
Given their solicitude to utilities in crafting a stranded-cost remedy,
there is not much hope that FERC or the CPUC will recover the val-
ues in administration that they discarded during drafting. Should
Congress pass a retail bill, it should exercise great care to avoid re-
peating the Commission's mistake. If retail stranded costs are to be
recovered, such recovery should extend only to the degree that these
costs result from true regulatory compulsion and not from manage-
ment mistakes. The states should be equally careful to reject the
have the effect of guaranteeing pipeline revenues. Ironically, the method for the re-
covery of stranded costs in the electric industry is precisely the approach condemned
by the Commission for natural gas pipelines.
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oversimplification of full recovery. They should base their rules on
the responsibility that markets demand, even if amended for regula-
tory factors by allowing costs truly ordered by commissions to be re-
covered. Only in this way will the stranded-cost aspects of deregula-
tion match the hopes and goals that have produced the movement.
